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Does authoritarian regime provide social protection to its people? What is the purpose of 
social welfare provision in an authoritarian regime? How is social welfare policy designed and 
enforced in the authoritarian and multilevel governance setting? Who gets what, when and how 
from the social welfare provision in an authoritarian regime? My dissertation investigates these 
questions through a detailed study of Chinese social health insurance from 1998 to 2010. I argue 
and empirically show that the Chinese social health insurance system is characterized by a 
nationwide stratification pattern as well as systematic regional differences in generosity and 
coverage of welfare benefits. I argue that the distribution of Chinese social welfare benefits is a 
strategic choice of the central leadership who intends to maintain particularly privileged 
provisions for the elites whom are considered important for social stability while pursuing broad 
and modest social welfare provisions for the masses. Provisions of the welfare benefits are put in 
practice, however, through an interaction between the central leaders who care most about 
regime stability and the local leaders who confront distinct constraints in local circumstances 
such as fiscal stringency and social risk. The dynamics of central-local interactions stands at the 
core of the politics of social welfare provision, and helps explain the remarkable subnational 
variation in social welfare under China’s authoritarian yet decentralized system.  
This dissertation attempts to contribute to the studies of authoritarianism, decentralization 
and social welfare in the following aspects. First, in specifying the rationale, conditions and 
policy results of the interaction between Chinese central and local leaders in social welfare 
 
 
provision, the dissertation sheds light on how political leaders in an authoritarian regime with 
multilevel governance structure respond to social needs. The analysis of subnational politicians’ 
incentive structure and policy choices in social welfare provision, which are missing in most 
extant studies of authoritarianism and social welfare, demonstrates an “indirect accountability” 
built into the Chinese social welfare provision. This “indirect accountability”, evidenced by local 
leaders’ proactive accommodation of social and local needs through social policies, may partially 
account for the puzzling resilience and flexibility of Chinese authoritarian regime. Second, the 
dissertation demonstrates that social welfare expansion, in some cases, is not a result of 
democracy but of resilient authoritarianism. Social welfare is one tool employed by authoritarian 
leaders to maintain regime stability. The political motivation for social welfare provision is 
different in non-democracies—it is more directly from top-down pressure of maintaining order 
rather than from bottom-up demands as in democracies—but this does not mean that non-
democracies provide less social welfare than democracies do. Furthermore, the dissertation 
highlights the multidimensionality of social welfare policy and the trade-offs that politicians face 
in distributing welfare benefits. It suggests that politicians, no matter in democracies or non-
democracies, face similar policy trade-offs (e.g. coverage versus generosity) in social welfare 
provision and that they make policy choices on the different dimensions of social welfare –
coverage, generosity and stratification– according to the specific institutional and socioeconomic 
constraints they encounter. It is the combination of these different choices that constitute the 
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1 Social Health Insurance in Contemporary China: An Overview 
 
Does authoritarian regime provide social protection to its people? What is the purpose of 
social welfare provision in an authoritarian regime? How is social welfare policy designed and 
enforced in the authoritarian and multilevel governance setting? Who gets what, when and how 
from the authoritarian social welfare provision? My dissertation investigates these questions 
through a detailed study of Chinese social health insurance.  
In 2009, sixty years after the People’s Republic of China was founded, Chinese leaders 
announced a plan to provide “safe, effective, convenient, and affordable” health care services to 
every citizen in China. Throughout much of China’s history, healthcare was seen as an individual 
responsibility rather than a social right, and despite remarkable economic progress over the past 
thirty years, its fragile healthcare system received little attention until the 2003 SARS epidemic 
that caused 349 deaths in mainland China. That episode, however, catalyzed a shift in 
perspective regarding healthcare, one of the most important components of social welfare. The 
Chinese leadership realized the inadequacies of the country’s public health protection system and 
the importance of balancing economic growth and social services. Behind the government’s 
resolution to tackle healthcare provision shortage lay three critical challenges: an aging society, 
stagnation in domestic consumption, and political instability.  
China is aging at an unprecedented pace. Because fewer children are born and the larger 
generations of adults are getting older, its median age will rise to 49 by 2050 (Economists, April 
21, 2012). By then, the proportion of people in China aged 60 or over is projected to surpass 30 
percent. Aging will reduce the young workforce upon which the Chinese economy has relied 
since its economic reform and openness in the late 1970s; meanwhile, the anxiety of aging will 




to worry about expensive medical bills after retirement, they are less likely to spend money on 
other things. Instead, they are likely to save more. In fact, between the mid-1990s and 2006, out-
of-pocket payments by patients constituted more than 50 percent of total health care spending in 
China, making medical expenses one of the consumption items that most worry ordinary Chinese 
(Huang 2011). Since the 2008 global financial crisis, domestic consumption has been a 
centerpiece of China’s economic plan. Since then government officials have aimed to shift 
China’s economy away from its current dependence on exports and investment, and toward a 
more sustainable reliance on domestic consumption.  Establishing a decent social safety net, 
including a social insurance system, is one means of bolstering domestic consumption, insofar as 
the government can reduce disincentives to household consumption.  
Finally, as every citizen is a stakeholder of healthcare, fixing the healthcare system is an 
important tool for maintaining political stability in China. Unlike the pension system, in which a 
long time lag exists between contribution and consumption, healthcare policy is more likely to 
bring instant and tangible impacts to people’s daily lives. Conversely, however, an ineffective 
healthcare system has been fueling social agitation in China. More than 73 percent of China’s 
hospitals reported violent conflicts between patients and healthcare workers in 2005. In 2010, 
17,000 physical attacks by patients against doctors and healthcare workers were recorded. As a 
result, Shenyang, the capital city of Liaoning Province in northeastern China, sought to hire 
police officers to handle conflicts between patients and healthcare providers at the city’s 23 
major hospitals (Huang 2011). Ironically, the Chinese government’s neglect of healthcare in the 
1990s also contributed directly to the rise of Falun Gong, the very movement that the 
government has sought to repress. Since health care was inaccessible or too expensive for many 




stem from its traditional Chinese exercises. By 1998, there were as many as 70 million Falun 
Gong members in China (Huang 2011), and the regime fomented turmoil at home and long-
lasting protests abroad by cracking down on Falun Gong in 1999.  
Given the imperative of healthcare reform in China, contributory social health insurance—
the dominant method of social protection in China—has undergone dramatic expansion over the 
past decade. In 1998, the State Council established a social health insurance program for urban 
employees, the so-called Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI, chengzhen zhigong 
jiben yiliao baoxian). Starting in 2003, a New Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance (NRCMI, 
xin  nongcun hezuo yiliao baoxian) program was initiated, which rapidly expanded services into 
rural China. In 2007, another health insurance program, the Urban Resident Basic Medical 
Insurance (URBMI, chengzhen jumin jiben yiliao baoxian), was introduced into urban areas to 
incorporate the urban non-working population into the social insurance system. By 2010, 237.35 
million employees (including retirees) were enrolled in UEBMIC and 195.28 million urban 
residents (including college students, children, and the elderly without pensions) were 
beneficiaries of URBMI. Meanwhile, 832 million rural people have received coverage under the 
NRCMI. In 2004, when social health insurance expansion just began, only 34.4% of the Chinese 
population was covered by social health insurance. In 2010, after the social health insurance 
expansion was fully implemented, coverage reached 90.62%. The present expenditure for urban 
social health insurance, furthermore, is 353.81 billion RMB, more than four times the 2004 level 
of spending.  
Accompanying the expansion of Chinese social health insurance coverage, however, has 
been the increasing stratification of healthcare benefits across social groups. In 2010, the 




and NRCMI programs, meaning that the smallest group of social health insurance 
beneficiaries—urban employees—enjoys an overwhelming share of the social health insurance 
benefits in China. A report by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Insurance (MoHRSS 
2011) demonstrates that the UEBMI’s in-patient reimbursement rate is notably higher than the 
URBMI’s: the provincial average of in-patient reimbursement rates is 67.68% for UEBMI 
beneficiaries (mainly urban state-sector employees) and only 55.32 % for URBMI beneficiaries 
(mainly urban non-working people including the elderly, children and students). A similar 
pattern can be found for out-patient reimbursement. The provincial average of out-patient 
reimbursement for UEBMI beneficiaries is 98.23 Yuan per patient, 1/3 higher than for URBMI 
beneficiaries. The level of benefits in the NRCMI program for rural residents, meanwhile, is 
even lower than the benefits offered through the URBMI program. Regional disparities in 
healthcare benefits, furthermore, are substantial. For example, the per capita expenditure for 
urban social health insurance in Beijing stands at 1,852 yuan/person (averaged from 2007 
through 2010), more than four times the per capita expenditure in Jiangxi province. 
The above figures highlight a paradox: the impressive expansion of social health insurance 
enrollment and the increased number of social health insurance programs have not reduced, but 
rather have reproduced, socioeconomic inequalities in China. Instead of leveling the social 
playing field, the changes in social health insurance continue to link welfare benefits to citizens’ 
socioeconomic status and residency. My dissertation addresses this paradox by analyzing the 
political agents and the political economic mechanisms responsible for the patterns of social 
health insurance provision in China.  My research finds that the Chinese social health insurance 
system is characterized by a nationwide pattern in terms of stratification but distinct yet 




distribution of Chinese social welfare benefits is a strategic choice of the central leadership who 
intends to maintain particularly privileged provisions for the elites whom are considered 
important for social stability while pursuing broad and modest social welfare provisions for the 
masses. Provisions of the welfare benefits are put in practice, however, through an interaction 
between the central leaders who care most about regime stability and the local leaders who 
confront distinct constraints in local circumstances such as fiscal stringency and social risk. The 
dynamics of central-local interactions stands at the core of the politics of social welfare provision, 
and helps explain the remarkable subnational variation in social welfare under China’s 
authoritarian yet decentralized system. 
This dissertation attempts to contribute to the studies of authoritarianism, decentralization 
and social welfare in the following aspects. First, in specifying the rationale, conditions and 
policy results of the interaction between Chinese central and local leaders in social welfare 
provision, the dissertation sheds light on how political leaders in an authoritarian regime with 
multilevel governance structure respond to social needs. The subnational politicians’ incentive 
structure and policy choices in social welfare provision are missing in most extant studies of 
authoritarianism and social welfare. This study suggests an “indirect accountability” built into 
the Chinese social welfare provision, evidenced by local leaders’ proactive accommodation of 
social and local needs through social policies. This may partially account for the puzzling 
resilience and flexibility of Chinese authoritarian regime. Second, the dissertation demonstrates 
that social welfare expansion, in some cases, is not a result of democracy but of resilient 
authoritarianism. Social welfare is one tool employed by authoritarian leaders to maintain regime 
stability. The political motivation for social welfare provision is different in non-democracies—it 




demands as in democracies—but this does not mean that social welfare provision is minimum in 
non-democracies. Furthermore, the dissertation highlights the multidimensionality of social 
welfare policy and the trade-offs that politicians face in distributing welfare benefits. It suggests 
that politicians, no matter in democracies or non-democracies, face similar policy trade-offs (e.g. 
coverage versus generosity) in social welfare provision and that they make policy choices on the 
different dimensions of social welfare –coverage, generosity and stratification– according to the 
specific institutional and socioeconomic constraints they encounter. It is the combination of these 
different choices that constitute the variation of social welfare provision observed cross countries 
and within countries.     
1.1     Building Blocks of the Arguments  
Multidimensionality of Social Health Insurance Policy  
Most existing studies of the welfare state focus on one single dimension of social welfare, 
usually spending—either per capita spending or the ratio of social spending to GDP. The narrow 
focus on spending captures only one part of social welfare variation cross geographic units, 
however. Esping-Andersen (1990) points out that the key to understanding variation in welfare 
provision is not simply how much money a state spends, but what the programs that states 
initiate actually do. Recent literature on welfare state reform emphasizes the importance of 
multidimensionality of reform politics (Levy 1999, Pierson 2001, Hausermann 2010). Pierson 
(2001) argues that a close look at recent reform challenges indicates at least three different goals 
that post-industrial continental governments pursue: 1) cost containment, which encompasses all 
attempts to make the industrial welfare state more fiscally viable, 2) re-commodification, 
meaning policies that aim to bring women, early retirees and the unemployed back into paid 




to new organizational technologies and new social needs and demands. Pierson suggests that the 
combination of these reform goals have implications for the “new politics” of social welfare 
reform.   
The multidimensional conceptualization of social welfare reform is useful for identifying the 
ongoing dynamics of healthcare reform in China. Building on the recent literature on welfare 
state reform, my dissertation thus develops a multidimensional conceptualization of social health 
insurance policies. I propose that the distribution of social health insurance benefits entails at 
least three different dimensions: generosity, coverage and stratification. Generosity, similar to 
the concept of spending commonly used in existing social welfare studies, captures the average 
level of benefits or spending per individual. Coverage, in terms of the proportion of people 
insured in the total population, represents the spread of health insurance benefits among 
individuals. While both generosity and coverage pertain to the distribution of social health 
insurance benefits among the general public, stratification describes the distribution across 
specific social groups within the general public. These three dimensions may be correlated under 
specific conditions. For example, when the amount of resources available for allocation is fixed, 
broader coverage might lead to lower generosity and vice versa. For another example, low 
coverage combined with high generosity indicates high stratification of social welfare. Moreover, 
these different dimensions have distinct distributive implications and may lead to different 
distributive outcomes. For instance, a high level of stratification of social welfare implies 
inequalities while broad coverage implies universalism.  
As most scholars tend to pay more attention to the generosity (i.e. spending) dimension of 
social welfare, the stratification and coverage dimensions of social welfare remain understudied. 




important elements that characterize the Chinese social insurance system.  According to Esping-
Andersen (1990:23), “social welfare is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly 
corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active 
force in the ordering of social relations.” In empirical terms, my research finds that the Chinese 
social health insurance program has reflected and reinforced multiple inequalities or cleavages in 
society since its inception in the 1990s. First, like other large-population states with diverse 
regional economies, China faces built-in regional disparities in social welfare provision by virtue 
of its size and geographical expanse. The regional disparities in social provision, furthermore, 
have persisted and even worsened in the post-Mao or reform era due to fiscal and administration 
decentralization. Second, since the Maoist era, rural and urban China have operated under quite 
distinct systems, with urban residents consistently privileged over rural ones in terms of social 
provision. Third, even within urban China, those with employment enjoy various types of social 
welfare benefits not available to those outside of the labor market due to skill shortages, disease, 
disability, or age. Fourth, the Chinese social health insurance system provides much better 
benefits to those in government employment or working in state sectors compared to those 
working in other sectors of the economy, especially the informal sector that is home to an 
increasing number of migrant workers. Therefore, one of the major challenges of ongoing 
healthcare reform in China has been to transform the highly stratified healthcare provisions into a 
more coherent and equitable whole by integrating various health insurance programs at a higher 
level of administration.  
Coverage addresses one of the traditional functions of social health insurance, risk sharing. 
Since social health insurance can be viewed as a mechanism to pool and share health risks across 




risk. However, changes in both demography and the labor market have brought a new set of risks 
to the Chinese social health insurance system. First, the labor surplus gradually fades away and a 
labor shortage emerges, especially in the coastal regions, as fertility rates decline and the 
population ages. Over the past 30 years, China's total fertility rate—the number of children a 
woman can expect to have during her lifetime—has fallen from 2.6, well above the rate needed 
to hold a population steady, to 1.56, well below that rate (Economists, Apr 21, 2012). As a result, 
it is predicted that between 2010 and 2050 China's workforce will shrink as a share of the 
population by 11 percentage points, from 72% to 61%—a huge contraction. A relatively smaller 
workforce combined with a larger population of elderly residents worsens the system-wide risk 
profile and thus imposes new stress on the social insurance system. Moreover, China is 
undergoing the largest wave of urbanization in human history. In 2011, the urbanization rate 
reached 51.3% in China, the first time in Chinese history that the urban population has exceeded 
the rural one. The new Chinese administration that took power in March 2013 has been resorting 
to urbanization to fuel China’s economic growth in the upcoming decade, but continued rural-to-
urban migration will only exert more pressure on social welfare provision. My research shows 
that Chinese localities endowed with different risk profiles due to labor market shifts and 
demographic conditions make different policy choices regarding social health insurance 
coverage.  
To summarize, a multidimensional conceptualization of social health insurance policy 
facilitates better understanding of the complexity of policy variations. Politicians have different 
preferences and choices on the three dimensions of social health insurance policy -stratification, 
generosity and coverage, based on their incentives and interests under specific institutional and 




and socioeconomic conditions determine Chinese politicians’ policy preferences and choices on 
these three policy dimensions of social welfare. As China is an authoritarian regime, one should 
first understand the regime’s motivation and strategy for providing social welfare in a general 
sense, before addressing the specific institutions and political economic mechanisms governing 
social welfare provision in China.    
Social Welfare Provision in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Authoritarian leaders are fundamentally interested in their survival in power (Tullock 1987; 
Wintrobe 1998; Haber 2007). To minimize potential threats to regime stability, they must 
manage relations on two fronts: with elites and with the masses (Svolik 2012). As the threats to 
their stability can be from either front, choosing to distribute rents and goods only to the elites or 
only to the masses is not an optimal strategy from the authoritarian leaders’ perspective (Bueno 
de Mesquita & Smith 2009; Kricheli & Livne 2009). Authoritarian leaders thus have to 
calculatedly distribute resources between the masses and the elites. While the extant literature 
typically emphasizes the role of formal institutions such as elections, legislature, and political 
parties in authoritarian survival and adaptability (Magaloni 2008; Cox 2008; Gandhi & 
Przeworkski 2006), my study considers another important mechanism that political leaders in 
authoritarian regimes utilize to prevent threats to regime stability: social welfare policy. Social 
policies such as pensions, health care and housing allowances are not necessarily regressive in 
terms of benefit distribution because the distributive outcomes are contingent on the financing 
mechanisms and specific policy designs on coverage, generosity and stratification. It has been 
argued that the specific profile of social policy that autocracies pursue is premised on their 
political strategy for survival. Based on the different political survival strategies articulated in 




and purges to survive politically, one should see little or no social policy legislation in the regime. 
Conversely, if the authoritarian relies on organizational co-optation of a small group of critical 
supporters, they will enact “restrictive” social policies characterized by narrow coverage and 
generous benefits. If the autocrat is brought to power by a broad coalition of interests and 
chooses a strategy based on organizational proliferation, social policy will be characterized by 
high levels of institutional fragmentation on the one hand, and broader coverage on the other. In 
a similar vein, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) evaluate strategies of political incorporation or 
exclusion of working-class and peasant organizations in the first half of the twentieth century to 
account for differences in social welfare policies cross East Asian, Eastern European and Latin 
American countries.  
Although the extant literature has identified the correlation between authoritarian regimes’ 
political strategies and their social policy choices, it does not characterize and resolve the 
dilemma that authoritarian leaders face to efficiently balance the benefits between elites and the 
masses so as to maximize their survival prospects (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). When 
authoritarian leaders concentrate too many benefits on elites, they become vulnerable not only to 
threats from within the empowered elites but also to unrest from discontented masses. Yet when 
authoritarian leaders reduce the privileges of elites and empower the masses through 
universalizing benefits, they risk betraying the very elites on whom they rely to ensure political 
survival. My research demonstrates that Chinese authoritarian leaders also face a trade-off 
between control and accommodation of social needs in social welfare provision. On one hand, 
the top leadership attempts to control “who gets what,” distributing more benefits to the social 




to accommodate many other social groups to some extent, avoiding too much gap between the 
“haves” and “have-nots.”  
I argue that a strategy of authoritarian social welfare is that the authoritarian leaders maintain 
particularly privileged welfare provisions for the elites while preserving an essentially modest 
social provision for the masses. I call it “divide and rule” strategy in authoritarian social welfare. 
It serves the authoritarian leaders’ interests in maintaining regime stability by consolidating 
divisions among social groups to prevent alliances that could challenge the regime and 
privileging the politically influential or important groups over others to reward their loyalties to 
the regime. Such strategy for social welfare provision is manifest specifically on the three 
dimensions of social health insurance: 1) on stratification: a hierarchy in health insurance system 
is promoted, in which entitlements or benefits are linked to people’s sociopolitical status such as 
employment sector, administrative rank, residency or household registration status; 2) on 
coverage and generosity: under the condition of stratification, social health insurance is 
expanded to incorporate many other social groups and to raise the level of benefits.  
For the above strategy to work or be implemented, it is imperative that the authoritarian 
leaders establish institutions to effectively enforce social welfare provision at the multiple levels 
of governments. I specifically examine the institution setting of the interaction between the 
central state and the local state agents in Chinese social welfare provision, and its results and 
implications on social welfare policies.  
Multilevel Governance and Social Welfare Provision in China 
 
Unlike Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which had unitary systems based on 
functional or specialization principles (the “U-form” structure), the Chinese state organization 




(the “M-form” structure). Under the “M-form” state structure, interdependence between regions 
is not as strong as it is under the U-form organization, because each region is relatively “self-
contained” (Qian and Xu, 1993). The M-form state structure has undergone further 
decentralization along regional lines during reform, adding both increased authority and 
incentives for regional governments in China. Some scholars, in fact, attribute China’s high 
economic growth in recent decades to the increased incentives and rights to revenue from local 
economic activities that local governments enjoy under the de facto “fiscal federalism” 
(Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995; Oi 1999). The fiscal and administrative decentralization in 
China provide the institutional basis for power-sharing and interaction between Chinese central 
leadership and local political leaders in social welfare provision. On the one hand, 
decentralization assigned more public spending responsibilities to local state agents; on the other 
hand, it clearly defined the localities’ share of tax revenues and granted them the property rights 
to fiscal surplus. It is now estimated that nearly 70 percent of total public expenditure in China 
takes place at sub-national levels, as compared to 32% in OECD countries (World Bank, 2002). 
Since local governments usually fund the operations of local social welfare agencies (e.g. the 
bureau of social security, the bureau of public health, and hospitals) with budgeting, staff, office 
space and other resources, policy making and implementation regarding social welfare 
provisions are largely influenced by the interests and priorities of local governments. Frazier 
(2010) contends that the desire of local governments to accumulate social security funds explains 
the rapid establishment of a local-based pension system in China.  
A question then arises: when the central leadership shares or delegate powers of resource 
allocation with local leaders through decentralization, how might they ensure that local leaders 




the Center) successfully involves local leaders into social welfare provision through fiscal and 
administrative decentralization, what institutions can the top leadership rely on to monitor and 
control local leaders’ use of power? In the case of China, the key lies in political centralization—
extensive and centralized personnel control. Without competitive elections, Chinese local leaders 
owe their political careers to the party committee at the next higher level of governance rather 
than to the general public in their jurisdiction. The “cadre responsibility system”, through which 
the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth, CCP) top leadership controls subordinate agents’ 
incentives and performance, was introduced from the provincial level down in the mid-1980s and 
governs job assignments, performance appraisals, and remuneration (O’Brien and Li 1999). 
Through a variety of policy targets listed in cadre evaluations, upper-level leaders convey 
information to local cadres regarding which policies should receive priority (Whiting 2004). 
Performance targets are internally ranked in importance, including soft targets, hard targets and 
priority targets with veto power. Failure to fulfill priority policies with veto power would cancel 
out all other work performance, however successful, in the comprehensive evaluation at the end 
of the year. Thus, completion of priority targets constitutes the basis for personnel decisions 
(Edin 2003). Maintaining social stability has been one of the nationwide priority targets with 
veto power in the CCP’s official evaluation for years.
1
 Recent studies of turnover rates among 
Chinese leaders debate the effectiveness of this personnel system in terms of its reward for merit 
as opposed to loyalty (Shih et al. 2012; Li and Zhou 2005; Guo 2007). Regardless of the 
limitations, the CCP’s control over local leaders is far more secure than critics of China’s 
decentralization suggest (Landry 2008).  
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Therefore, fiscal decentralization combined with political centralization (extensive and 
centralized personnel control) constitute the institutional base on which the center shares the 
power of decision making regarding social welfare with local political leaders. On the surface, 
local leaders manage a considerable portion of the social insurance funds and responsibilities 
over social welfare provision, which significantly enhances their power through larger budgets, 
more personnel slots and greater regulatory power. Nonetheless, the performance and policies of 
local leaders in social welfare provision is monitored and constrained by the Center through the 
top-down evaluation and promotion system. Therefore, an adequate explanation of Chinese 
social welfare provision needs to take into account the interests and strategies of both the Center 
and local leaders.     
The Center’s top priority is maintaining regime survival and stability. As elaborated above, 
they face a trade-off between control and accommodation of social demands, so they have to 
make two decisions in social welfare provision: first, whether to share power, or more precisely, 
to delegate discretionary power to local leaders over social welfare policy; and second, on which 
dimension of social welfare policy (stratification, coverage or generosity) the delegation is to be 
made. Here I make a simple assumption that local leaders have lower information costs and more 
expertise in making and implementing social welfare policy than the Center does. The best 
strategy for the Center is to, on one hand, control the stratification pattern of social health 
insurance to achieve a “divide and rule” result that ultimately weakens social groups’ capabilities 
for horizontal mobilization while privileging the groups with political importance. On the other 
hand, the Center seeks to delegate power to local leaders regarding the coverage and generosity 
of social health insurance, both to accommodate diverse local and social needs and to co-opt 




On the part of local leaders, whose ultimate interest is political survival and/or promotion 
within the system, regime stability is not their first-order priority. Nonetheless, local leaders are 
concerned about social stability because social unrest taking place in their jurisdictions will 
jeopardize their political careers under China’s centralized evaluation and promotion system. Put 
differently, even though local leaders in China are not seeking to maximize the public’s votes as 
their counterparts in democracies are, they nonetheless need to take the public’s likely reactions 
into account in the policy process, or else risk non-cooperation from the public in social policy 
such as incompliance in social insurance contribution. Therefore, Chinese local leaders 
proactively design and provide social welfare in a way that addresses the main social needs in 
their jurisdiction in order to prevent social unrest or public grievances. Given the discretionary 
power delegated from the Center on the dimensions of coverage and generosity of social health 
insurance, local leaders have four different choices in designing the profile of local social health 
insurance: 1) a generous and inclusive model (high generosity and coverage, or giving more 
people more benefits); 2) a generous yet exclusive model (high generosity and low coverage, or 
giving certain social groups more benefits); 3) a strict yet inclusive model (low generosity and 
high coverage, or giving more people benefits but with meager provisions); and 4) a strict and 
exclusive model (low generosity and coverage, or giving certain social groups benefits and with 
only meager benefits). The choice local leaders make in social welfare provision depends on the 
specific profile of constraints they have derived from local circumstances and from the Center’s 
decrees.  
My research finds that the Chinese social health insurance system is highly stratified across 
three social cleavage lines: 1) rural versus urban; 2) labor market insiders versus labor market 




class differences have been institutionalized into China’s social health insurance system by the 
Center through a bundle of social legislations and finally by the Social Insurance Law 
promulgated in 2010. More crucially, the stratification pattern in social health insurance is 
pervasive across Chinese localities: urban state-sector employees receive far more benefits than 
other urban residents and rural dwellers in all of China’s provinces. By contrast, the generosity 
and population coverage of social health insurance differ dramatically across localities, 
indicating that local leaders choose different models in social welfare provision based on the 
specific profile of constraints they encounter in local circumstances. In other words, Chinese 
social health insurance is characterized by a nationwide stratification pattern and distinct regional 
patterns in terms of coverage and generosity. These patterns, resulting from China’s 
authoritarianism, multilevel governance system and diversity of local conditions, allows the 
Center to control the distribution of social welfare benefits across social strata while co-opting 
local leaders in social welfare provision and accommodating diverse social needs. Given both 
incentives and capacity to design and implement social welfare policy, how do Chinese local 
leaders choose a specific model for social welfare provision under local circumstances? What are 
the key local socioeconomic factors that shape their decisions? Does any political economic 
regularity exist that accounts for the regional variation of social welfare provision in China? The 
next subsection specifically addresses these questions.  
The Political Economy of Social Welfare Provision in Subnational China  
 
The rich literature on the welfare state in political economy research provides plenty of clues 
for analyzing social welfare policy in China, though it cannot adequately explain the trajectory of 
Chinese social welfare development (Huang 2013). The welfare state literature has invoked a 




welfare across countries. From that literature, three principal explanations emerge to account for 
the social welfare variation: politics, economy and demography. The most important political 
explanation of social welfare is the power resource theory, which holds that the relative power of 
the left and labor is a strong explanatory factor for welfare state growth (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Huber and Stephens, 2001). More generally, scholars found that certain political and institutional 
attributes, including the policymaking activities and capacities of bureaucrats (Heclo 1974), the 
degree of state centralization (Weir et al. 1988), state structure (Immergut 1992), electoral or 
representation institutions (Iversen and Soskice, 2006) and policy legacy (Hacker 2005) have far-
reaching impacts on social welfare.  
Contrary to the political account that emphasizes institutional or political factors in 
explaining social welfare policy, the economic explanations that are derived from research on 
industrialization (Pampel and Williamson 1989; Wilensky 1974), globalization (Cameron 1978; 
Garrett, 1998; Katzenstein 1985) and the “variety of capitalism” (Hall & Soskice 2001) focus on 
the economic rationale of social welfare policy. The main view of those economic explanations 
for social welfare is that economic conditions such as the level of industrialization, economic 
openness, and production strategies generate different demands for the type and amount of social 
protection.  Differential demands then translate into distinct social welfare policies through 
respective political institutions.  
The social explanation of differences in social welfare across nations incorporates 
demography. Population aging is found to be the most powerful predictor of social transfer 
policies around the world, when compared to GDP per capita and democracy (Lindert 2004). A 
literature on postwar social spending agrees that an older population means a greater share of 




aging, migration has also received increasing scholarly attention in recent social welfare studies 
(Carmel et al. 2011; Schierup et al. 2006; Borjas 1994). Extant studies find that migration has 
contributed to the change of welfare state politics through its impacts on the financial stability of 
welfare state programs and the political and ideological consensus that supports the welfare state 
(Freeman 1986; Razin et al. 2002).  
Most of the extant social welfare analysis, however, whether focused on the politics, 
economy or demography, was overly conducted at the national level. The influence of local 
governments on the design and implementation of welfare programs has thus gone missing in 
most discussions of welfare policy in developing countries to date. With a few exceptions 
(Huang 2004, Frazier 2010, Solinger and Hu 2012, Hurst 2009), similar problems exist in 
Chinese social welfare studies, which focus primarily on the central state; that is, what the 
central state did, why, and with what effect on the country’s overall long-term trajectory (Lue 
2012, Duckett 2012, Gu 1999). This approach has limits for understanding the Chinese social 
health insurance system, given its high degree of internal heterogeneity and the fact that the 
Center controls basic parameters but leaves most action to the localities. Thus, research at the 
subnational level might be more fruitful because it can holds factors constant at the national level 
such as regime type, national institutions and broader culture, and it restricts the independent 
variables to factors that differentiate subnational units to tease out the nuanced causal stories that 
produce divergent outcomes across subnational units.  
In the comparative political economy literature, a debate persists regarding subnational 
governments’ spending behaviors for social welfare provision in a decentralized setting. Some 
scholars claim that under federal systems, local governments will spend more on social welfare 




providing pubic goods (Oates 1972). However, other scholar’s work suggests that under federal 
systems, local governments will spend less on social welfare because they compete for capital 
and seek to avoid becoming a “welfare magnet.”(Tiebout 1956) Thus far, the empirical evidence 
has been mixed (Treisman 2007; Lindert 2004). Huber and Stephens hold that in cases of strong 
federal institutions, both expansion and retrenchment of welfare programs are difficult to achieve 
because federalism institutionalizes a system of veto points that slow down policy changes 
(Huber and Stephens 2001). The primary lesson from recent research on subnational 
governments’ spending and borrowing behavior in federal systems is that the nuanced fiscal 
arrangement matters.
 
Some scholars argue that the relationship between decentralization and the 
size of government spending depends upon the balance between local taxation and 
intergovernmental grants (Rodden 2003; Stein 1999). If provincial and local politicians in the 
politically favored districts expect extra loans and grants from the central government, their 
incentives for fiscal discipline are reduced ex ante (Rodden 2006). Another nuance of fiscal 
arrangement is between taxation of individuals and taxation of corporations (Gelback 2008). It is 
inferred that local leaders in regions whose fiscal revenues derive primarily from individuals 
tend to be more responsive to public demand and thus could provide generous welfare benefits to 
the people. Empirically, evidence indicates that if a government begins taxing a group, it has 




In a similar vein, studies of the local government’s role in the provision of public health care 
in rural China find that the stronger local government’s extractive capability from local sources, 
the better the public health status of the locality, because rural cadres with thriving local 




likely to defer to peasants’ welfare demands in order to hold the position in the community 
(Huang 2004). Corroborating the insights from the recent political economy studies, my research 
finds that high levels of fiscal revenue do lead local leaders to provide more generous social 
health insurance benefits in China; nonetheless, the causal mechanism underlying the positive 
correlation between fiscal affluence and generosity of social health insurance is not uniform, but 
is instead dependent on the source or base of the fiscal revenue (i.e. fiscal transfers from other 
(levels of) government or fiscal revenues from local sources).  
In addition to fiscal revenue, this dissertation argues that the level of labor mobility also 
shapes local leaders’ preferences and choices on social health insurance. The importance of 
factor mobility in determining local public goods provision has been alluded in the conventional 
political economy literature (Tiebout 1956, Oates 1972), but little research (with an important 
exception, Beramendi 2012) explicitly explores how factor mobility, as an independent variable, 
shapes the configuration of social welfare provision or social welfare policy. One of the possible 
keys to resolve the debate outlined above—regarding whether local governments under a 
decentralized system provide more or less social welfare benefits—lies in the variation in 
interregional factor mobility. When labor mobility is high (e.g. free movement across regions), 
local governments that desire more labor inflow could provide more social welfare that attracts 
more workers, while local governments that are wary of the inflow of long-term dependents such 
as pensioners could reduce the provision of social welfare to avoid becoming “welfare magnets”. 
Turning to the case of Chinese social health insurance, high level of labor mobility works as a 
multiplier of the social risks for local governments, thus create strong preferences for enlarging 
the risk pool in social health insurance. As a corollary, local leaders in regions with high level of 




regions with low level of mobility. The empirical findings in my research support this theoretical 
prediction and highlight the interplay of fiscal revenue and labor mobility in determining the 
specific policy choice of Chinese local leaders in social health insurance. Under the central-local 
interaction framework as elaborated above, local socioeconomic conditions lead to different 
social health insurance policy choices among Chinese localities. Local officials in regions with 
high level of labor mobility tend to enlarge the coverage of social health insurance, while local 
officials in regions with high level of fiscal revenue are more likely to enhance the generosity of 
social health insurance benefits. While leaders of regions with high labor mobility and fiscal 
prosperity become pioneers in promoting risk and income redistribution through radical social 
health insurance reform, their counterparts in regions with neither high labor mobility nor fiscal 
prosperity would defend the status quo--a fragmented and inequitable social health insurance 
system-- in their jurisdictions.  
1.2     Research Design and Data  
The central goals of this dissertation are to explore the distribution of Chinese social health 
insurance benefits and to explain why we observe remarkable variation in social health insurance 
coverage and generosity across Chinese regions that have the same social stratification patterns. 
In an effort to accomplish these goals, the dissertation documents social health insurance reform 
policy, examines and characterizes the variation, and explicates the politics and political 
economy of social health insurance in China.  
I conceptualize social welfare policy on three dimensions—stratification, coverage and 
generosity. Firstly, I examine the stratification dimension of Chinese social health insurance 
using public survey data. The survey data come from two national survey projects, the China 




and project information are available to the public.
2
 Both surveys collected data at the individual 
level in multiple waves from 2000 to 2009. The CGSS sample covers more than 4,000 adult 
Chinese citizens in twenty-eight out of thirty-one Chinese provinces and CHNS covers nine 
provinces in total, four in Eastern China, three in Central China and two in Western China. The 
survey data are suitable for this study because they allow for examining the statistical 
correlations of individuals’ socioeconomic conditions (including demographic, employment and 
economic characters) and their participation in various health insurance programs. I conducted 
logistic and multinomial logistic regression analyses using the data, and the analytical results 
validate one of the central hypotheses in the dissertation, that the Chinese social health insurance 
program is stratified along three social cleavage lines: 1) rural versus urban; 2) labor market 
insiders versus labor market outsiders; and 3) state versus non-state sectors.   
Secondly, I utilize government statistics on expenditure and enrollment of China’s major 
social health insurance programs to describe and characterize the distribution of Chinese social 
health insurance benefits along the three dimensions—stratification, coverage and generosity—
over time and across regions. The statistics are compiled from government-released publications 
such as the China Labor Statistics Yearbook (1999-2007) and the China Human Resource and 
Social Security Yearbooks (2008-2011). The statistics, covering all Chinese mainland provinces 
from 1999 to 2010, supplement the aforementioned individual-level survey data in delineating 
the distribution profile of Chinese social health insurance benefits. One might suspect the 
accuracy of the Chinese government’s statistics insofar as local governments could misrepresent 
their social health insurance expenditures or beneficiaries to impress the Center. Thus, to cross-
validate the accuracy of the government statistics used in this study, I computed and compared 
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the enrollment rates (coverage) of the major social health insurance programs using both the 
CHNS data and the government statistics. The comparison shows little significant difference 
between the two sets of results, which, to some extent, validates the government statistics on 
social health insurance. The government statistics provide evidence in support of the theoretical 
prediction that substantial cross-regional variation exists in coverage and generosity of Chinese 
social health insurance but less in the stratification.  
Thirdly, I used the government statistics to conduct cluster analysis for thirty-one Chinese 
provinces from 2007 to 2010 to specifically identify and characterize the regional patterns of 
social health insurance in China. The results of the cluster analysis suggest that there exist four 
significantly distinct types of social health insurance in terms of coverage and generosity among 
Chinese regions. Then I constructed a provincial-level panel dataset including variables 
measuring local socioeconomic conditions between 1999 and 2010 compiled from various 
statistics publications such as the China Statistics Yearbook, the China Population Statistics 
Yearbook and the China Public Finance Yearbooks. I used this dataset to conduct time-series-
cross-section analysis to test the hypothetical correlations between local socioeconomic 
conditions and patterns of local social health insurance. The quantitative results indicate 
significantly positive correlations between local fiscal prosperity and generosity of social health 
insurance and between labor mobility and coverage of social health insurance.  
Lastly, I used comparative case studies of social health insurance in the four types of Chinese 
provinces to reconstruct their social health insurance policy and reform processes, and to 
elucidate the underlying motivations and policy choices. The subnational small-N comparative 
research design has a series of advantages over single case or large-N studies. First, it allows for 




reform processes, while framing findings from particular clusters within a larger comparison that 
shows broad variation in both outcomes and explanatory factors. Second, detailed analysis of 
each type of province allows me to identify the causal mechanisms behind policy adoption and 
implementation, which is usually absent in large-N studies. Third, subnational comparison of the 
types of provinces has allowed me to better address the spatially uneven nature of social welfare 
reforms in China. In short, the subnational small-N comparison can credibly accomplish the 
goals of providing both a comparative perspective and a focus on causal mechanisms. Moreover, 
the subnational comparative case studies draw on extensive empirical evidence collected from 
field interviews, qualitative study of government regulations and documents about social health 
insurance policy between 2008 and 2012. I conducted more than 140 interviews with 
government officials, social health insurance administrators, insurance beneficiaries, and hospital 
and enterprise directors in 16 Chinese provinces over the past four years (2009-2013). The social 
health insurance programs of the sixteen provinces that I have visited cover all four types of 
provinces identified in the cluster analysis. In addition, I take advantage of government 
regulations and documents, and officials’ public speeches collected during fieldwork to better 
understand the motivation and deliberation underlying the policy choice on social health 
insurance.  
A few caveats for interpreting the empirical results of this study are in order. First, the unit of 
quantitative analysis in this study is province. This is not optimal for the study of Chinese social 
welfare because prefectural-level governments in urban areas and county-level governments in 
rural areas are the main local actors in the specification and implementation of social health 
insurance policy in China. The disadvantage of using provincial-level data is thus that 




within-province differences between urban and rural areas and among prefectures or counties. 
Nonetheless, the advantage of a provincial-level dataset is that it provides systematic coverage of 
the entire time period and regions under study. By contrast, prefectural- or county-level data on 
social health insurance are available only for a few Chinese provinces and most are concentrated 
in the economically advanced regions such as Guangdong and Liaoning. Given the advantages 
and limitations of provincial-level data, the empirical strategy employed here is to use province 
as the unit of analysis in the quantitative analysis and to supplement it with qualitative studies 
that draw on field interviews and government documents at various levels (including township, 
county, municipal, provincial and national levels).     
The second caveat for interpreting the quantitative analysis results in this study is that the 
empirical tests do not focus on an extended period of time and thus might risk “excessive causal 
proximity”.
3
 The time period under study is constrained to a relatively short time for objective 
reasons. The start time for quantitative analysis (1999) is contingent upon the establishment of 
social health insurance in China. On December 15
th
 1998, the State Council promulgated the 
Decision on Establishing Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Employees, indicating the formal 
start of contributory social health insurance in China. Hence, systematic government statistics on 
social health insurance began to accumulate in 1999. The ending time for quantitative analysis 
(2010) is a function of data availability. Most Chinese statistics yearbooks, one of the main data 
sources for this study, are published one or two years after the year of data collection. Thus, at 
the time that the panel dataset for this study was constructed in the spring of 2012, most statistics 
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after 2010 were not made public yet. As the Chinese social health insurance system continues, 
more years of data can be added to the dataset for empirical tests.   
1.3     Organization of the Dissertation  
Chapter 2 develops a theory that take into account of authoritarianism, multilevel governance 
and multidimensionality of social welfare policy to explicate the political agents and the 
mechanisms underlying the distribution of Chinese social health insurance benefits. The theory 
identifies the actors, specifying their interests, constraints and strategies in Chinese social 
welfare provision and elucidates the interaction between the actors under Chinese political 
system. Then it uses subnational comparative case studies to illustrate the central-local 
interaction in Chinese social welfare provision. Finally, it lays out the observable implications of 
the theory and hypotheses for empirical tests in the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the stratification dimension of the Chinese social health insurance, and 
its underlying political rationale. I quantitatively examine the distribution of social health 
insurance benefits that recently expanded in China. Data shows that in terms of the number of 
beneficiaries, peasants were the largest beneficiary group of Chinese social health insurance 
from 2007 to 2010. From 2007 onwards, urban labor market outsiders (including the elderly, 
students, children, the urban unemployed, and self- or flexibly-employed) have increasingly 
enrolled in the newly established URBMI program, and thus became the second largest 
beneficiaries group of social health insurance in most provinces by 2010. By contrast, the 
percentage of employees among total beneficiaries of social health insurance declined by 4 % 
from 2007 to 2010. However, comparison of the expenditures of the UEBMI, URBMI and 
NRCMI programs indicates that spending on urban employees’ health insurance has been much 
higher than the sum of total spending on urban residents’ or rural population’s health insurance. I 




terms of risk pooling but also highly stratified in terms of generosity. Of special importance for 
the Chinese authoritarian regime’s survival is the maintenance of particularly privileged welfare 
provisions for urban and state employees while establishing and preserving an essentially modest 
social provision for other social groups. China’s fragmented social provisions that ensure social 
inequalities without fostering deep class cleavages echo the old saying: “divide and rule”. The 
manner in which the Chinese social welfare expansion reinforces rather than corrects social 
cleavages reveals the regime’s priority in social welfare provision: co-opting the societal groups 
with political importance. This argument helps to explain the puzzle of why China’s growing 
middle class does not lead to democratic transition. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the regional disparities of Chinese social health insurance in coverage 
and generosity. It is puzzling to find that although the stratification pattern identified in Chapter 
3 is similar among Chinese localities, the cross-regional variation in generosity and coverage is 
nevertheless overwhelming. This chapter develops a political economic explanation of this 
variation by taking into consideration the authoritarian and multilevel nature of the Chinese 
system of governance. I argue that the Center, concerned about regime survival and stability, 
creates and controls the stratification pattern of social health insurance benefits in order to 
privilege certain groups over others while deliberately delegating discretionary authority to local 
state agents in making coverage and generosity policies to accommodate diverse social or local 
circumstances. Under this framework, local leaders, who are concerned about their political 
careers in the top-down official evaluation system, design and implement local social health 
insurance policy according to local needs and conditions. In doing so, they proactively prevent 
social instability or grievances from fomenting in their jurisdictions. The upshot is that, on one 




generosity and coverage where the Center delegates substantially to local leaders. On the other 
hand, differences in the generosity and coverage of local social health insurance programs 
correspond to differences in local socioeconomic conditions such as labor mobility and fiscal 
affluence.  
Chapter 4 presents empirical evidence for the argument using a provincial-level panel dataset 
(1999-2010) and subnational comparative case studies constructed around government 
regulations, documents, and 140 field interviews. The cluster analysis provides evidence for the 
existence of four regional patterns or types in Chinese social health insurance implementation: 1) 
the risk pooling type (a high level of coverage but low generosity); 2) the privileged type (a high 
level of generosity but low coverage); 3) the dual type (high levels of coverage and generosity); 
and 4) the status quo type (low levels of generosity and coverage). Moreover, cross-section time-
series analysis results show significant statistical correlations between labor mobility and social 
health insurance coverage and between fiscal affluence and social health insurance generosity in 
China. Furthermore, detailed cross-regional comparisons and within-region studies reconstruct 
the causal mechanism that links local socioeconomic conditions and social health insurance 
patterns through local leaders’ incentives and policies. The three empirical analyses combined 
provide a political economic explanation for the cross-regional variations in generosity and 
coverage of social health insurance in China. 
Chapter 5 extends the inquiry of social welfare provision in China to a cross-national 
comparative context. Using the same multidimensional conceptualization of social welfare 
benefits developed and adopted in the study of Chinese social welfare, social protection in other 
countries can also be investigated and evaluated on the three dimensions of coverage, generosity 




and socioeconomic constraints will make different policy choices on these three dimensions. 
First, democracies should provide less stratified benefits than autocracies do because the 
popularly elected leaders in democracies must please a larger proportion of population in order to 
stay in office. Second, countries that rely more heavily on taxation of individuals for fiscal 
revenue should provide more generous and broader benefits than their counterparts that reply 
more heavily on taxation on corporations or outside-source revenue. Third, economies with more 
openness should offer broader social protection coverage but lower generosity of social benefits 
than others do.  To test these hypotheses, I use a cross-national panel dataset on social protection 
from 37 Asian countries between 2005 and 2010. The data are compiled from various public 
datasets including The Social Protection Index (Asian Development Bank). The results from 
quantitative analysis lend support to the theoretical predictions and signify the importance of a 
multidimensional conceptualization and measure of social welfare in understanding the political 
economy of social welfare provision across nations. Moreover, putting the study of Chinese 
social welfare provision into a broad and comparative context allows to generalize the findings 
from specific country cases and to identify significant commonalities and differences of social 
welfare development in Asian countries.  
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing its main arguments and empirical 
findings. Then it discusses in detail two important issues that deserve further research on Chinese 
social welfare: individuals’ preference for redistribution in China, and the public opinions of 
social provision and governance in China and its impact on the prospect of regime survival and 




2 The Politics of Social Welfare Provision in China 
2.1 Introduction  
Public goods provision constitutes a central issue in the political economy of development. 
Critically, the welfare state is typically considered to be a feature best provided by democracies 
(Marshall 1950, 10-11; Bulmer et al. 1950, 73-74, Heclo 1981, 390). According to the received 
wisdom, democracies better provide public goods like social welfare for two reasons. First, a 
top-down explanation holds that democratic leaders have to win a large share of the popular vote 
in order to win elections, so they have a stronger interest in providing public goods to garner 
broad support. Alternatively, a bottom-up explanation argues that democracies permit interest 
group organizations and increase social pressure, allowing public demand for social welfare to 
drive government spending and policy decisions. Many quantitative studies find empirical 
support for the contention that democracies spend more than non-democracies do on social 
welfare (Preworski et al. 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Brown 2004). Some studies note, however, 
that significant variation exists within both democracies and non-democracies in terms of public 
goods provision and social welfare spending (Mulligan et al. 2004; Charron and Lapuente 2011; 
Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Scholars have also noted that many welfare programs were 
initially adopted by nondemocratic governments (Mares and Carnes 2009) and that some 
autocracies spend more than democracies do in social welfare benefits (Haggard and Kaufman 
2008). A number of intriguing questions thus arise: without democratic mechanisms, why might 
autocracies provide and even expand welfare benefits? How do autocratic leaders design and 





In recent years, attempts to explain social welfare provisions in authoritarian regimes have 
emerged. Unlike social policy in democracies, which is usually a result of the activities of social 
movements, organized interests, unions, and parties, authoritarian policymaking is largely based 
on the proactive role of leaders who may take preventive actions in anticipation of future 
problems (Forrat 2012). Scholars of the political economy of dictatorship contend that autocratic 
rulers use social welfare privileges to buy the support of winning coalitions, in order to ensure 
that they stand on the side of the regime against social opposition forces (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003; Haber 2007; Gandhi 2008; Gallagher and Hanson 2009).
 
Wintrobe argues that dictators 
provide public goods mainly for two purposes: 1) to increase the loyalty of the population, and 2) 
to promote general economic growth on which the dictator’s budget depends (Wintrobe 1998). 
The political leaders’ concern for regime survival and stability is often considered the key to 
understanding the design of authoritarian welfare systems. When explaining social legislation 
underpinning the state-led social insurance model and social welfare initiatives in Germany, 
Esping-Andersen points to Bismarck’s strategy to consolidate divisions among social groups and 
to tie individuals’ loyalties directly to the central state authority (Esping-Andersen 1990). Built 
on the three different political survival strategies articulated in Haber’s work on the political 
economy of autocracy (Haber 2007),
 
Mares and Carnes contend that the specific profile of social 
welfare provision that autocratic leaders pursue is premised on their political strategies for 
staying in power (Mares and Carnes 2009). 
     Extant studies thus provide valuable insights to understand the political motivation for social 
welfare provisions in authoritarian regimes. Some questions, however, remain unaddressed in the 
literature. First, the influence of subnational politicians on the design and implementation of 




regimes largely focus on policymaking at the national level. Yet, subnational politicians have a 
noteworthy role to play in social welfare provision, both empirically and theoretically. As many 
countries turn to various forms of decentralization,
 4 
 particularly in the developing world where 
state capacity is weak and the monitoring of policy enforcement is costly,
 
national leaders leave 
most of the decisions regarding welfare provision to localities. Local leaders’ incentive structure 
and policy choices concerning social welfare provision thus merit closer attention. Moreover, 
studies on the political economy of federalism/decentralization recognize that the interactions 
between national and subnational politicians stands at the core of the policymaking process and 
drives the differences in many policy domains, including finance, economy and social welfare 
(Wibbels 2005; Rodden 2006; Beramendi 2012).
 
But most of these studies presume a nexus 
between democracy and decentralization. Authoritarianism and decentralization do not go hand 
in hand intuitively or theoretically (Stepan 2004). Under a decentralized system, how can 
authoritarian leaders ensure that social welfare provisions at the local level lend support to their 
paramount interest of maintaining regime survival and stability? Answering this question adds to 
the theory of policy making and enforcement in non-democracies with multiple levels of 
governance.  
Second, despite the fact that the institutional design of welfare programs is typically 
multidimensional, most existing studies of social welfare focus on one single dimension, usually 
the level of government spending (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Rudra 2008; Huber and 
Stephens 2001).
 
The level of welfare spending, however, says little about the distribution of 
welfare benefits, which can be conceptualized on three different dimensions— generosity, 
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Generosity refers to the average level of benefits among people who 
receive social welfare. Coverage represents the percentage of the population that has access to 
the benefits. Stratification captures the inequality in levels of benefits that different groups 
receive. These dimensions are correlated in different ways and engender policy tradeoffs for 
policy makers. For example, broad coverage and high generosity combined suggest low 
stratification; when fiscal resources for social welfare provision are fixed, broader coverage 
generally leads to lower generosity and vice versa. Since authoritarian leaders provide welfare 
benefits for multiple goals (e.g. buying off dissidents, rewarding loyalties or engendering human 
capital for economic growth), they should, at a minimum, calculate the different dimensions of 
welfare provision and factor the trade-offs into their policy choices. The multidimensional 
conceptualization of welfare benefits thus offers a better framework for understanding 
authoritarian leaders’ policy preferences and choices regarding social welfare provision.  
The contribution of this study is to bring subnational leaders into the account and to probe 
the interactions between national and subnational leaders in multiple dimensions of social 
welfare provision under authoritarian institutional settings. China constitutes a perfect case for 
this purpose: the combination of remarkable decentralization
6 
and resilient authoritarianism in 
China not only offers wide subnational variation in social welfare provisions but also allows for 
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an examination of the interactions between different levels of government in an authoritarian 
regime.  
Chinese social welfare provision,
7 
especially social health insurance,
 
has been expanding 
rapidly in the past decade (see Figure 2.1). Accompanying the expansion has been a sharp 
stratification of healthcare benefits across social groups and across regions. The impressive 
expansion
8 
of social health insurance and the increased number of social health insurance 
programs have not reduced, but have rather reinforced, socioeconomic inequalities in China. 
Instead of leveling the social playing field, the changes in social health insurance continue to link 
social benefits to citizens’ socioeconomic status and to household registration (hukou).
 9 
 In 
recent years, there has been tremendous variation in the enforcement of social health insurance 
expansion in China. What accounts for the highly uneven yet systematic patterns of social 
welfare expansion in China?  
I argue that the expansion of Chinese social welfare results from the central leaders’ 
strategic choice; the distribution of the expanded welfare benefits is then contingent on the 
compliance and discretion of local leaders whose policy preferences and choices might diverge 
from the central leaders’.
10 
The argument has two important steps. First, the Chinese central 
leadership takes the initiative and has the most interest in expanding social welfare provisions 
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while maintaining a fragmented and stratified pattern of distribution. The central leaders thus 
take control over the provision of social welfare for the privileged groups that are important for 
regime stability and to delegate provision for the other groups to local leaders. Second, Chinese 
local leaders have both the mandate and the discretion in social welfare provision. Importantly, 
under a certain set of local conditions, their policy choices in social welfare provision are not 
congruent with the central leaders’ first choice. The dynamics of central-local interactions thus 
stand at the core of the politics of Chinese social welfare provision and partially account for the 
remarkable subnational variation.  
This chapter unfolds as follow. I begin with the Chinese central leadership’s interests and 
strategies for social welfare provisions. I then analyze the local leaders’ incentive structure and 
their choices in social welfare policy under different constellations of local constraints. 
Following that, I elaborate on the central-local interaction and its impacts on Chinese social 
welfare expansion through case studies of recent social health insurance reform in different 
Chinese regions. The final section concludes with a summary of hypotheses for empirical 
analyses regarding the distribution and provision of welfare benefits in China.   
2.2 The Center’s Interests and Strategies in Social Welfare Provision   
The top priority of Chinese national leaders (hereafter, the central leadership or the center) in 
social welfare provision is maintaining regime stability.
11
 As threats to regime stability can come 
from both the elites and the masses, choosing to distribute rents and goods only to one or the 
other does not constitute an optimal strategy from the authoritarian leaders’ perspective (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003; Kricheli and Livne 2009). Instead, authoritarian leaders try to efficiently 
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balance the benefits between elites and the masses so as to maximize their survival prospects 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). The strategy that the Chinese leadership has adopted is 
maintaining particularly privileged provisions for the elites while preserving an essentially 
modest provision for the masses. To achieve this, however, the central leadership faces a trade-
off between control and accommodation of social needs in its provision of social welfare benefits. 
On one hand, they attempt to control who gets what, distributing more benefits to the social 
groups with the most political importance for regime stability. On the other hand, the central 
leadership seeks to accommodate most social groups to some extent, thus avoiding too much of a 
gap between the haves and have-nots that could potentially foster public grievances and trigger 
social unrests. Under what conditions does the central leadership choose to control social welfare 
provision, and under what conditions does it choose to accommodate social and local needs by 
delegating social welfare provision to local leaders? This analysis starts by identifying the groups 
to whom the center aims to grant policy privileges.  
Of special importance for the stability of the Chinese authoritarian regime are the urban state-
sectors, concentrated ethnic minority groups and the “launching organizations”
12
. These groups 
are considered crucial for regime stability from the center’s perspective for three reasons. First, 
the urban state sectors are the main source of fiscal revenue, employment and economic growth 
for the regime (Lardy 1998; Lau et al. 2000). Chinese leaders often remark that the development 
of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is related to the political future of the regime. Through the 
urban state sectors, the regime maintains a firm grip on the economy and on revenue sources: in 
2011, about 40% of the state’s total tax revenue came from the state sectors, much higher than 
the share from other sectors. It is estimated that urban SOEs contributed about 50% of Chinese 
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industrial value-added/profits in 2005 (Huang 2008). Second, the regime needs launching 
organizations
 
such as the bureaucracy, legislature, police, courts and judicial organs, to assist in 
policymaking, implementing policy and maintaining social stability. It is estimated from 
government statistics that in 2007 the number of Chinese civil servants was about 13.55 million 
and the size of the launching organizations (including civil servants, party cadres, legislators, 
judicature and so forth) was 53.93 million. A large literature on patrimonial, rentier, and Leninist 
regimes suggests that non-democratic leaders often transfer rents to key elite constituencies 
because those distributions increase the opportunity costs of defecting to a challenging coalition 
(Bates 1981; Boone 1990; Snyder 1992; Shih 2004). Third, the concentration of groups such as 
state-sector employees in the capital or large cities, and the concentration of ethnic minority 
groups in certain remote and periphery areas (e.g. Tibet, Xinjiang, Ningxia), make collective 
action problems easier to solve for these groups, thus potentially posing a credible threat to 
regime stability (Wallace 2013). Therefore, the central leadership attempts to placate these 
groups by privileging them in social welfare provision. It follows that social welfare provision in 
the regions where the privileged groups are historically concentrated, such as the capital city, the 
provincial-level municipalities and the ethnic minority autonomous regions, faces a greater 
control from the center.  
The central leadership’s interest in privileging urban state sectors, the launching 
organizations and the concentrated ethnic minority groups does not mean that other social groups 
do not receive social welfare benefits. It is rational and strategic for the Chinese central 
leadership to expand social welfare provision to many other social groups once welfare 
privileges are granted to the elites. The reasons are threefold. First, since the end of Mao’s era in 




proletarian revolutions has gradually died away and has come to rest upon a fragile base of 
bringing improvements to the economic well-being of the people. Such “legitimacy fragility” 
makes the regime particularly vulnerable to popular resistance and social unrest (Goldston and 
Tilly 2001; Hurst 2009; Cai 2006; Hurst and O’Brien 2002; Frazier 2004). Despite decades of 
continuous economic growth, social unrest and public grievances over income inequalities, 
social inequity and injustice have not disappeared but have instead expanded in China (Yang 
2006). Nationwide, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security recorded 8,700 so-called 
“spontaneous incidents” (such as street demonstration, protests and riots) in 1993, rising to 
11,000, 15,000 and 32,000 in 1995, 1997, and 1999, respectively (Pei 2003). In 2003, some 
58,000 incidents were staged by three million people, including farmers, workers and students 
(Ma 2004). The Chinese state’s public security spending for maintaining social stability, which is 
dedicated to domestic forces such as armed police, courts and judicial departments, has 
significantly increased and even exceeded its military spending (Wang 2014). Aside from 
coercion, the state utilizes social welfare policy as another important mechanism to placate 
society and prevent unrest (Gallagher and Hanson 2009).  
The second reason why the central leadership seeks to expand social welfare provisions to 
many other social groups is to deal with the “autocrat’s dilemma”: autocratic leaders face a 
dilemma in that the launching organizations strong enough to put them in power must also 
possess the resources to end their rule. One of the autocracies’ political strategies to resolve this 
dilemma is to empower competing organizations or social groups to raise the collective action 
costs on the part of elites (Haber 2007). Under this political strategy, the distribution of social 
welfare is characterized as broad yet fragmented institutionally (Mares and Carnes 2009). The 




this strategy. The central leadership established and maintained a fragmented social welfare 
system to achieve a “divide and rule” situation, which, on one hand, consolidates various 
divisions among social groups to prevent alliances that could challenge the regime,
13
 and on the 
other hand, ties the loyalties of various social groups to the central state authority.    
Thirdly, social welfare expansion also serves the economic interests of the central leadership.  
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, increasing domestic consumption has become a 
centerpiece of the central leadership’s plan to stimulate economic growth, a crucial source of the 
regime’s legitimacy. The plan aims to shift China’s economy away from its dominant 
dependence on exports and investment and toward a more sustainable reliance on domestic 
consumption. In the absence of a well-developed social security and insurance system, however, 
Chinese people tend to save more and spend less (Yang et al. 2011). From the central 
leadership’s perspective, establishing a social safety net and expanding social welfare provisions 
to broad social groups constitute a means of reducing disincentives to household consumption 
and bolstering domestic consumption (National Development and Reform Commission 2013). 
What is being argued clearly is that the Chinese central leadership intends to expand social 
welfare provision to many social groups once welfare privileges are granted to the politically 
important urban state sectors, launching organizations, and concentrated ethnic minority groups. 
To distribute benefits among many social groups in a way that maximizes political returns under 
changing and diverse local circumstances, however, the center needs to delegate discretionary 
authority to local state agents in the provision of social welfare benefits, because the latter have 
lower information costs and more expertise. Hence, the central leadership adopts a “control” 
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tactic in social welfare provisions for the concentrated privileged groups and an “accommodation” 
tactic (i.e., delegation) for other groups. The accommodation in social welfare provision is 
intended to be limited in regions like the capital city, provincial-level municipalities, and ethnic 
autonomous regions where the priority of placating the privileged groups trumps the priority of 
expanding social welfare to many other groups. Other studies of autocrats’ priority in goods 
provision find that autocratic rulers likely place a greater emphasis on maintaining short-term 
stability and buying the support of winning coalitions than on providing broadly encompassing 
goods (Wintobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Shih et al. 
2012). A question thus arises: how does the Chinese central leadership implement its differential 
tactics in social welfare provision across regions? 
The policy tools that the center makes use of to achieve control and accommodation in social 
welfare provision include fiscal transfers, social legislation and regulations, and personnel 
management. The center-to-local fiscal transfer is the most direct and effective tool for the center 
to control the provision of social welfare for the privileged groups. The central-to-local fiscal 
transfer system began in 1995 after the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform, through which the central 
government substantially enhanced its share in total tax revenue.
14
 The distribution of central-to-
local fiscal transfers follows a clear geographic pattern: the amount of fiscal transfers sharply 
decreases from western China to eastern China (Figure 2.2). Specifically, the center’s fiscal 
transfer accounts for more than 70% of social health insurance financing in the western ethnic 
autonomous regions and less than 5% in the eastern coastal regions. Two important facts indicate 
that the center’s fiscal transfers are determined mainly by political considerations --assuring that 
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the privileged regions and groups receive more benefits than do others-- rather than by a concern 
for local social needs. First, the western ethnic minority regions with relatively small populations 
such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia receive most of the center’s fiscal transfers 
(sometimes over ten times the local-sourced fiscal revenue) (Guo 2008; Jeong 2014). Second, the 
center’s fiscal transfer to localities responds to the size of the local government payroll, 
including local officials, retired cadres, and decommissioned military officers (Shih et al. 2010; 
Zhan 2011). 
Another tool that the central leadership employs to control social welfare provision is social 
legislation and regulation. Since the 1990s, through a series of social legislation and statutes, the 
central leadership has established a social welfare system that is characterized as fragmented and 
biased in favor of civil servants, state sectors, and urbanites. According to the Social Insurance 
Law promulgated in 2010, social health insurance should be pooled at or above the county level. 
Within each of the pooling units (e.g. country or city), it is divided into at least three schemes: an 
urban employee scheme, an urban (non-working) resident scheme, and a rural resident scheme. 
These different schemes are stipulated to be operated, managed and financed separately under 
the center’s supervision. Through the law, the center declares to “establish” (jianli) and “perfect” 
(wanshan) the social insurance system that is very fragmented by design. In stark contrast to its 
detailed instructions on the stratification pattern of social health insurance, however, the Social 
Insurance Law does not stipulate the coverage and generosity specifically, except to vaguely 
state that they will be administered according to the center’s “rule” (guiding). The ambiguity in 
legislation leaves the center sufficient space to define the local leaders’ discretion in social 




generosity of social health insurance for the purpose of accommodating diverse local and social 
needs is explicitly stated in the central state’s various administrative regulations.
 15
  
In addition to fiscal transfers and social legislation, the center uses centralized and extensive 
personnel control to influence local social welfare provisions. In the absence of competitive 
elections, the central leadership controls and monitors subordinate state agents through political 
centralization—mainly the “cadre responsibility system” that introduced from the provincial 
level down in the mid-1980s governing job assignments, performance appraisals, promotions and 
demotions, and remuneration. Under the top-down personnel control system, local leaders are 
held accountable upward to the center rather than downward to local people. To get promoted or 
even to maintain a career under the cadre responsibility system, local leaders must meet a variety 
of policy targets set by the center. Improving people’s livelihood, including social welfare (min 
sheng), has become an increasingly important component of official evaluations.
16
  
The centralized personnel system has some important implications for policy enforcement in 
China. First, it significantly increases the cost of non-compliance on the part of local leaders and 
thus assists the center in shaping the policy choices of hundreds and thousands of cities and 
counties. Local leaders who are interested in advancing their political careers in the system have 
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to internalize the center’s intention in local policy making. It is important to note, furthermore, 
that the policy preferences of the center and the local leaders do not always converge. A crucial 
factor that leads central leaders to hold different preferences from the local leaders is the center’s 
stronger interest in maintaining regime stability, because the national leaders represent the 
regime and are more responsible for the survival of the regime (Cai 2008). This difference in 
priorities between the central and local governments compels the center to use its appointment 
control to obtain preferred outcomes (Huang 1996; Sheng 2010). Some evidence suggests that 
the center establishes different policy targets or assigns different weights to the same policy 
targets in official evaluations of different regions, in order to convey its differential policy 
intentions and priorities to the local leaders (Zuo 2014). 
Second, the centralized personnel system works as a tool of ex-post control and monitoring, 
compatible with the center’s delegation that grants considerable ex-ante discretion to local 
leaders in policy making and implementation.
17
 With general guidelines and delegated discretion 
from the center, local leaders are able to make policy choices and experiments according to 
specific conditions (Heberer and Trappel 2013). The diversity of policy measures that local 
leaders take based on their respective local situations is precisely what the center seeks to 
stimulate in order to accommodate different local and social needs, especially in the domains 
where the center faces higher information costs, such as social policy. The centralized personnel 
system then allows the center to punish opportunistic local leaders afterwards.    
In summary, the Chinese central leadership attempts to expand social welfare provisions in 
order to maintain regime stability but faces a trade-off between control and accommodation of 
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social needs. The center’s strategy is to control the provisions for concentrated privileged groups 
such as urban state sectors, launching organizations and concentrated ethnic minority groups, and 
to accommodate other groups. To implement both control and accommodation in social welfare 
provisions, the center employs a variety of tools such as central-to-local fiscal transfers, 
legislation and regulations, and centralized personnel management. This leads to questions 
concerning the local leaders. What is the incentive structure that local leaders face regarding 
social welfare provision? How do they make policy choices in light of both their local situations 
and the center’s directives?  
2.3 The Localities’ Interests and Strategies in Social Welfare Provision 
Chinese local leaders do not have many viable career alternatives outside of the political 
hierarchy, as a comparable job market in the private sector hardly exists. Hence, these local 
leaders care most about their political careers and are eager to advance their careers in the 
established system (Li and Zhou 2005; Guo 2007; Shih et al. 2012). Unlike the central leadership, 
local leaders do not consider regime stability to be their first-order priority. Nonetheless, local 
leaders are also concerned about social unrest taking place in their jurisdictions, because social 
instability may jeopardize their political careers under the centralized evaluation and promotion 
system (O’Brien and Li 1999; Edin 2003). In addition to maintaining social stability in their 
jurisdictions, economic growth and public goods provision are also principal responsibilities of 
local officials (Whiting 2004; Landry 2008).
 
Some existing studies suggest that many Chinese 
local officials not only provide and deliver social welfare benefits to the privileged groups as the 
center orders, but that they also attempt to placate local people in social welfare provision 
(Solinger and Jiang 2013; Frazier 2010). Put differently, even though Chinese local leaders are 




to take the public’s likely reactions, in addition to the center’s decrees, into account; otherwise, 
they will risk, in the worst case, public grievances that can lead to social unrest, or in other cases, 
non-cooperation from the public in policy implementation. Therefore, Chinese local leaders have 
an incentive to proactively design and provide social welfare in a manner that addresses the main 
social needs in their jurisdiction, in order to secure and advance their political careers.  
In social welfare policymaking, local officials face political, fiscal and social constraints that 
jointly shape their policy choices in social welfare provision. First of all, as elaborated in the 
previous section, local officials’ policy choices are constrained by the center’s control. In social 
welfare policy, the stratification pattern stipulated in the Social Insurance Law is considered a 
political principle for local leaders to follow in social welfare provision.   
The second constraint that local officials face in social welfare provision is fiscal stringency. 
The Chinese social insurance system, which is characterized as highly decentralized yet 
predominantly government-run, makes local fiscal resources a particularly important factor in 
predicting local leaders’ policy preferences. On average, Chinese local governments bear about 
70% of social health insurance financing for the non-working population, including peasants, the 
elderly, students and children. For most localities, the center’s fiscal transfer for social welfare 
provisions is far from sufficient and many local governments face substantial budget deficits,
 
so 
paying the medical bills in full and on time places a considerable burden on local budgets (Oi 
and Zhao 2007; Wong 2009).
 
Moreover, some social insurance programs, such as health 
insurance, have a shorter time lag between contribution and benefit payments, and broader 
beneficiaries. This makes the funding situation, particularly the local government’s fiscal 
resources, crucial in ensuring that the social insurance system functions properly.
18
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Some existing studies find that different financial situations at the local level explain the 
cross-regional variation in public goods provisions or government spending (Rodden 2003; 
Zhuravskaya 2000; Wibbels 2005). Scholars of Chinese social welfare also identify a positive 
correlation between local fiscal revenues and social welfare provisions. Yanzhong Huang argues 
that the stronger the local government’s fiscal extractive capability from local industrial 
enterprises, the better the public health status of its residents, because rural leaders with thriving 
local industrial sectors value their lucrative jobs more highly than their counterparts and are more 
likely to defer to peasants’ welfare demands in order to hold the position in the community 
(Huang 2004). Solinger and Hu argue that wealthier cities have less strict eligibility requirements 
for family allowance benefits because they can afford to give more people benefits (Solinger and 
Hu 2012). It is critical to note, moreover, that a local government’s fiscal resources are jointly 
determined by the level of local-sourced revenue and the central-to-local fiscal transfer. It is thus 
possible that the privileged regions with meager local revenues, such as the peripheral ethnic 
minority provinces, can afford to provide as generous benefits as some of the wealthy coastal 
regions do, largely because of the center’s preferential fiscal transfers to those peripheral 
provinces.  
The third constraint on local officials’ policy choices regarding social insurance is social 
risk.
19
 Social policy often responds to demographic and labor market shifts (Peng and Wong 
2008, Iversen 2001a, Esping-Andersen 1999) and the nature of social insurance typically 
involves pooling and sharing risks across different segments of a population. The performance of 
social health insurance is thus particularly contingent on the demographic or risk profile of 
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 The regions with young populations face lower risks than the regions with aging 
populations. Moreover, the lack of a nationwide risk pooling and redistribution mechanism in 
China’s social insurance system makes the regions with small populations particularly vulnerable 
to exogenous shock such as disease outbreak. Most importantly, decades of mass internal 
migration accompanying economic reform and openness have profoundly changed the risk 
profiles of some Chinese regions. China’s reform strategies in the 1980s “letting some people 
(regions) get rich first” starting from the “special economic zones,” created a domestic labor 
market in which some inland regions continuously “export” labor to the coastal regions (Yu 
2008). Labor mobility works as a multiplier of social risks for these regions, creating stronger 
incentives for local officials to enlarge the risk pool or coverage of social insurance.
 21
 
To summarize the interests of local officials, Chinese local leaders have both the mandate 
and the discretion to make policy choices regarding the coverage and generosity of social welfare 
provisions. The specific choices they make are jointly determined by 1) the center’s control, such 
as the stratification pattern of social welfare provision, and 2) local socioeconomic constraints, 
including the amount of local fiscal resources and the degree of social risk. In general, local 
leaders have four different choices in designing the coverage and generosity of social health 
insurance: 1) giving more people more benefits (high generosity and coverage, or “Dual Type” 
model); 2) giving certain social groups more benefits (high generosity and low coverage, or 
“Privileged Type” model); 3) giving more people benefits but with meager provisions (low 
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21 This mechanism is the same for labor-inflowing and –outflowing regions. It seems more obvious in 
labor-outflow regions, where mass labor outflow exacerbates population aging and places burdensome 
payment pressures on local social health insurance funds. The risk-magnifying mechanism applies to 
labor-inflow regions as well, because the regions receiving mass labor inflows are heavily reliant on 
labor-intensive manufacturing and service sectors. With potentially high needs of medical service and 
threats of large labor outflows, local officials in the labor-inflow regions prefer and attempt to obtain a 




generosity and high coverage, or “Risk-Pooling Type” model); and 4) giving only certain social 
groups meager benefits (low generosity and coverage, or “Status-Quo” model).  
As elaborated in last section, the center’s strategy in social welfare provision is to adopt 
“control” in the regions with concentrated privileged groups such as urban state sectors, 
launching organizations or concentrated ethnic minority groups and to adopt “accommodation” 
(or, delegation) in other regions. In the regions where the center controls social welfare 
distribution through earmarked fiscal transfer to favor the privileged groups in social welfare 
provision, local leaders are interested in raising the generosity of social health insurance which 
only the privileged groups have access to, because the more they spend on these groups, the 
more fiscal transfer they can credibly claim and obtain from the center. Thus, the social welfare 
provision in the politically privileged regions will be re-enforced as the “Privileged Type” 
model—low coverage, high generosity and stratification. In the other regions where the center 
substantially delegates discretionary authority to local leaders in social welfare provision 
especially on coverage and generosity dimensions, local leaders will make different choices 
according to local conditions. In the regions where both social risk and fiscal revenues are low, 
local leaders have insufficient incentive and capacity to change much either coverage or 
generosity of social health insurance. They maintain a modest welfare provision for the 
privileged groups such as the launching organizations to meet the center’s minimum expectation. 
As a result, the social welfare provision of these regions remains to be the “Status-Quo Type” 
model—low coverage and generosity. By contrast, in the regions where social risks are 
significantly high, local leaders who are concerned about the increasing social risks and their 
impact on the ability to maintain social stability are motivated to expand the coverage of social 




local leaders in the wealthy regions afford to expand both coverage and generosity of social 
health insurance whereas their counterparts in the poor regions will only expand the coverage. 
Thus, social welfare provision in the former results in the “Dual Type” model—high coverage 
and generosity in social welfare provision while social welfare in the latter results in the “Risk-
Pooling Type” model—high coverage but low generosity. Figure 2.3 summarizes local leaders’ 
political strategies and respective results in local social welfare provision given the center’s 
strategies.  
2.4 The Politics of Social Health Insurance Reform in China 
Recalling that the center’s strategy in social welfare provision is to control the stratification 
pattern while accommodating diverse social needs or local circumstances through generosity and 
coverage, the different policy choices at the local level regarding coverage and generosity of 
social welfare provisions have distinct impacts on social welfare distribution, some of which may 
diverge from the center’s primary interest. Thus the interactions between central and local 
leaders, including efforts at control and evasion of control of the stratification pattern in social 
welfare provisions, stand at the core of the politics of Chinese social welfare reform.  
In 2009, the Chinese central leadership unveiled its most ambitious health reform plan to date 
and committed to expanding social health insurance to provide affordable and equitable basic 
health care to all (State Council 2009). The implementation of the social health insurance reform 
is remarkably uneven at local levels, reflecting not only the contradiction underlying the Chinese 
authoritarian regime’s competing tactics of “control” and “accommodation” in social welfare 
provision, but also the divergence of policy preferences between the central and local leaders. 
Specifically, some local leaders who do not prefer to change the pooling level or coverage of 




cooperate with the center in social health insurance expansion. By contrast, some local leaders 
eagerly expand the coverage of social health insurance to counteract high social risks in local 
circumstances; their efforts will inevitably change the stratification pattern and thus deviate from 
or even contradict the central leadership’s preference for maintaining a stratified and fragmented 
social welfare system in favor of the privileged groups. The dynamic interaction between the 
central and local governments constitutes the politics of social health insurance reform in most 
regions where the center has delegated substantial discretion to local leaders in social welfare 
provision. This section uses case studies of the social health insurance reform in different 
Chinese regions to illustrate the central-local interaction or the politics in Chinese social welfare 
provision. Table 2.1 summarizes the basic socioeconomic and health insurance situations of the 
provinces from which the following case studies largely draw evidence.  
Local Resistance to Reform  
Social health insurance in the Guangxi and Heilongjiang provinces has relatively low 
generosity and coverage. Moreover, it is especially fragmented and inequitable, without 
substantial health insurance reform in the past decade. For example, Heilongjiang, a northeastern 
province in China, has 91 pooling units for social health insurance. Within each of those 91 
pooling units (most of them counties), there are three to six social health insurance programs 
designated for different social groups, including a scheme for urban employees, a scheme for 
flexible (self-employed) employees, a scheme for rural-to-urban migrants, a scheme for urban 
adult residents, a scheme for urban youth and college students, and a scheme for rural residents. 
With relatively low labor mobility and fiscal revenue in these provinces, the local leaders have 
insufficient motivation and capacity to substantially expand coverage or generosity of social 




health insurance expansion is resistance or hypocritical compliance. In one provincial-level 
officer’s own words, “some of our local governments cannot even pay off their staff’s salaries on 
time, let alone expand social health insurance [for the people].”
 22 
In order to meet the center’s social health insurance expansion target, local officials in these 
provinces tolerated or even encouraged duplicate enrollments in social health insurance. Under 
China’s current hukou system,
 
millions of rural-to-urban migrants, including peasant workers and 
students who work or study in cities for years, still have to maintain rural status. In terms of 
hukou, they are entitled to rural social health insurance benefits through the New Rural 
Corporative Medical Insurance (NRCMI); yet, in terms of employment and residency, many of 
them are qualified for urban social health insurance benefits such as the Urban Employee Basic 
Medical Insurance (UEBMI) or the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI). Some 
local officials compete to put this “floating population” on their social health insurance 
enrollment rosters. By doing so, they not only easily satisfy the upper levels’ evaluation by 
increasing the social health insurance enrollment in their jurisdiction, but they can also ask for 
more fiscal subsidies from the upper-level government since the subsidization is linked to 
enrollment size.
23
 The more fragmented the local social health insurance system is, the easier it is 
to hide and make duplicate enrollments. Therefore, duplicate enrollment is quite common in the 
provinces like Guangxi and Heilongjiang where multiple social health insurance programs co-
exist without much coordination or integration. According to an informant, the amount of social 
health insurance duplicate enrollments in Guangxi is estimated to be as high as 30%, compared 
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 In 2011 and 2012, the central state frequently sent out ad-hoc inspection 
teams to these regions, examining social health insurance enrollment documents and auditing 
insurance funds to verify the local enrollments of social health insurance.
25 
Local Reforms Ahead of the Center  
Contrary to the local resistance to reform in regions like Guangxi and Heilongjiang, local 
reform initiatives in some other regions are often ahead of the center’s plan and directives. One 
commonality of the regions with substantial social health insurance reforms is that they 
encounter high social risks, resulting from population aging, mass migration or labor market 
shifts, which motivate local leaders to dramatically expand social health insurance coverage 
despite a possible decrease in the stratification of social health insurance. Social health insurance 
expansion per se is encouraged by the center. But expanding social health insurance in a manner 
that attenuates stratification undercuts the center’s interest, as it indicates that the privileged 
groups’ relative gains and benefits may be reduced. Two examples of social health insurance 
expansion illustrate the central-local struggles around the issue of stratification: 1) pooling 
together all the health insurance programs for different groups; and 2) pooling together the urban 
and the rural health insurance programs.  
One of the most radical initiatives in social health insurance expansion can be found in 
Dongguan City of Guangdong Province, a young migrant city located in the Pearl River Delta 
Area—one of the wealthiest regions in China. Dongguan is the first prefectural-level city in the 
country to abolish divisions of social groups (e.g. urban vs. rural, indigents vs. migrants, labor 
market insiders vs. outsiders, state vs. private sector divisions, etc.) in social insurance 
enrollment. Beneficiaries, no matter their income, hukou, or employment status (sector, employer 
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size, informality, etc.) all receive the same package of health insurance benefits. Such radical 
reform measures not only significantly expand the coverage of social health insurance in 
Dongguan, but also remove its institutional fragmentation and stratification. Meanwhile, the 
generosity of social health insurance has increased as coverage has expanded. Starting from 2008, 
the Dongguan government subsidizes migrant and peasant workers to join social health insurance 
programs.  
The center has wavered in its responses to Dongguan’s radical health reform. On one hand, 
the center does not wholeheartedly endorse the reform measures, as “universalistic” social 
welfare is not the center’s preferable model for social welfare provision. According to a local 
official, the city was implicitly “punished” by the center in many ways because of its radical 
health reform, such as losing in the national competition for the title of “the Cleanest City”.
26 
Since the Social Insurance Law took effect in 2011, Dongguan leaders have encountered 
increasing pressure to moderate or reverse some of the reform measures because the center’s 
preferable stratification pattern of social health insurance has been “institutionalized” by law. 
Aside from exerting top-down pressure on Dongguan leaders to slow down their radical reform 
experiments, however, there is not much the center has done to reverse the health reform in 
Dongguan. The radical yet pragmatic reform measures are welcomed by the people who work or 
live in a city as highly open and marketized as Dongguan, and no social unrest has resulted from 
the reform. Moreover, all reform initiates are financed through local coffers; as one official said, 
“we receive nothing from the center for social health insurance.”
27
 By the summer of 2011, one 
compromise that the Dongguan local leaders made in social health reform was to introduce 
supplementary social health insurance benefits for civil servants on top of the local 
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“universalistic” health insurance provisions, in order to maintain a higher healthcare benefit level 
for the privileged groups.   
Unlike the Dongguan local leaders, who afford to expand both coverage and generosity of 
social health insurance, the local leaders in many other regions with high social risks prefer to 
enlarge social health insurance coverage without raising the generosity. Peasants, rural migrants 
and informal or private sector employees who were previously excluded from the social 
insurance system are now sought after by those local leaders who seek to expand social health 
insurance coverage. The expansion is generally encouraged by the center, but how to expand the 
coverage without changing the preferable stratification pattern of social welfare provision is 
controversial within the central leadership. In the inland provinces such as Sichuan and Hunan, a 
bold yet effective local initiative to enlarge the coverage of social health insurance is to pool 
together the health insurance programs for urban non-working residents and for rural residents.
28 
According to the center’s estimates, this reform measure has been undertaken by one tenth of 




The center has at least two concerns about expanding social welfare provision by merging the 
urban and rural health insurance programs. First, doing so may hurt the vested interests of some 
bureaucrats. The social health insurance program for the rural population (NRCMS) has been 
supervised by the Ministry of Health (MoH), while health insurance for the urban population (e.g. 
UEBMI and URBMI) is supervised by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
(MoHRSS). Each of these two ministries takes credit for managing its respective program and 
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has tremendous interest in keeping it.
30
 The ambiguity of the central leadership’s decisions on 
whether and how to merge these health insurance programs leads to a variety of local practices in 
social health insurance reform. Among the 30 prefectural-level cities and 150 counties that have 
pooled these two health insurance programs together, some localities put the newly integrated 
program under the supervision of MoH, some put it under the MoHRSS, and others changed 
back and forth; a few tentatively put the program under the supervision of a third agency.
31
  
The second concern, and the fundamental one for the central leadership, is that expanding 
social health insurance coverage by merging separate health insurance programs may change the 
stratified social welfare provision model that is most preferred by the center for political reasons. 
Of special importance for the survival of the Chinese authoritarian regime is giving different 
groups different benefits in social welfare provision to weaken their will and capacity for 
horizontal mobilization that could be a threat to regime stability. The center has to trade off the 
gains against the political risks of integrating urban and rural social health insurance.
32
 A 
compromising measure for the local leaders who try to expand social health insurance coverage 
by pooling together different social health insurance programs without inviting the center’s 
intervention is to differentiate benefits packages for different social groups. For example, in 
Sichuan province, where the integration of rural and urban social health insurance programs is 
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 In the Third Plenum of the 18
th
 Chinese Communist Party Congress in November 2013, the central 
leadership promised to create an “urban-rural integrated social welfare system” but it is not clear yet how 





endorsed by the center, the benefit differentials between rural and urban residents are maintained 
in the new rural-urban integrated health insurance program.
33 
     
In sum, a considerable part of the politics of social welfare expansion in China lies in the 
central-local struggles over the design and implementation of policy. The root of the central-local 
tension in social welfare provision is the center’s competing goals: on one hand, it attempts to 
control who gets what, distributing more benefits to the groups that are politically connected or 
important from the center’s perspective; on the other, the center seeks to delegate decisions over 
social welfare provision to local leaders in order to accommodate many other social groups and 
the diversity of local situations. The center’s competing goals both constrain and compel local 
leaders, generating various policy choices at local levels, some of which diverge from or even 
contradict the center’s most desirable outcome. Given the center’s extensive personnel control 
and exclusive legislative power, however, many of the central-local struggles or disagreements 
result in compromise on the part of local leaders, though some of them end in deadlocks in 
reform.  
2.5 Summary of Hypotheses  
This section concludes the above analysis of Chinese social welfare provision and the politics 
thereof by formulating a set of hypotheses about the distribution of social health insurance 
benefits for empirical analyses that the following chapters pursue.   
Who Gets What, When and How from Chinese Social Welfare Expansion?  
The theoretical analysis of the central leadership’s preference and strategy in social welfare 
provision indicates that the center adopts different strategies in social welfare provision for 
different social groups. The center establishes and promotes a highly stratified and fragmented 
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social welfare provision system to privilege the groups such as urban state sectors, launching 
organizations and ethnic minority groups whom they consider politically critical for regime 
stability. The observable implications of this argument include 1) the privileged groups will 
receive more social welfare benefits than other social groups do in all regions; 2) the regions 
with concentrated privileged groups will have more stratified social welfare provision than do 
other regions. Accordingly, I formulate the following two hypotheses using social health 
insurance example. Chapter 3 in this dissertation will test these hypotheses using individual-level 
survey data and provincial-level government statistics. 
Hypothesis 1: The privileged groups (e.g. urban state sectors, launching organizations) will 
receive more healthcare benefits than others do.  
Hypothesis 2: Stratification of social health insurance is higher in the privileged regions (e.g. 
capital city, provincial-level municipalities, and ethnic autonomous regions) than in other regions.  
Subnational Variation in Chinese Social Welfare Provision  
The theoretical analysis also demonstrates that central leadership adopts different strategies 
in social welfare provision for different regions. The center adopts “control” in social welfare 
provision in the regions with concentrated privileged groups and adopts “accommodation” (or, 
delegation) in other regions. In the regions where local leaders are given substantial discretionary 
authority in determining the coverage and generosity of social welfare, local leaders will make 
choices based on local socioeconomic conditions. Empirically, we should see significantly 
distinct regional variation of social welfare provision across Chinese regions and these variations 
should be systematically correlated to the differences in local fiscal and social conditions such as 
fiscal resource and social risk. The hypotheses for empirical tests are developed as below using 
social health insurance example. Chapter 4 in this dissertation will assess these hypotheses using 




Hypothesis 3: Chinese social health insurance provision will display distinct and systematic 
regional variation in generosity and coverage.  
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Regions with high social risks will expand more the coverage of social health 
insurance.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2: Regions with high fiscal revenue will increase more the generosity of social 
health insurance.  
 
Social Welfare Provision in a Comparative Perspective  
Chapter 5 extends the investigation of social welfare provision in China to a cross-
national comparative context. Using the same multidimensional conceptualization of social 
welfare benefits developed and adopted in the study of Chinese social welfare, social protection 
in other countries can also be investigated and evaluated on the three dimensions--coverage, 
generosity and stratification. Theory suggests that politicians faced with different political 
institutions and socioeconomic constraints will make different policy choices on these three 
dimensions. First, democracies should provide less stratified benefits than autocracies do because 
the popularly elected leaders in democracies must please a larger proportion of population in 
order to stay in office. Second, countries that rely more heavily on taxation of individuals or 
local sources for fiscal revenue should provide more generous and broader benefits than their 
counterparts that reply more heavily on taxation on corporations or outside-source revenue. 
Third, economies with more openness should offer broader social protection coverage but lower 
generosity of social benefits than others do. A cross-national panel dataset on social protection in 
37 Asian countries between 2005 and 2010 is constructed to test the hypothetical correlations 
between political regime/fiscal resource/economic openness and social protection. 
Hypothesis 1: social welfare in non-democracies has a higher degree of stratification than 
does social welfare in democracies.   
 
Hypothesis 2: countries with higher shares of tax revenue from taxation on individuals 
provide more social welfare benefits (indicated by a higher degree of generosity and coverage of 





Hypothesis 3: countries with higher shares of total fiscal revenue from outside sources 
provide more social welfare benefits than otherwise.   
 
Hypothesis 4: economic openness is positively associated with the coverage of social 
protection.  
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3 Expansion of Chinese Social Health Insurance: Who Gets What, When 
and How? 
 
3.1     Introduction  
In the conventional welfare state literature, a counterintuitive finding persists, namely that 
“social welfare is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of 
inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of 
social relations.” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 23) Among the “three worlds of welfare capitalism,” 
conservative welfare states such as Germany, Austria, Italy and France consolidate divisions 
among wage-earners by legislating distinct programs for different occupations and status groups, 
while liberal welfare states such as Great Britain and most of the Anglo-Saxon world allow for a 
dualism between the state and the market, in the form of state-provided means-tested assistance 
and market-based private welfare plans.  Most existing studies of social welfare, however, are 
geographically confined to these categories of advanced industrial democracies, particularly in 
the European setting. The question of social welfare distribution in an authoritarian regime with 
a transitional economy, like China, remains an understudied yet intriguing one. What does social 
welfare distribution look like in China? Does it differ from the stratification attributes found in 
OECD countries, and if so, by what political logic? This chapter addresses those questions by 
drawing upon empirical evidence from China’s social health insurance programs.  
My investigation starts with a puzzling observation about Chinese social health insurance 
over the past decade. On the one hand, coverage of social health insurance dramatically 
expanded during that time period. In 1998, the State Council established a social health insurance 
program for urban employees, the so-called Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI). 




which rapidly expanded services into rural China. In 2007, another health insurance program, the 
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI), was introduced into urban areas to 
incorporate the urban non-working population into the social insurance system. By 2010, 237.35 
million employees (including retirees) were enrolled in UEBMIC and 195.28 million urban 
residents (including college students, teenagers, and the elderly without pensions) were 
beneficiaries of URBMI. Meanwhile, 832 million rural people were covered under the NRCMI. 
In 2004, when social health insurance expansion began, only 34.4% of the Chinese population 
was covered by social health insurance. In 2010, after the social health insurance expansion was 
fully implemented, coverage reached 90.62%. The present expenditure for urban social health 
insurance, furthermore, is 353.81 billion RMB, more than four times the 2004 level of spending.  
On the other hand, the distribution of expanded social health insurance benefits has been 
highly fragmented and uneven, reflecting and reinforcing existing inequalities or cleavages in 
society. First, like other large-population states with diverse regional economies, China’s 
healthcare system faces built-in regional disparities by virtue of the country’s geographical 
expanse and uneven development across regions. The regional disparities in healthcare has 
persisted and even worsened through the recent expansion. Second, since the Maoist era, rural 
and urban China have operated under quite distinct systems, with urbanites consistently 
privileged over their rural counterparts in terms of social provision. Third, even within urban 
China, the employed, working class enjoys various types of healthcare benefits not available to 
those outside of the labor market due to skill shortcomings, disease, disability, or age. Fourth, the 
Chinese social health insurance system is so fragmented that those in government employment or 




sectors of the economy, especially in the informal sector that is home to increasing numbers of 
migrant workers. 
Based on eleven months of fieldwork and in-depth data analysis, I find that China’s social 
health insurance expansion does extend access to basic social health insurance to most people. 
Yet, the expansion not only fails to correct inequalities resulting from the burgeoning market 
economy, but also reinforces existing social cleavages inherited from the socialist past, such as 
the rural-urban divide. Moreover, the fragmented programs and increasing benefit disparities at 
the heart of the expansion have created new divides within certain social groups, such as 
urbanites and the workforce. In elucidating the multiple social cleavages embedded in China’s 
social health insurance system, this chapter sheds light on the politics of authoritarian social 
welfare more generally, that is, how political leaders in an authoritarian regime distribute 
resources to maintain regime stability. Of special importance to the survival of the Chinese 
authoritarian regime is the maintenance of particularly privileged welfare provisions for urban 
and state-sector employees while preserving an essentially modest social provision for other 
societal groups. China’s fragmented social welfare provision intertwines multiple social 
inequalities that do not follow a single deep class cleavage and thus consolidates divisions 
among social groups to prevent alliances that could challenge the regime. Its underlying political 
rationale echoes authoritarian regimes’ conventional tactic: “divide and rule.”  
This chapter unfolds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews relevant social welfare studies to define 
this study’s contribution to the literature. Section 3.3 overviews the development of China’s 
healthcare system in the past decades and introduces the historical background of the recent 
social health insurance expansion. Section 3.4 analyzes the distribution of the expanded social 




implications. Section 3.5 elucidates the political rationale of the stratified and inequitable social 
welfare system in China. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of China’s 
social health insurance expansion on social mobilization and social welfare development.  
3.2     Received Wisdoms: Political Economy of Social Welfare Expansion 
Much scholarship in recent decades has been devoted to studying the expanding coverage of 
health insurance in various countries, thereby identifying a number of key factors for successful 
expansion of social health insurance coverage (Carrin and James 2001, 2005). First, there is the 
general level of income and the rate of economic growth: more income means, ceteris paribus, 
greater capacity to pay health insurance contributions. Second, the structure of the economy also 
matters. Most relevant are the relative sizes of the formal and informal sectors, as this ratio 
affects the administrative costs of social health insurance. Third, administrative costs may be 
further influenced by the distribution of the population, both demographically and geographically. 
A fourth factor is the country’s ability to administer health insurance, as government stewardship 
is required to launch and guide a process that leads to compulsory health insurance for all. 
Finally, the level of solidarity in a society affects the expansion of health insurance coverage, 
insofar as it becomes very difficult to pool resources when a society is already quite unequal 
from the start. 
Concurring with these findings, studies of social health insurance coverage in China 
generally discover that (1) economic development plays a valuable role in the development of 
social health insurance for urban employees; (2) a strong financial and administrative capacity of 
the government contributes to the progress of social health insurance for urban employees; and 
(3) higher trade union density is closely related to more rapid expansion of social health 
insurance for urban employees (Liu 2011). However, many questions are unanswered by this line 




coverage? Who pays and who gains from the expansion? The absence of micro-level accounts is 
one weakness of this literature. Moreover, as this literature sees health insurance expansion 
primarily as a functional process, it pays insufficient attention to the question of how political 
power shapes the expansion of social health insurance coverage, particularly the distribution of 
the expanded benefits. That question of resource distribution—who gets what, when and how—
is a central theme of political studies of social welfare.  
Unlike the functional account of social health insurance expansion, a new line of literature in 
comparative political economy attempts to account for the cross-national variation of social 
welfare from political leaders’ strategies for political survival (Mares and Carnes 2009).
 
Studies 
note that outside a handful of European and North American countries, social insurance 
programs have largely been adopted by nondemocratic regimes. Studies of authoritarian regimes 
demonstrate that political leaders adopt strategies using both “sticks” (e.g. repression, terror etc.) 
and “carrots” (e.g. rents, patronage etc.) to minimize potential threats to regime stability and to 
mobilize mass support. The distributive outcomes of social welfare, one of the instruments for 
autocratic regimes to maintain regime stability, depend on specific policy design. This, then, 
raises an interesting series of political choices: to whom the authoritarian leaders would 
distribute benefits and what determines the distribution thereof. Mares and Carnes contend that 
the social policy profile autocracies pursue is premised on their political strategy for survival 
(Mares and Carnes 2009). If the authoritarian government relies on organizational co-optation of 
a small group of critical supporters, they will enact “restrictive” social policies characterized by 
narrow coverage and generous benefits. Conversely, if the autocrat is brought to power by a 
broad coalition of interests and chooses a strategy based on organizational proliferation, the 




and broader coverage on the other hand. Although this literature aims to explain cross-national 
differences in social welfare provision, it provides useful insight for understanding China’s 
social welfare changes across time as well. My study builds on this literature and demonstrates 
that Chinese authoritarian leaders not only strategically change the scope of distribution of social 
welfare benefits but also manipulate the relative benefits for different social groups to achieve 
political goals. Moreover, I specify the relative gains and losses of different social groups from 
the social health insurance expansion and explore the political motive underlying the 
fragmentation and hierarchy of Chinese social welfare.  
Despite rich studies of Chinese social health insurance policies (Du 2009; Gu 2001b; Gu and 
Zhang 2006; Lue 2012; Pan and Liu 2012; Wagstaff et al. 2009b), some gaps in the extant 
literature remain to be filled. First of all, scholarship in the field is in need of updating, as 
existing publications on Chinese social health insurance do not sufficiently reflect recent 
dramatic changes in the system, especially those occurring since expansion started in 2003. 
Secondly, expansion of Chinese social health insurance in general has received less scholarly 
attention than individual social health insurance programs, such as the NRCMI or UEBMI. 
While there have been specific or systematic studies of those individual social health insurance 
programs (Lei and Lin 2009; Lin et al. 2009; Liu 2011; Liu et al. 2002), none has focused on the 
overall landscape comprised by such programs. Thirdly, the stratification consequences of social 
health insurance expansion have been largely neglected in existing literature. Thus, many 
interesting questions are left unanswered in the literature, regarding, for example, who benefits 
from the expansion, what kinds of health insurance benefits different groups obtain from the 




benefits. To address these gaps in the literature, this chapter presents a detailed analysis of “who 
gets what, when and how” from the expansion of Chinese social health insurance.  
3.3     Pathway to “Universal” Social Health Insurance in China  
China’s social welfare reform began in the mid-1980s, accompanying its economic transition 
and openness. The reform is a trial-and-error process characterized by gradualist and incremental 
changes over the past decades. The pathway to universal (quanmin) social health insurance
34
 in 
contemporary China can be summarized as consisting of the following steps. 
Pre-reform Phase (1949-1988): Free Health Care under the “Iron Rice Bowl” System  
During Mao’s era (1949-1976), Chinese health insurance and to some extent health care 
delivery were organized around work units (danwei). The system was thus called a “danwei-
based welfare system.” It consists of three components. The Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS, 
nongcun hezuo yiliao) financed health care for members of the agricultural communes, whereas 
the Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS, laobao) and Government Insurance Scheme (GIS, gongfei 
yiliao) financed health care for state-owned enterprise (SOEs) workers and government officials, 
respectively. As the market transition was initiated in 1979 and then gathered speed, the danwei-
based welfare system began to malfunction (Gu 2001). First, when China reformed its rural 
economy in 1979 and introduced the household responsibility system, the communes 
disappeared in rural areas; without that base for funding and organization, the CMS collapsed, 
leaving around 90% of all peasants uninsured. Second, reform of the SOEs caused many 
enterprises to fall into financial difficulty, and a large number of SOEs were closed. 
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Consequently, employment levels in SOEs fell sharply, and the workers who did keep their jobs 
often found their employers unable to honor their commitments to the LIS scheme. Third, the 
danwei-based welfare system placed a heavy financial burden upon work units as well as upon 
the state. The non-contributory nature of the system resulted not only in the extremely inefficient 
operation of welfare provision, but also in an unlimited growth of welfare demands. The older an 
enterprise was, and the more retired workers it had, the heavier the welfare burden it had to bear. 
This resulted in the absence of a level playing field for different enterprises, even for those in the 
same industrial sector and same location (World Bank 1997). The problem was exacerbated by 
increasing competition between the state and private sector enterprises. The poor financial 
situation of SOEs throughout the 1990s in turn led to crises in the danwei-based welfare system 
(Gu 2001).  
Reform Phase I (1988-2003): Initiation of Social Health Insurance  
The Chinese government faced tremendous pressure for reform, especially because the total 
expenses of danwei-based welfare soared from the mid-1980s onwards. Reform of the danwei-
based welfare system formally began in 1988. During the early stage of the reform from 1988 to 
1994, health care reform concentrated on reducing medical care expenses rather than on building 
a new insurance system (Gu 2001). One of the commonly imposed reform measures was that 
individual patients had to share 10–20% of outpatient fees and 5–10% of hospitalization fees, 
and expenditure for individual workers was capped at 5% of their annual wage or the level of 
their monthly wage (Ma 1992). These measures were followed by “risk-pooling” experiments, in 
which groups of enterprises pooled funds to pay for the treatment of their current employees’ 
serious illnesses or the medical treatment of their retired employees (Duckett 2004). After the 
experiments with “co-payment” and “risk pooling” of health insurance in some cities from 1988 




began to operate in about sixty Chinese cities in 1994. Finally, the Urban Employees Basic 
Medical Insurance (UEBMI) was established by the central government in late 1998. According 
to that 1998 policy decision, all cities had to set up contribution-based basic health insurance 
schemes by the end of 1999. In this health insurance scheme, employers were required to pay 6–
8% of their total payroll into a local health insurance fund (HIF) and dedicate health insurance 
accounts (HIAs) held in the name of each employee. Employees pay 2% of their wages into their 
HIAs. In principal, HIAs pay for an employee’s treatment costing up to 10% of the local average 
annual wage, after which the HIF pays. There is a limit on how much the HIF will pay for any 
single individual, set at four to six times the average annual wage (Duckett 2004). 
Compared to the former GIS and LIS, the UEBMI established in 1998 expanded coverage to 
non-state sectors and enterprises, but its coverage was still limited for many reasons. First, 
enterprises in poor financial health were not able to pay the employer’s portion of health 
insurance contributions. In particular, private firms and small businesses, whose employees are 
mostly young migrants, found it too costly to enroll them in the urban employee health insurance. 
Second, members of certain social groups, especially people without stable and secure 
employment, the elderly, the disabled, and peasants, enjoyed no health security at all due to an 
institutional design that mainly targeted formal employees (but not their dependents). By 2003, 
the coverage rate of UEBMI was only 36%, and self-paying patients made up a large share of the 
health care market (Gu and Zhang 2006). Consequently, the 2003 SARS outbreak shocked the 
Chinese leaders, exposed the inadequacies of the public health protection system, and showed 
how government’s neglect had left the health care system unprepared to deal with its core 
responsibilities. 




A series of measures were introduced from 2003 onwards. The first was the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Insurance (NRCMI), introduced in 2003 to replace the former CMS and 
aimed at providing insurance to the rural population. By the end of 2010, in 22 out of 31 
provinces, more than 90% of the rural population was covered by the NRCMI program thanks to 
huge public subsidies (see Figure 3.1). Secondly, a health insurance program known as Urban 
Resident Basic Medical Insurance, or URBMI, was introduced in 2007 for the 420 million urban 
residents not covered by the UEBMI. In 2008, the government announced its intention to roll the 
URBMI program out in half of China’s cities by the end of 2008, and to ultimately extend 
coverage to 100% of cities by 2010. By the end of 2010, more than half of urban residents in 
twelve provinces were covered by the URBMI program, with considerable government subsidies 
(see Figure 3.2). Target groups for the URBMI are children, the elderly, the disabled, and other 
non-working urban residents (Wagstaff and Yip 2009). Furthermore, in 2009, the Chinese 
government unveiled its most ambitious health reform plan to date and committed to spending an 
additional US $125 billion in the following three years, providing affordable and equitable basic 
health care for all. About 50% of the government’s 2009 health reform funding is targeted for 
subsidization of enrollment in social health insurance (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Stimulated by 
the new influx of funding, the provincial average of UEBMI coverage increased from 68.02% to 
95.88% in 2009, despite the presence of discernible regional variation (see Figure 3.3). At the 
end of 2010, social health insurance coverage in 26 out of 31 Chinese provinces exceeded 80% 
(see Figure 3.4). Since then, a social health insurance system with “universal” (quanmin) 
coverage has been established in China.  
In summary, the evolution of China’s healthcare entitlements during the past decades follows 




healthcare as a basic social right.
35
 Instead, the changing scope and generosity of healthcare 
benefits have reflected the strategies adopted by the Chinese central leadership of different 
generations, with distinct political and economic priorities in minds. During the economic 
transition from command economy to market economy from 1978 to 1998, political leaders’ 
priority over increasing economic efficiency induced the abolishment of free healthcare and 
induced state retreat from social welfare. During the subsequent state-sector restructuring and 
reforms from the late 1990s into the early 2000s, increasing concern over social instability led to 
the socialization of risk pools and social protection through a rapid build-up of the social health 
insurance system for urban employees. In 2003, accompanying the rise of the new Hu-Wen 
leadership and their visions of sustainable development with a “harmonious society” and 
economic openness, the social health insurance coverage began expanding and became 
inclusive.
36
 However, social welfare expansion without significant political reforms in China has 
stimulated much curiosity among scholars regarding its distributive consequences and 
implications. Given the absence of enfranchisement in China, can everyone benefit the same 
from the expansion of social welfare? Who will benefit more from the expansion of social 
welfare and who will loss or pay the cost? The next section will examine the distribution of the 
expanded social health insurance benefits in Chinese society.   
3.4     Distribution of the Expanded Social Health Insurance Benefits in China 
The impact of social welfare reform has been no less dramatic than that of economic reform 
in China. Social welfare reform has produced new inequalities, regional disparities and an 
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abandonment of the “Iron Rice Bowl” for the urban industrial working class. This section will 
first illustrate with descriptive data who are the beneficiaries of the social health insurance 
expansion and what kinds of health insurance benefits they obtain from the expansion. Special 
attention will be given to the distributive implications of the expansion, which will highlight the 
highly stratifying nature of the social health insurance expansion. The section then relies on two 
individual-level survey data sets to test the stratification hypothesis in two ways: 1) on coverage 
of the generous employment-based social health insurance, and 2) on the distribution of various 
health insurance programs among social groups. It contends that the social health insurance 
expansion not only strengthens and deepens existing social cleavages, but also creates new 
divides in the Chinese society.   
Inequality of Social Health Insurance Benefit  
Both individual-level survey data and provincial-level statistics demonstrate that China’s 
social health insurance coverage has dramatically expanded in the past decade. According to the 
China Health & Nutrition Panel Survey (CHNS) data,
37
 the coverage of social health insurance 
(including UEBMI, URBMI and NRCMI programs) in nine Chinese provinces increased from 
37.39% in 2000 to 89.5% in 2009 on average (see Figure 3.5). In terms of the number of 
beneficiaries, provincial-level statistics show that peasants and their dependents were the largest 
beneficiary group of Chinese social health insurance throughout 2007-2010 (Figure 3.6). From 
2007 onwards, urban residents (the urban unemployed, self-employed, elderly and students) 
increasingly got insured by the newly established URBMI program, becoming the second largest 
group of beneficiaries of social health insurance in most provinces by 2010 (also seen in Figure 
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3.6). By contrast, the percentage of employees among total beneficiaries of social health 
insurance declined from 2007 to 2010 by 4 %. Only in the coastal metropolises (Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin) are more than half of social health insurance beneficiaries employees. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that urban employees, who are the primary 
beneficiaries of the UEBMI program, have lost out in the social health insurance expansion. On 
the contrary, a comparison of the per capita expenditures of UEBMI, URBMI and NRCMI 
programs in 2007 and 2010 respectively indicates that the generosity to urban employees was 
remarkably higher than the generosity to urban non-working population and rural populations in 
both years (Figure 3.7). In 2010, the expenditure of the UEBMI program was thirteen times the 
summed expenditures of the URBMI and NRCMI programs. This implies that the smallest group 
of social health insurance beneficiaries--urban employees, enjoys the vast majority of social 
health insurance benefits. Therefore, Chinese social health insurance after expansion can be 
considered not only fragmented, but also highly stratified in terms of generosity.  
The tremendous disparity between the size of beneficiary groups and the size of their 
respective benefits urges us to look carefully into the types and levels of benefits offered by 
different social health insurance programs. Based on eligibilities, Chinese social health insurance 
programs
38
 can be categorized into two types: employment-based programs (e.g. GIS, UEBMI) 
and residency-based programs (e.g. URBMI, NRCMI). Employment-based social health 
insurance is financed by defined contributions from employers and employees, while residency-
based social health insurance programs are financed mostly by general taxes in addition to 
individuals’ premium payments. Government subsidization accounts for up to 70% of financing 
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responsibilities for residency-based social health insurance in some provinces. In this sense, the 
residency-based social health insurance in China is conceptually closer to the social transfers 
financed from general taxes that are commonly seen in Scandinavian welfare states, rather than 
the conventional social insurance models employed in European continental welfare states.   
According to the CHNS data, the landscape of Chinese social health insurance has 
dramatically changed from 2000 to 2009 (Figure 3.8). In 2000, before social health insurance 
expansion, employment-based health insurance programs such as GIS and UEBMI were the 
dominant social health insurance programs in China, enrolling and supporting approximately 80% 
of overall social health insurance beneficiaries. By contrast, in 2009, after social health insurance 
expansion, as much as 40% of social health insurance beneficiaries were covered by residency-
based health insurance programs such as URBMI and NRCMI. It is noteworthy, furthermore, 
that the government’s free medical care (GIS), which had previously covered government 
officials and civil servants, shrank to become one of the smallest health insurance programs in 
2009, as it became a supplementary scheme under UEBMI in many provinces. Shares of 
commercial and other health insurance programs remained residual and decreasing in China from 
2000 to 2009, especially after the social health insurance expansion that has significantly 
squeezed the space for private insurance.   
In terms of the generosity of health insurance, a report by the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Insurance in 2010 demonstrates that the UEBMI’s in-patient reimbursement rate is 
notably higher than the URBMI’s, except in three metropolises (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) 
(see Figure 3.9). The provincial average of in-patient reimbursement rates is 67.68% of medical 
expenses for UEBMI beneficiaries (mainly urban state-sector employees), down to 55.32 % for 




students). A similar pattern can be found for out-patient reimbursement, with a few exceptions 
(see Figure 3.10). The provincial average of out-patient reimbursement for UEBMI beneficiaries 
is 98.23 Yuan per patient, 1/3 higher than for URBMI beneficiaries. Despite the lack of 
comparable data for the NRCMI program, both my research and secondary literature indicate 
that the NRCMI’s reimbursement rates are further lower than the URBMI’s (Meng and Tang 
2010).  Hence, it can be said that the employment-based social health insurance programs 
provide the most generous yet exclusive benefits to urban formal employees, while the 
residency-based social health insurance programs supply inclusive yet limited benefits to other 
groups.  
Stratification of Social Health Insurance: Employment-Based Health Insurance Coverage  
The above section has delineated a nuanced picture of Chinese social health insurance 
expansion. On the one hand, social groups such as peasants or urban residents who are 
unemployed, self-employed, or informally employed, and who were previously excluded from 
the urban employment-based social health insurance programs, have gradually been insured 
through the residency-based health insurance programs (mainly URBMI and NRCMI). On the 
other hand, the benefits these newly insured groups have received are quite limited and rely 
heavily on government subsidization for financing (half from the central government and half 
from the local government in the western and inland provinces). Such a policy design generates 
certain consequences with intrinsic distributive implications. First, the residency-based social 
health insurance benefits are vulnerable to fiscal cutbacks, especially when local governments—
one of the major sponsors of social health insurance, are unable to make ends meet. Second, the 
employment and non-employment divide artificially created in the social health insurance 
programs identifies beneficiaries with labor market participation and thus continues to 




into the social health insurance system as well. Hence, the expansion of Chinese social health 
insurance reinforces social inequalities. The stratification of social health insurance throughout 
the expansion period is evident on two aspects: selective coverage of the generous employment-
based social health insurance, and different types of health insurance programs available to 
different groups. It is hypothesized that both the coverage of employment-based social health 
insurance and the distribution of social health insurance programs among social groups are 
highly correlated with people’s socioeconomic and employment status. This subsection will 
present empirical evidence regarding the coverage of employment-based health insurance and 
the next subsection will focus on the distribution of various health insurance programs among 
social groups.  
The analysis of employment-based social health insurance coverage is based on a publicly 
available dataset, the China General Social Survey (CGSS)
39
, which was collected at the 
individual level in multiple rounds from 2003 to 2008. For inter-temporal comparison, this 
analysis relies on CGSS data collected in 2003, 2006 and 2008. The dependent variable (medinsu) 
is binary, constructed from respondents’ answer to the question: “does your work unit/company 
provide any kind of medical insurance?” on the CGSS questionnaire. The independent variables 
are all at the individual level and concentrate on individual respondents’ socioeconomic and 
employment status. The socioeconomic factors included are respondent’s education level (educ), 
annual income (log_indiv_income), household registration status (urban hukou)
 40
, membership 
in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and migration status (migrant). The employment factors 
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included are respondents’ employment status (unemployed), employment type—whether they 
have signed legal labor contract with employer (formal), employment sector (employment 
sector),
41
 and employer size (employer size). Control variables are respondents’ demographic 
factors such as age (age) and gender (female). A descriptive summary of the data is provided in 
Table 3.1. A logistic regression model is employed in this analysis.  
The logistic regression results, presented in Table 3.2, strongly support the stratification 
hypothesis. Employment-based health insurance coverage continues to privilege those 
advantaged in socioeconomic status— the high-income and high-educated group. Moreover, 
CCP members were more likely to be covered by employment-based health insurance in 2003 & 
2006, but the positive effect of party membership disappears in 2008. Using the “divide by four” 
rule for interpreting logit coefficients,
42
 holding other conditions constant, urban hukou increased 
one’s probability of being covered by employment-based health insurance by about 29% in 2003, 
but the magnitude of this effect decreases over the time period studied. Migrants had a lower 
probability of being covered by employment-based health insurance until 2008, when 
migration’s negative effect on social health insurance coverage is found becoming trivial and 
statistically insignificant.  
While we can conclude from the above results that the impacts of socioeconomic status on 
employment-based social health insurance coverage are declining in terms of significance and 
magnitude from 2003 to 2008, the effects of employment situations on insurance coverage 
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increases over the same period. Again, using the “divide by four” rule for convenience, holding 
other conditions constant, unemployment decreased one’s probability of being covered by the 
employment-based social health insurance by 1% in 2003, however, this effect increased 
significantly to 19% in 2008, meaning that unemployed people were increasingly cut off from 
the employment-based social health insurance programs from 2003 to 2008. By contrast, formal 
employees (those who have a legal labor contract with their employer) have increasingly 
benefitted from employment-based social health insurance. In effect, formal employment (formal) 
turns out to be the most salient and significant factor in determining one’s probability of being 
covered by employment-based social health insurance in all model specifications. As for 
employment sectors, the state sector is consistently and significantly associated with higher 
probabilities of being covered by employment-based health insurance. On the contrary, working 
in the private sector decreases one’s probability of being covered by employment-based social 
health insurance, though this effect is not consistent and significant if we look at a specific year’s 
sample. A large-sized employer is also more likely to provide employment-based health 
insurance, although this effect was strongest in 2003 and gradually decreased thereafter.  
To summarize the results from the logistic regression analysis, an individuals’ chance of 
being covered by employment-based social health insurance is determined by both her 
socioeconomic status (such as urban or rural household registration, indigene or migrant) and 
employment situations such as employment status (employed or unemployed), employment type 
(formal or informal), employment sector (state sector or non-state sectors) and employer’s size. 
The urban-rural divide has existed in Chinese society for decades due to the rigid household 
registration system stemming from the command economy prior to 1976. The divides between 




employment-based social health insurance, as shown in the CGSS data, reflect new kinds of 
social inequalities associated with the China’s burgeoning market economy. Therefore, it is fair 
to conclude that the expansion of the employment-based social health insurance hardly corrects 
socioeconomic inequalities; instead, it reflects and reinforces labor market cleavages. The 
Chinese state that has been remarkably successful in supervising the transition from command 
economy to market economy, fail to correct the existing and emerging social inequalities.  
Stratification of Social Health Insurance: Distribution of Various Health Insurance 
Programs in the Society  
It has been shown that the employment-based social health insurance provides much more 
generous benefits to a relatively small-sized group of beneficiaries—urban formal employees. 
The social health insurance expansion that preserves the vested interests of urban employees 
while incorporating other societal groups by creating separate health insurance programs further 
stratifies the society by reinforcing existing social cleavages and generating new divides within 
social groups. Last subsection provided empirical evidence for the stratification in terms of 
employment-based social health insurance coverage among social groups. This subsection uses 
another individual-level dataset, the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), collected in 
nine Chinese provinces in multiple waves between 2000 and 2009, to demonstrate how people 
with different socioeconomic and employment status are “selected” into different health 
insurance programs with distinct levels of benefit. In order to better compare the stratification of 
social health insurance before and after the social health insurance expansion, I use data 




The dependent variable, health insurance program (prog)
 43
, consists of five categories: 
“commercial or other health insurance,” “GIS,” “UEBMI,” “URBMI” and “NRCMI.” The rank 
of generosities of these Chinese social health insurance programs is: GIS > UEBMI>URBMI> 
NRCMI. Other than social health insurance, some people (9.87% and 2.97 % of urban adult 
respondents in the 2004 and 2009 samples, respectively) join the non-social health insurance 
programs such as commercial or other health insurance programs, but the non-social health 
insurance continues to be residual in terms of coverage and generosity in China. The focus of the 
analysis lies on social health insurance programs. Since the dependent variable is multinomial, a 
multinomial logistic regression model is applied to this analysis. I use “commercial or other 
health insurance” as the baseline category in the multinomial logistic regression. The 
independent variables cover two dimensions of individuals’ attributes: socioeconomic status and 
employment situations. The socioeconomic factors included are household registration status 
(urban hukou)
44
 and education level (edu).
45
 The factors pertaining to respondent’s employment 
situations include employment status (employsta),
46
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A summary of the descriptive data shows that the distribution of various health insurance 
programs among individuals dramatically differs with people’s socioeconomic and employment 
situations both before and after the expansion (Figures 3.11-3.14). In addition, several 
discernible trends stand out from cross-time comparison of the descriptive data. First, social 
health insurance programs became more diverse, especially for the urban population in 2009. 
Second, the share of non-social health insurance, such as commercial and private health 
insurance, has been significantly shrinking from 2004 to 2009. Third, the share of government 
free medical care (GIS) became much smaller in 2009 compared to 2004. This does not mean 
that the privileges of civil servants and government officials in healthcare have disappeared; 
rather, GIS has been integrated into the UEBMI program as a subcategory or supplementary 
insurance program for the privileged groups in two-thirds of Chinese provinces (Xinhua News 
2012).  
The regression results for the 2004 sample are presented in Table 3.3, and results for the 
2009 sample are summarized in Table 3.4. As expected, highly educated people were more likely 
to become the beneficiaries of urban employment-based social health insurance programs (GIS 
and UEBMI) than commercial or other health insurance in 2004. However, this effect decreases 
in terms of magnitude and significance in 2009. By contrast, urban household registration 
(hukou)’s effect substantially increases in both magnitude and significance from 2004 to 2009. 
Specifically, urban hukou significantly increases the odds of individuals having urban 
employment-based social health insurance (i.e. GIS or UEBMIC) relative to having commercial 
health insurance in 2009, while it did not have such an impact in 2004. This indicates that urban 
household registration (hukou) rather than individuals’ income level (assuming education being a 




benefits (including GIS, UEBMI and URBMI) since 2004. This implies that the distribution of 
social health insurance benefits is more skewed to urbanites than to high-income groups.  
The quantitative results on employment status also lend support to the stratification 
hypothesis of social health insurance expansion. Specifically, the odds of an individual 
participating in employment-based health insurance (i.e. GIS or UEBMIC) relative to 
participating in commercial health insurance significantly decrease if his/her employment status 
changes from employed to unemployed. On the contrary, the odds of an individual joining urban 
social health insurance (i.e. GIS, UEBMI or URBMIC) relative to joining commercial health 
insurance significantly increase if his/her employment status changes from employed to retired. 
These results can be interpreted to mean that as compared to employees, unemployed people 
(including students and housekeepers) are generally excluded from generous social health 
insurance programs such as the GIS and UEBMI, while retirees have increasingly benefited from 
various urban social health insurance programs, from employment-based social health insurance 
(i.e. GIS, UEBMI) to residency-based social health insurance (i.e. URBMI) throughout 2004-
2009.  
As for the effects of employment sector, there was no significant difference in terms of odds 
of one joining social health insurance relative to joining commercial and other health insurance if 
one’s employment sector changed from government institutes to SOEs in 2004 or 2009. This 
implies that no significant gap in terms of social welfare benefits existed between government 
employees and SOE employees in those years. However, the odds of individuals joining 
employment-based health insurance relative to joining commercial and other health insurance 
significantly decreased if their employment sector moves from government institutions to private 




employees, private-sector employees are less likely to benefit from employment-based social 
health insurance than from commercial or other forms of health insurance. It is also noteworthy 
that private-sector employees’ disadvantage in obtaining employment-based social health 
insurance benefits became more substantial in 2009 than in 2004. In addition, the odds of 
individuals having employment-based health insurance relative to having commercial or other 
health insurance significantly decreased if their employment sector moves from government 
institutions to collective or foreign-owned firms in 2004, though such an effect disappeared in 
2009, implying an expansion of employment-based social health insurance coverage among 
collective and foreign-owned firms in 2009.  
The effect of employer’s size on employment-based social health insurance coverage is 
positive as expected. Working for a large-sized employer significantly increased the odds of one 
having UEBMI relative to having commercial or other health insurance in both 2004 and 2009, 
which means that large-sized firms or work units in China continued to insure employees 
through UEBMI rather than commercial or other health insurance programs.  
 To summarize the multinomial logistical regression results, people with different 
socioeconomic status and employment situations are enrolled into different health insurance 
programs. Other factors equal, people with urban hukou are covered by the social health 
insurance programs with generally higher levels of benefit. Moreover, people of differential 
employment status are covered by different social health insurance programs. Retirees and 
incumbent employees are covered by the generous GIS or UEBMI programs, while unemployed 
people (including students and housekeepers) are either uninsured or insured by the programs 
with much meager and more vulnerable benefits, such as URBMI and NRCMI. Furthermore, 




insurance programs with the fewest benefits, such as NRCMI. Hence, social health insurance 
after expansion stratifies Chinese society along three cleavage lines: 1) urban versus rural; 2) 
labor market insiders versus outsiders;
49
 and 3) state versus non-state sectors. These social 
cleavage lines are not exclusive to one other. On the contrary, they are interwoven in such a way 
as to fragment the society and privilege some groups over others without breaking society into a 
single and deep class line. How does one explain the political rationale behind the social welfare 
expansion? What can the inequality and fragmentation of social health insurance tell us about 
China’s authoritarianism? The next section turns to these questions.  
3.5     The Paradox: Welfare Expansion and Social Stratification  
The distribution of China’s expanding social health insurance reveals a paradox: the 
impressive expansion of social health insurance enrollment and the increased number of social 
health insurance programs have not reduced, but rather have reproduced, socioeconomic 
inequalities. Instead of leveling the social playing field, the changes in social health insurance 
continue to link social benefits to citizens’ socioeconomic status and residency. As proved in last 
section, the expansion has significantly reinforced rather than mitigated social cleavages by 
institutionalizing those existing and emerging social divides into the social health insurance 
system. As a result, social welfare expansion strengthens rather than attenuates social 
stratification in China. This reflects authoritarian regimes’ “divide and rule” tactic in social 
welfare provision.
50
 It serves the authoritarian leaders’ interests in maintaining regime stability 
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by consolidating divisions among social groups to prevent alliances that could challenge the 
regime while tying social groups’ loyalties directly to the central state authority. Under such a 
fragmented social welfare system, horizontal mobilization among societal groups—including 
cross-regional, cross-class or cross-sectoral coalitions—becomes even more difficult as people’s 
preferences and interests are divided in a complicated way that their capabilities of aggregating 
and organizing appeals to the state are weakened.
51
 Although the “divide and rule” strategy in 
social welfare provision can contribute to preventing social groups from horizontally mobilizing 
across sectors, regions, or classes, it inevitably impairs labor market mobility and social 
solidarity. The institutional fragmentation of social security and welfare system has been 
commonly deemed by media, press and public policy scholars as one of the largest obstacles to 
China’s urbanization (Xinhua News 2013ab). It is thus speculated that in the long run such a 
strategy is detrimental rather than beneficial for China’s authoritarian regime, whose legitimacy 
has been heavily relying on economic performance.  
3.6     Conclusion  
This chapter starts from a theoretical inquiry—how are social welfare benefits stratified in 
countries outside of the OECD? Empirically, it explores who gets what, when and how from 
China’s recent social welfare expansion. Despite a large number of studies assessing the welfare 
state in advanced industrial democracies as well as single social health insurance programs in 
China such as UEBMI, NRCMI and UEBMI, little research has explored the overall landscape of 
China’s social health insurance, which has changed dramatically since expansion in 2003. This 
chapter attempts to fill these gaps by providing a nuanced understanding of the distribution 
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pattern of social health insurance benefits in China. Based on in-depth data analysis and 
fieldwork, this chapter finds that China’s social health insurance expansion from 2003 to 2009 
did significantly expand people’s access to social health insurance. Peasants and urban non-
working people who were previously excluded from the urban employee health insurance are 
now covered by separate social health insurance programs. However, the social health insurance 
coverage and benefits after expansion are not only fragmented but also highly stratified across 
three cleavage lines: 1) rural versus urban; 2) labor market insiders versus labor market outsiders; 
3) state versus private sectors. The social health insurance expansion from 2003 to 2009 reflects 
and reinforces social inequalities based on individuals’ labor market participation and 
socioeconomic status.  
The findings and arguments of this chapter highlight the coexistence and complexity of 
multiple social cleavages embedded in China’s social health insurance system, which, it is worth 
noting, also characterize the distribution of other social welfare benefits in China, such as 
pensions. The distribution pattern of social welfare in China starkly differs from the model of the 
conventional welfare state in advanced industrial democracies: it is neither solely a market-state 
division as in the liberal welfare state nor an occupational cleavage as in the conservative welfare 
state. The multiplicity and complexity of social cleavages in Chinese social welfare system 
reveal the authoritarian leaders’ “divide and rule” strategy for maintaining order. The fragmented 
social welfare provision enables multiple social cleavages to cross-cut without following a single 
and deep class line. Of special importance for the Chinese authoritarian regime to survive is the 
maintenance of particularly favorable welfare provisions for the urban and state-sector 
employees while establishing and preserving an essentially modest social provision for other 




As more and more Chinese people are covered by social health insurance, their 
dissatisfaction with the system has gradually shifted from a lack of health insurance coverage to 
inequity of health insurance benefits. Integration of social health insurance was first placed on 
the agenda in 2009 when the central government announced a comprehensive health reform with 
the primary goal of making health care accessible and affordable to all people. However, 
integrating the fragmented social health insurance programs with distinct eligibilities, generosity 
and financing mechanisms has proven to be a difficult task for the government, more complex 
than the incremental expansion of social health insurance coverage that it has accomplished over 
the past decade. Since 2012, the Chinese top leadership has come to rely on urbanization to fuel 
China’s economic growth and have planned to move 250 million rural residents into newly 
constructed towns and cities over the next dozen years. This makes integration of the fragmented 
social insurance an imperative for the government. Will the resource reallocation and 
redistribution as a result of social insurance integration empower previously marginalized social 
groups in the upcoming decade? How will the leadership integrate the fragmented social 
insurance to facilitate the largest wave of urbanization in human history without sacrificing their 
political controls over social mobilization? Will it be possible that different social groups ally to 
articulate their policy preferences and thus influence the configuration of social health insurance 
integration? If yes, what are their tools and how will they mobilize themselves cross sectors, 
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Figure 3.5 Health Insurance Coverage in Nine Provinces 
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Figure 3.8 Distribution of Health Insurance Program by Year 
Note: “commercial or other” refers to private and other health insurance; “GIS” refers to 
Government Insurance Scheme; “UEBMI” refers to Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; 
“URBMI” refers to Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance; “NRCMI” refers to New Rural 







Figure 3.9 Inpatient Reimbursement Rates of Urban Health Insurance by Province 






















































































































































Inpatient Reimbursement Rates of UEBMI and URBMI by Province 






Figure 3.10 Outpatient Reimbursement of Urban Health Insurance by Province 





















































































































































Outpatient Reimbursement Amount of UEBMI and URBMI  



















Figure 3.11 Distribution of Health Insurance Programs by Hukou and Year 
Note: “commercial or other” refers to private and other health insurance; “GIS” refers to 
Government Insurance Scheme; “UEBMI” refers to Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; 
“URBMI” refers to Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance; “NRCMI” refers to New Rural 






Figure 3.12 Distribution of Health Insurance Program by Employment Status and Year 
Note: “commercial or other” refers to private and other health insurance; “GIS” refers to 
Government Insurance Scheme; “UEBMI” refers to Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; 
“URBMI” refers to Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance; “NRCMI” refers to New Rural 







Figure 3.13 Distribution of Health Insurance Programs by Employment Sector and Year 
Note: “commercial or other” refers to private and other health insurance; “GIS” refers to 
Government Insurance Scheme; “UEBMI” refers to Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; 
“URBMI” refers to Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance; “NRCMI” refers to New Rural 






Figure 3.14 Distribution of Health Insurance Programs by Employer Size and Year 
Note: “commercial or other” refers to private and other health insurance; “GIS” refers to 
Government Insurance Scheme; “UEBMI” refers to Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; 
“URBMI” refers to Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance; “NRCMI” refers to New Rural 







Table 3.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results about Health Insurance Program 
Choice in 2004 
 















Table 3.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results about Health Insurance Program 
Choice in 2009 





4 Four Worlds of Welfare in China: Understanding Subnational Variation 
in Chinese Social Health Insurance 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Expansive social welfare provision is typically considered to be a feature of democracy. 
However, one of the most notable changes in the Chinese authoritarian regime over the past 
decade has been expansion of social welfare benefits without democratization. Programs such as 
the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Insurance (NRCMI), and the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI), which 
incorporated not only working population but also non-working urban and rural residents into the 
social health insurance system,
52
 have resulted in a dramatic expansion of social health insurance 
coverage (Figure 4.1). By 2010 over 80% of Chinese citizens were covered by social health 
insurance programs, up from only 34.4% in 2004. Meanwhile, the increase in generosity 
(measured by per capita expenditure of social health insurance) is substantial (Figure 4.2). A 
closer look at the social health insurance expansion will find that it is remarkably uneven across 
regions. Both the generosity and population coverage have dramatically differed across 
provinces during expansion (Figure 4.3). Data on Chinese urban social health insurance indicate 
that up to one-quarter of the urban population in northern provinces such as Qinghai, Shanxi, and 
Heilongjiang are still unprotected by social health insurance, while over 90% of the urban 
population is covered in the provinces along the Yangtze River such as Sichuan, Chongqing, 
Hunan, and Jiangxi. In terms of generosity, the per capita expenditure of urban social health 
insurance in Beijing is 1,852 yuan/person (averaged from 2007 through 2010), more than four 
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times the one in Jiangxi province. Why does such notable regional variation exist in Chinese 
social health insurance? How might that variation be explained? What does it tell us about 
Chinese social welfare provisions and authoritarianism more generally? This chapter addresses 
these questions by analyzing the political agents and the political economic mechanisms 
responsible for the regional patterns of Chinese social health insurance.   
I argue that that the regional variation in China’s social health insurance results from central 
and local leaders’ policy choices. The Chinese central leaders, whose priority is to maintain 
regime stability, face a trade-off between control and accommodation of local needs. When the 
central leaders control the career incentives of local officials, they delegate substantial 
discretionary power to local officials in health insurance reform to accommodate diverse social 
needs at the local level. With discretionary power in hand, local officials, who care about their 
political careers and wish to prevent social unrest from jeopardizing their political survival, 
design and implement social welfare policy in a way that suits local circumstances. Thus, diverse 
local socioeconomic conditions lead to different distributional choices in social health insurance. 
Specifically, local officials in regions with high social risk tend to enlarge the risk pool of social 
health insurance, while local officials in regions with high fiscal revenues are likely to enhance 
the generosity of social health insurance. While officials in regions with favorable risk profiles 
and high fiscal revenues become pioneers in promoting risk- and income- redistribution through 
social health insurance reform experiment, their counterparts in regions with neither high social 
risk nor sufficient fiscal resources maintain the status quo of a fragmented and inequitable social 
health insurance system in their jurisdictions. In specifying the rationale, conditions and patterns 
of the regional variation in Chinese social health insurance, this chapter addresses the more 




This chapter unfolds as follows: Section 2 discusses existing studies of Chinese social 
welfare. Section 3 elucidates the rationale, conditions, and policy results of Chinese social 
welfare provision, and formulates three hypotheses for empirical test. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the empirical findings and evidence. Section 5 concludes this chapter with a discussion 
of its implications.  
4.2 The Political Economy of Chinese Social Welfare: Received Wisdom 
Studies of Chinese social welfare in the fields of economics, public policy and political 
science provide insights to understand the Chinese social welfare system from different 
perspectives. Scholarly work on Chinese social health insurance in the fields of health policy and 
economics usually takes benefits (including the number of people who receive benefits and the 
level of benefits that people receive) as the starting point. Several problems are commonly 
identified and discussed in this strand of literature: 1) a pro-rich bias, or inequity in social health 
insurance benefits across social groups (Yip 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009); 2) unequal health 
insurance coverage between urban and rural areas, as well as between the poor and affluent 
social classes (Zhang and Kanbur 2005; Lin et al. 2009; Liu et al. 1999); 3) inter-regional 
inequalities in social health insurance benefits (Wagstaff et al. 2009; Chou and Wang 2009); 4) 
fragmentation of risk pooling and management (Liu 2002; Hsiao 2007). Although this literature 
has contributed to a rigorous evaluation of the socioeconomic impact of health insurance 
programs, the causes of those outcomes remain understudied. In the literature on Chinese 
political economy, some attempts were made to explore the causes of China’s fragmented social 
welfare provision.   
The dominant paradigm explaining fragmentation and piecemeal reform over the past 




to a market-oriented one.
53
 Marketization, especially the privatization and reconstruction of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), is said to have led to a collapse of the “iron rice bowl” (life-time 
employment) and the work-unit (danwei)-based welfare system (Ho 1995; Gu 2001a; Gu and 
Zhang 2006). Mass labor dislocation, especially the “laid-off” (xia gang) in SOEs that caused 
popular discontent and a wave of “collective events” (ji ti shi jian) such as protests and street 
demonstrations in the 1990s, induced the establishment of a social insurance system, moving the 
risk pooling from individual enterprises to regions (Frazier 2004; Hurst and O’Brien 2002; Cai 
2002). The state’s “retreat” from social protection during the earlier stages of economic reform 
(before 2003) has been systematically studied (Duckett 2011; Li and Zhong 2009) and criticized 
by scholars (Lue 2012; Zheng 2011). 
Although the impact of the economic transition on China’s social welfare system has 
received widespread attention, the political mechanism underlying the fragmentation of Chinese 
social welfare provisions is underspecified in those accounts. Duchektt’s recent work challenges 
the economic reform paradigm and shows that elite leadership and ideological changes in the late 
1970s help to explain the collapse of the Rural Co-operative Medical System (Duckett 2012). 
Her earlier work shows how bureaucratic interests within the central government have influenced 
the design and adoption of the UEBMI program, which provided only for the urban working 
population, subsidized civil servants, and was administered locally (Duckett 2003). In a similar 
vein, William C. Hsiao attributes the pendulum in China’s health reform policy between health 
care provision through government funding and through a regulated market to the competition of 
bureaucratic interests in the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 
respectively (Hsiao 2007).  
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     Neither the economic-reform paradigm nor the bureaucratic-politics paradigm, however, can 
sufficiently explain the remarkable subnational variation in China’s social health insurance.  
Recent scholarship has shifted to local leaders—the main providers of social welfare—to 
understand the political economy of social welfare provision in China. Two different 
perspectives emerge from these works. One view focuses on local leaders’ economic incentives 
for social welfare provision. Mark Frazier uses local leaders’ zeal for accumulating social 
security funds in local coffers to account for the rapid establishment of local-based pension 
systems in urban China (Frazier 2010). Yanzhong Huang’s research finds that rural leaders with 
thriving local industrial sectors value their lucrative jobs more highly than do their counterparts 
and thus are more likely to defer to peasants’ welfare demands in order to hold their positions in 
the community (Huang 2004). The other perspective focuses on local leaders’ political incentives 
for social welfare provision. Xiaobo Lu and Mingxing Liu, for example, attribute the different 
patterns of education spending among Chinese counties to local leaders’ differential career 
trajectories and promotion prospects (Lu and Liu 2013). In a similar vein, Taiwei Liu contends 
that ambitious provincial officials—those who seek to advance their careers at the central level—
spend more on education and health and less on social security and welfare than their local-
oriented counterparts do, because the former are more eager to impress Beijing and increase their 
chances for promotion (Liu 2011).  
      This study contributes to the literature on Chinese social welfare in three aspects. First, 
following the recent scholarship that explores the political economy of Chinese social welfare 
provision at the local level, this study emphasizes various local constraints that local leaders face 
in designing social health insurance policy. Second, I make an effort to clearly identify and 




variation in Chinese social welfare provisions is not new to many scholars, the variation has not 
been delineated in a systematic way. Third, this study theorizes the interplay of the central and 
local leaders’ interests and its impact on the multidimensional design of social welfare policy. 
Extant studies either focus on the central leadership’s interests or emphasize local officials’ 
incentives; few have explicitly studied the interaction of the two. The next section turns to the 
theoretical analysis of the Chinese social welfare provision and its subnational variation.  
4.3 Social Welfare Provision in Authoritarian China: Theory and Hypotheses 
Two features are the key to understand Chinese social welfare provision: the 
multidimensionality of social welfare policy,
54
 and the interplay of central and local leaders’ 
incentives.
55
 Social insurance is the dominant format of social welfare provision in China.
56
  The 
distribution of insurance benefits comprises three different dimensions: generosity, coverage, and 
stratification. Generosity refers to the average level of benefits among people who receive social 
welfare. Coverage represents the share of the population that has access to the benefits. 
Stratification captures the inequality in levels of benefits that different groups receive. These 
three dimensions are correlated in different ways depending on the specific conditions: when the 
amount of social welfare benefits is fixed, broader coverage might lead to lower generosity, and 
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 Moreover, these different dimensions have distinct distributive implications and 
outcomes. For instance, a high level of stratification of social welfare implies severe inequalities, 
while broad coverage implies universalism. Politicians at different levels have different policy 
preferences for these dimensions, depending on their interests and policy options in a specific 
institutional setting.      
The Chinese central leaders’ top priority in social welfare provision is to maintain regime 
stability.
58
 As the threats to regime stability can come from both elites and the masses, choosing 
to distribute rents and goods only to the elites or only to the masses is not an optimal strategy 
from the authoritarian leaders’ perspective (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Kricheli and Livne 
2009). Instead, authoritarian leaders try to efficiently balance the benefits between elites and the 
masses so as to maximize their survival prospects (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Of special 
importance for the political survival of the Chinese authoritarian regime is to maintain 
particularly privileging welfare provisions for the elites, while preserving an essentially modest 
social provision for the masses. To achieve this, the central leaders face a trade-off between 
control and accommodation of social needs. On one hand, they attempt to control who gets what, 
distributing more benefits to the social groups with the most political connections or importance 
for regime stability. The center’s control of the stratification patterns of social welfare works 
through three mechanisms: social legislation, fiscal transfers, and personnel management. Since 
the 1990s, through a series of legislation and statutes, the central leadership has established a 
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social health insurance system in which social groups are entitled to different programs with 
distinct levels of benefits depending on their socioeconomic status.
59
 This fragmented social 
welfare system is conducive to weakening social groups’ capabilities for horizontal 
mobilization
60
 while privileging the groups with political connections or importance to the 
regime. Moreover, the center allocates huge transfer payments to subsidize the health insurance 
for the privileged groups such as party officials, civil servants, and concentrated ethnic minority 
groups, assuring that they receive higher levels of benefits.
61
 Furthermore, through extensive and 
centralized personnel control, the center makes local state agents internalize its political 
priority—maintaining social order— in social policy making and implementation.
62
  
On the other hand, the central leaders want to accommodate most social groups to some 
extent, avoiding too much of a gap between the haves and have-nots. Since the central leaders 
have higher information costs and less expertise to distribute benefits among various social 
groups in a way that maximizes political returns under changing and diverse subnational 
circumstances, they need to delegate discretionary power to local state agents in making and 
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implementing social welfare policy; the center can do this precisely because it controls the career 
incentives of local state agents and can control the stratification of social welfare provisions 
through the aforementioned tools (e.g. social legislation and fiscal transfer). Thus, through 
various administrative regulations,
63
 the center has granted substantial discretion to local officials 
in specifying the policy details that directly determine the coverage and generosity of social 
health insurance, such as eligibility requirements, pooling units (e.g. county, city, or province), 
reimbursement rates, contribution rates, and conditions for premium exemption. 
Chinese local leaders are appointed by the center, and they care about their political careers 
in the established system. In order to advance their careers, they have to meet a variety of policy 
targets set by the center. Aside from maintaining social stability in their jurisdiction, economic 
development and public goods provision are also the main responsibilities assigned to local 
officials. In social welfare policy-making, local officials face various constraints: political, fiscal 
and social. First, local officials’ policy choices are constrained by the political principles set by 
the center. On the surface, Chinese local officials manage the majority of the social insurance 
funds and responsibilities over social welfare provisions,
64
 which significantly enhances their 
power through larger budgets, more personnel slots and greater regulatory power. Nevertheless, 
the performance of local officials is monitored by the center through top-down personnel control. 
                                                          
63
 See, for example, “Guowuyuan guan yu jian li chengzhen zhi gong ji ben yi liao bao xian zhi du de jue 
ding” ("Decision about establishing urban employee basic medical insurance"). (Beijing: State Council 
Decree #44, 1998). “Guowuyuan guan yu kai zhan cheng zhen ju min ji ben yi liao bao xian shi dian de 
zhi dao yi jian” ("Directives about establishing urban resident basic medical insurance") (Beijing: State 
Council Decree #20, 2007). “Guan yu jian li xin xing nong cun he zuo yi liao zhi du de yi jian” 
("Directives about establishing new rural cooperative health insurance") (Beijing: Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, 2003). 
64
 In 2002, local governments accounted for nearly 70% of all government spending. See Christine Wong. 
"Central-Local Relations revisited: the 1994 tax sharing reform and public expenditure management in 




In addition, local leaders have to abide by the Social Insurance Law that specifically stipulates 
the fragmentation and stratification patterns of social insurance.
65
  
The second constraint that local officials face in social welfare provision is fiscal stringency. 
Under China’s fiscal decentralization or de facto “fiscal federalism”,
66
 local governments are the 
main providers and sponsors of social welfare: they bear about 70% of the social health 
insurance financing for the non-working population, including peasants, the elderly, students and 
children. Some local governments have faced substantial budget deficits (Oi and Zhao 2007; 
Wong 2009) so paying the medical bills in full and on time is a burden on local budgets for these 
localities.
 
Thus, local fiscal revenue is an important predictor of local officials’ policy choice 
regarding the generosity of social health insurance. Importantly, the degree of fiscal constraints 
on social welfare provision differs across regions depending on local fiscal resources, including 
fiscal revenue extracted from local sources and fiscal transfers received from the center.  
The third constraint that local officials face is social risk.
67
 Social risk is a crucial factor 
shaping local officials’ policy choice on health coverage for three reasons. First, the nature of 
social health insurance is pooling and sharing risk across segments of the population. The 
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performance of social health insurance is thus contingent on the demographic or risk profile of 
localities. A region with a younger population will face lower risk, for example, than a region 
with an aging population. Second, the lack of a nationwide risk pooling and redistribution 
mechanism in China’s social health insurance system makes the regions with small populations 
particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as disease epidemics and natural disasters. 
Third and most importantly, decades of mass migration accompanying economic reform and 
openness have profoundly changed the risk profiles of some regions. Deng Xiaoping’s strategy 
for economic reform and openness in the 1980s “let some people (regions) get rich first” starting 
from the “special economic zones,” creating a domestic labor market in which some inland 
regions continuously “export” labor to the coastal regions. Labor mobility works as a multiplier 
of social risk, creating strong preferences for local officials in these regions to enlarge the risk 
pooling of social health insurance.
68
  
In summary, the Chinese central leadership incorporates elements of both control and 
accommodation in social welfare provision in order to maintain regime stability. On one hand, 
the center relies on social legislation, fiscal transfers and personal management to maintain a 
fragmented and stratified social welfare system that ultimately weakens social groups’ 
capabilities for horizontal mobilization while privileging certain groups over others. On the other, 
the center delegates discretionary power to local officials in policy design regarding the coverage 
and generosity of social insurance, in order to accommodate diverse local situations. Local 
officials who want to survive under the top-down evaluation system attempt to prevent social 
                                                          
68 This mechanism is the same for labor-inflowing and –outflowing regions. It seems more obvious in 
labor-outflow regions, where mass labor outflows exacerbate population aging and place burdensome 
payment pressures on local social health insurance funds. The risk-magnifying mechanism applies to 
labor-inflow regions too, because the regions receiving mass labor inflows are heavily reliant on labor-
intensive manufacturing and service sectors. With potentially high needs of medical service and threats of 
large labor outflows, local officials in the labor-inflow regions prefer expansive risk-pooling for social 




unrest from breaking out in their jurisdiction by proactively designing and providing social 
welfare benefits in a manner that suits the local conditions and social needs of their constituents. 
Since local officials’ discretion in social welfare policy lies mainly on the dimensions of 
coverage and generosity, they have four different choices in distributing social insurance benefits: 
1) a generous and inclusive model (i.e. giving more people more benefits), 2) a generous yet 
exclusive model (i.e. giving certain groups more benefits), 3) a strict yet inclusive model (i.e. 
giving more people benefits but with meager provisions), and 4) a strict and exclusive model (i.e. 
giving certain groups benefits with meager provisions). The model that local officials choose is 
determined by the configuration of constraints they face, particularly in terms of fiscal resources 
and social risk in their jurisdictions.  
Several empirical implications can be derived from the theoretical analysis. First, the local 
distribution of social health insurance benefits will differ importantly along the dimensions of 
generosity and coverage where the center delegates substantial authority to local officials. 
Second, the generosity and coverage of social health insurance will vary with the fiscal and 
socioeconomic conditions that constrain local officials’ policy choices. Based on these 
implications, the following hypotheses are formulated for empirical test.  
Hypothesis 1: The provision of Chinese social health insurance will display distinct and 
systematic regional variation in terms of generosity and coverage.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Regions with more fiscal resources will provide more generous social health 
insurance than others do.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Regions with high social risk will provide broader coverage in social health 
insurance than others do.  
4.4 Subnational Variation in Chinese Social Health Insurance: Empirical Analysis 
      The central goal of this section is to empirically explore and elucidate: 1) the regional 




relationship between local socioeconomic conditions and regional patterns of social health 
insurance; 3) the mechanism that local socioeconomic conditions influence distributional 
patterns of social health insurance benefits through  shaping local officials’ policy choices under 
the framework set by the center in social welfare provision. Before proceeding further with the 
empirical analysis, this section first discusses the data and empirical strategy to be used. In China, 
all local governments (including provinces, prefectures and counties, but except townships) 
manage certain social health insurance programs.
69
 Province is selected as the unit of analysis in 
the quantitative studies for two reasons. First, so far all available China’s social health insurance 
statistics are reported at national or provincial levels. The merit of these statistics is that they 
cover all Chinese provinces and time periods from 1999 when social health insurance was 
established in China. However, the drawback is that the statistics is too aggregated to conduct 
intra-province or inter-prefectural analysis. Considering both the merit and the drawback of the 
data, I decide to use province as the unit in quantitative analysis while complementing it with 
qualitative evidence drawing from my field interviews at other local levels (e.g. prefecture and 
county). Second, for analytical simplicity, the theoretical analysis assumes that the Chinese 
political structure consists of only two levels: the central and the local levels and that the logic 
underlying the interaction between central and local levels is portable to the one between upper 
and lower levels among local governments. Hence, using province as the unit of quantitative 
analysis does not contradict the theory but we need to keep its limits in mind when interpreting 
the quantitative results and the empirical implications.   
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 Chinese social health insurance programs can be considered consisting of two types: urban and rural. 
Urban health insurance that mainly consists of UEBMI and URBMI is pooled at prefectural or provincial 
levels and managed by the local governments of the respective level; rural health insurance that mainly 





To test the hypotheses, I constructed a provincial-level panel dataset (1999-2010) using 
statistics compiled from various Chinese yearbooks. The empirical strategy is that I first employ 
cluster analyses to identify and examine the regional patterns of social health insurance in terms 
of coverage and generosity; then, I conduct statistical analysis to evaluate the relationships 
between local socioeconomic conditions and the coverage/generosity of social health insurance; 
at last, complementary to the quantitative analysis, I provide qualitative evidence drawing upon 
140 field interviews to illustrate how local officials make policy choices regarding coverage and 
generosity of social health insurance according to local socioeconomic conditions.  
Cluster Analysis: Regional Patterns in Chinese Social Health Insurance 
 
       Cluster analysis
70
 is conducted to examine whether it is possible to discern statistically 
distinct patterns in Chinese social health insurance. To describe the local distribution of health 
insurance benefits, I construct two variables—generosity and coverage. Generosity is measured 
as annual per capita expenditures for social health insurance. Coverage refers to the percentage 
of the population in a particular location covered by social health insurance. Data come from 
government statistics
71
 and are averaged for 2007 through 2010.
72
 All Chinese mainland 
                                                          
70 Cluster analysis is a quantitative method that classifies objects into relatively homogenous groups. The 
objective is to group n units into r clusters where r is much smaller than n. Each group identified by 
cluster analysis is as internally homogenous as possible, but as distinct as possible from all other groups. 
For more details of this method, see Michael S. Lewis-Beck; Alan Bryman; Liao Futting Tim, eds. The 
Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods. Vol. III. (CA: Sage, 2004). For examples of 
using this method in the comparative social welfare studies, see Nita Rudra. "Welfare States in 
Developing Countries: Unique or Universal?" The Journal of Politics Vol. 69 No.2 (2007), pp. 378-396. 
Ian Gough. "Social assistance regimes: a cluster analysis." Journal of European Social Policy Vol. 11 No. 
2 (2001), pp.165-170. Charles C. Ragin. "A qualitative comparative analysis of pension systems" In The 
Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State, edited by Thomas Hicks, Alexander M. Janoski, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1994).  
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 They are compiled from China Human Resource and Social Security Yearbooks (2007-2010) and China 
Health Statistics Yearbooks (2007-2010). As the data for rural health insurance expenditure are missing in 
China Health Statistics Yearbooks, the generosity variable in the empirical studies of this paper pertains 
to urban social health insurance only. 
72





provincial-level units are ranked according to these two variables, and the rank values for each 
province on both variables are used as inputs for cluster analysis. 
Based on conventional procedures for cluster analysis,
73
 the results (see Table 4.1) indicate 
four significantly distinct clusters among Chinese provinces in terms of generosity and coverage 
of social health insurance. Table 4.2 reports the province members of each cluster and their ranks 
on generosity and coverage. Computing the cluster average ranks on these two indicators makes 
the features of each cluster readily apparent: cluster 2 and cluster 4 are starkly distinct from one 
another, as provinces in cluster 2 clearly privilege generosity over coverage, all of them having 
high ranks on generosity but low ranks on population coverage. Provinces in cluster 4 are just the 
opposite. Moreover, provinces in cluster 1 appear to favor both coverage and generosity, as they 
rank relatively high on both. In contrast, provinces in cluster 3 have low values on both 
generosity and coverage. Based on the characteristics of these clusters, provinces in cluster 2 are 
referred as the privileged type, because they place an emphasis on health generosity. Provinces in 
cluster 4 are labeled the risk-pooling type, as they prioritize broader coverage over generosity in 
social health insurance. Since provinces in cluster 1 favor both generosity and coverage in social 
health insurance, they are referred as dual type. By contrast, average generosity and coverage are 
both relatively low for provinces in cluster 3, and hence cluster 3 is called the status-quo type.  
The cluster analysis results also suggest that the regional patterns of social health insurance 
correspond to regional socioeconomic differences. To demonstrate this, the clustering is 
                                                          
73 There are many procedures (or “stopping rules”) to determine the number of clusters in a dataset. 
Milligan and Cooper have conducted a well-known study to distinguish between the many stopping rules 
and assess which criteria provide the most valid test for the existence of a cluster. Their experiment 
suggests that the Duda and Hart procedure performs best in determining stopping rules. See G. Milligan; 
M.C. Cooper. "An examination of procedures for determining the number of clusters in a dataset."  
Psychometrika Vol.50 (1985), pp.159-79. Richard O. Duda; Peter E. Hart. Pattern Classification and 
Scene Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973). F.E. Tidmore; D.W. Turner. "On clustering with 




presented on a map of mainland China (Figure 4.4). The map reveals that the northern and 
northeast provinces are predominantly of the status-quo type. Their counterparts in the east 
coastal areas are mainly of the dual type. The populous provinces along the Yangtze River such 
as Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui are of the risk-pooling type. Meanwhile, the large 
cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and the ethnic minority autonomous regions are of the privileged-
type. Overall, the results from the cluster analysis support the first hypothesis that systematic 
patterns exist in Chinese social health insurance. Moreover, the clustering of Chinese provinces 
in social health insurance appears to correspond to regional socioeconomic differences. The next 
subsection turns to a more rigorous examination of the correlations between local socioeconomic 
conditions and the distributional attributes (e.g. coverage, generosity) of social health insurance.  
Statistical Analysis: Social Health Insurance and Local Socioeconomic Conditions  
The coverage and generosity variables continue to be used as dependent variables in the 
regression analysis that follows. The explanatory variables are level of local social risk and fiscal 
resources. Two factors are used as proxies of social risk: 1) labor mobility, measured by the ratio 
of migrants to total local population. The measure of migrants, defined as the absolute value of 
the difference between provincial total population and local population (i.e. population with local 
hukou), focuses on the magnitude of province-to-province migration;
74
 2) dependency ratio, 
measured by the ratio of people aged above 65 or below 15 to the working population (between 
15-65). The other key explanatory variable is local fiscal resources, consisting of 1) local-
sourced fiscal revenue measured by per capita local budgetary revenue and 2) fiscal transfers, 
measured by per capita central-to-local transfer payments. Based on the above theoretical 
analysis, we should see in the regression results that the level of social risk is positively 
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 Such a measure does not take intra-province migration into account. Hence, it is a “conservative” 




correlated with health coverage and the level of fiscal resources is positively correlated with 
health generosity. A number of economic and political control variables are included in the 
regressions: 1) economic development, using the logarithm of GDP per capita; 2) urbanization, 
using percentage of urban residents in the total population; 3) political standing of provincial 
governors vis-à-vis central authorities, measured by the bureaucratic integration score (BINT) 
coded according to local leaders’ past career trajectories; 75 The BINT variable controls for local 
leaders’ personal ambitions in politics; 4) unobserved year- or region-specific situations, using 
year and province dummies. Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 4.3.  
The data cover 31 Chinese mainland provinces from 1999 to 2010 to take advantage of the 
large cross-provincial variation in social health insurance and local socioeconomic conditions. 
Since the data are constructed as a panel dataset, panel-corrected standard errors are applied in 
the analysis.
76
 The regression results are reported in Table 4.4. For each dependent variable, 
Model 1 reports the results of the baseline model that includes only the key explanatory variables; 
Model 2 presents the results when control variables including year and province dummies (fixed 
                                                          
75
 Province is assigned a value from 1 to 4, depending on the applicability of a set of criteria. A value of 4 
indicates a provincial governor who holds a provincial post while also serving in a central government 
position; a value of 3 refers to a provincial official with significant past service in central ministries; a 
value of 2 means a provincial official with significant service in other provinces; and a value of 1 suggests 
a provincial official with significant service in that province. The notion of BINT and its coding were first 
used in Huang Yasheng. Inflation and Investment Controls in China (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
It was further used in Sheng Yumin. Economic Openness and Territorial Politics in China (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). The data for coding this variable are provincial governors’ resumes, collected 
from Zheng Tan Wang (http://www.zt360.cn/jgzyjl/ljjl/), a government-sponsored media in Guangdong.   
76
 For panel or cross-section time-series data, the major concern is the contemporaneous correlation and 
heteroskedasticity in the error structure, which is normally corrected using panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSEs). See Nathaniel Beck; Jonathan N. Katz. "What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-




effects, FE) are added;
77
 Model 3 reports the results when control variables and the one-year 
lagged dependent variable (LDV) are included.
78
  
Overall, the regression results lend support to the main theoretical predictions. The first 
primary finding is that social risk (measured by labor mobility and the dependency ratio) is 
significantly and positively associated with health coverage. According to Model 2, all else 
constant, moving from minimal to maximal labor mobility increases coverage by nearly 30 
percentage points; according to Model 3, likewise, the dependency ratio increases coverage by 
19 percentage points. In the FE model (Model 2), the coefficient for labor mobility is larger and 
more significant than the coefficient for the dependency ratio, indicating that once we control for 
unobserved year- or province-specific situations, labor mobility better captures the effect of 
social risk on coverage. By contrast, in the LDV model (Model 3), in which we control for a 
province’s previous level of health coverage, the dependency ratio better captures the effect of 
social risk on coverage. In addition, health generosity is positively correlated with labor mobility 
and dependency ratio in the FE and LDV models, respectively.  
The second primary finding is that fiscal resources are significantly and positively associated 
with the generosity of social health insurance. According to Models 2 and 3, all else constant, 
moving from minimal to maximal fiscal resources increases health generosity per beneficiary by 
681 yuan and 607 yuan, respectively. These correlations are significant at the 99% confidence 
level in all model specifications. In addition, the regression results indicate positive correlations 
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 For panel or cross-section time-series data, another concern is the omitted variable bias (OVB) derived 
from the unobserved year- or province-specific factors, and the most common way to avoid this bias is to 
use a fixed-effects (FE) regression. 
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 As the results from PCSEs may not be reliable if serial correlation is present in the data, one-year 
lagged dependent variables (LDV) are included in some of the regressions as a robustness check. Some 
scholars suggest that we can think of FE and LDV as bounding the true effect of interest. See Joshua D. 
Angrist; Jorn-Steffen Pischke. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion (Princeton 




between fiscal resources and social health insurance coverage. However, the positive relationship 
loses statistical significance in the LDV model, indicating that given a province’s previous level 
of health coverage, fiscal resources are no longer predictive of the coverage.  
As for the control variables, urbanization is significantly and negatively correlated with 
health coverage but is positively correlated with health generosity. These quantitative results are 
in line with the recent observation that despite continuously increasing number of Chinese living 
in cities (i.e. the high urbanization rate), due to the rigid household registration system and its 
anachronistic associations with social entitlements, only a portion of the urban residents (usually 
those with state-sector employment and local urban hukou) have full access to urban social 
health insurance, which has markedly higher generosity than rural health insurance (Economists, 
April 19, 2014). Furthermore, BINT—the measure of provincial governors’ prior career 
trajectories—has no significant impact on social health insurance.  By contrast, economic 
development is significantly and positively associated with health coverage and generosity. In 
addition, the unobserved year- and region-specific situations (the year and province dummies) 
account for about 50% of the variation in health coverage and 25% in health generosity.  
In summary, the statistical results indicate significant correlations between local 
socioeconomic conditions and the distributional attributes of social health insurance (coverage 
and generosity). All other things being equal, regions with higher social risk tend to cover more 
people in health insurance, while regions with more fiscal resources tend to provide more 
generous health insurance benefits. The next subsection uses qualitative evidence to illustrate the 
underlying mechanism—how socioeconomic conditions, particularly labor mobility and fiscal 
resources, shape local officials’ policy choices and thus give rise to the different regional 




Evidences from Fieldwork Research: Local Choices in Social Health Insurance Reform  
Complementing the statistical analysis, I conducted more than 100 interviews in 16 Chinese 
regions over the last three years to understand the mechanism underlying local policy choices in 
social health insurance reform. The fieldwork sites cover the four different types of regions, and 
interviewees include government officials and health insurance administrators at both the 
national and local levels. The findings suggest that local officials’ priorities and policy choices in 
social health insurance reform vary markedly with local socioeconomic conditions, as the above 
theoretical analysis proposed. This subsection discusses the supporting evidence collected from 
the interviews.  
Most local initiatives to expand social health insurance coverage are found in the inland 
provinces along the Yangtze River such as Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei and Anhui. In interviews, 
local officials in these regions often reveal strong concerns about existing or looming deficits in 
local health insurance funds. These concerns are derived from the outflow of millions of labor 
that these regions have witnessed in the past three decades. According to China’s national 
population census data (Table 4.5), Henan, Sichuan, Hunan, and Anhui are the provinces with 
the largest labor outflows. Mass outflows of young labor exerts tremendous pressures on local 
social health insurance funds because those who stay, especially in the rural areas, are mainly the 
elderly and children who are more likely to need health care.
79
 As an administrator of social 
health insurance in the Zhengzhou city of Henan province put it, “Failure or delay in payments 
will give rise to public grievances and risk collective protests. No local officials dare to take 
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 Statistics show that 83.9% of migrants in mainland China are younger than 40-years-old and many of 
them are between 15- and 29-years-old. They migrate across regions mainly for jobs. See National 
Statistics Bureau, Nong ming gong diao cha jian ce bao gao (Peasant-workers survey and report) 
(Beijing: 2010). Yu Lu, Xin shi qi Zhongguo guo nei yi min fen bu yan jiu (Research of the Domestic 






 This concern drives local officials in these regions to prioritize expansion of social 
health insurance coverage to obtain a large risk pool for social health insurance funds. Every year 
those officials utilize propaganda and social media such as microblogs and mobile text message 
to remind people—especially young people—to join the social health insurance program.
81
 On 
occasion, the requirement of local household registration (hukou) is artificially blurred or ignored 
in order to obtain higher enrollment.
82
 Since 2008, an increasing number of migrant workers who 
are already in their 30s or 40s have returned from coastal areas to the inland. Local officials 
actively target the returning laborers, arranging special handlings (e.g. lower premiums, binding 
work injury, maternity, and health insurances together) to induce them to register for local social 
insurance. Some local governments go further, negotiating with coastal regions to transfer back 
the money in their returning migrants’ personal health insurance saving accounts that had been 
opened in the coastal provinces when they were working there.
83
  
In expanding the coverage of social health insurance, local officials in the inland regions hold 
conservative and sometimes averse views towards raising the generosity.
84
 This constitutes a 
stark contrast with the policy preferences in the coastal regions such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong and Shandong, where the generosity of social health insurance has increased as 
coverage expands. For example, the local government in Dongguan, a prefectural city in 
Guangdong province, has since 2008 been generously subsidizing not only the local population 
but also “outsiders”, such as rural-to-urban migrants and peasant workers, to join local social 
health insurance. As for the remarkable generosity, Dongguan officials explained that “we 
receive nothing from the center for social health insurance, but the prosperous local economy is 
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 Interview, Zhengzhou, 5/14/2012.  
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 Interview, Hefei, 5/17/2012.   
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 Interviews, Wuhan, 5/22/2012; Changsha, 5/25/2012.   
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 Interview, Chengdu, 4/17/2012.  
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absolutely sufficient to support it [local social health insurance]”.
85
 Similarly, when talking about 
local social health insurance, a local official in Kunshan, a county-level city of Jiangsu province, 
commented that “the prosperity of the local economy is impossible without the contributions of 
the migrant workers [so they deserve the benefits]. But those young people rarely go to hospitals, 
so [despite high generosity] we have been running a surplus in social health insurance funds for 
years.”
86
 Indeed, a huge amount of surplus has accumulated in the social health insurance funds 
of the rich coastal regions (see Figure 4.5). The surplus contributes to resolving the policy trade-
off between coverage and generosity for local officials in these regions. 
Like their counterparts in the coastal regions, local officials in the “privileged” regions such 
as Xinjiang, Ningxia, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, which receive either abundant fiscal 
transfers or political favors
87
 from the center, are pioneers in raising the generosity of social 
health insurance. Nonetheless, the generous health insurance benefits in the privileged regions 
are exclusive and delimited to only certain groups such as party officials, civil servants, formal 
state-sector employees, or in general, people with local urban hukou. During field interviews, I 
found that local social health insurance administrators in the privileged regions relentlessly stress 
local hukou as a crucial prerequisite for entitlement to social welfare benefits, a stark contrast to 
the loose enforcement of the local hukou requirement in social health insurance enrollment in the 
inland regions like Hubei and Hunan. The lack of incentives to expand health coverage is quite 
apparent in the privileged regions where labor mobility is low or restricted. Moreover, the heavy 
weight of the center’s fiscal transfer in financing social health insurance in the ethnic minority 
                                                          
85
 Interview, Dongguan, 6/27/2011. 
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regions further impedes local incentives to broaden the coverage.
88
 As a social insurance official 
in Ningxia province put it frankly, “we receive a lot of fiscal transfer from the center, and we 
want to use that money only on the designated groups.”
89
  
In the “status-quo” regions such as Guangxi and Heilongjiang, my fieldwork found that 
under-spending on social welfare was quite common. These provinces have not experienced the 
mass migration in the past decades that magnified local social risk and drove local officials to 
enlarge the risk pooling strategically. Moreover, unlike the privileged provinces, which usually 
receive fiscal or political favors from the center, these provinces with meager local revenues 
receive only moderate fiscal transfers from the center, which prevents them from overspending 
in social welfare. During interviews in these two provinces, fiscal straits were often cited as a 
reason for which local officials in these regions took “no actions” (wu zuo wei) in social health 
insurance reform. As one municipal official in Nanning city of Guangxi province pointed out, 
“some of our local governments cannot even pay their staff’s salaries on time, let alone providing 
generous social health insurance benefits [to people].”
90
 For local officials in the regions with 
low labor mobility and with dire fiscal straits, maintaining the “status quo” of the strict and 
exclusive social health insurance is a less costly policy choice. 
4.5 Conclusion  
Despite the increasing scholarly interest in Chinese social welfare, our understanding of the 
political economy underpinning the distributional patterns of Chinese social welfare benefits has 
remained preliminary. This study attempts to contribute to the literature by offering a political 
economy explanation for the regional variation in Chinese social health insurance. It starts with 
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 It is estimated that 60%-70% of government subsidies to URBMI and NRCMI programs in Ningxia 
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the puzzling discovery of remarkable regional variation in Chinese social health insurance over 
the past decade. The explanation is that subnational variation in China’s social health insurance 
results from central and local leaders’ policy choices. Chinese central leaders, who care about 
regime survival and stability, delegate substantial discretionary authority to local state agents for 
making coverage and generosity policies in social health insurance, in order to accommodate 
diverse local circumstances while maintaining a hierarchy in social welfare provision that favors 
groups with political connections and influence. Under the framework set up by the center, local 
officials who care about their political careers in the centralized personnel system proactively 
design and implement social welfare policy according to local socioeconomic conditions; in 
doing so, they prevent social unrest in their jurisdictions, which could jeopardize their political 
careers. Therefore, the local profile of social health insurance differs in generosity and coverage, 
the two dimensions in which the center delegates discretionary authority to local officials. 
Differences across provinces in health generosity and coverage reflect the diverse local 
socioeconomic conditions, particularly local fiscal resources and social risk. This chapter utilizes 
a provincial-level panel dataset (1999-2010) to identify the regional patterns of Chinese social 
health insurance and their correlations with local socioeconomic conditions; it also provides 
qualitative evidence drawing from 140 field interviews to understand the underlying political 
economy mechanism.  
In specifying the rationale, conditions and patterns of the subnational variation in Chinese 
social welfare provision, this study addresses a more general issue: how political leaders in an 
authoritarian regime with multilevel governance structure respond to diverse social needs. The 
study suggests that a rationale for widespread social welfare provision exists outside of 




different: it originates primarily from the top—the national leaders’ interest in maintaining 
regime stability— rather than from the bottom or public demands as in democracies. Moreover, 
as this chapter demonstrates, the role and influence of subnational politicians in authoritarian 
social welfare provision are interesting and important. Under conditions of political 
centralization and fiscal decentralization, the Chinese local officials who owe their political 
careers to the upper-level authority would proactively adapt to and accommodate the local 
socioeconomic conditions in their policy-making choices. Such accommodation of local 
situations not only accounts for the subnational variation in Chinese social welfare provision; it 
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5 Social Protection in Asia: Coverage, Generosity and Stratification 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Using a multidimensional conceptualization of social welfare spending, the previous chapters 
have characterized and explained differences in social welfare provision in terms of coverage, 
generosity and stratification across Chinese regions. Theory suggests that politicians facing 
different political institutions and socioeconomic constraints make different policy choices on 
those dimensions of social welfare. Interesting questions arise when we extend the inquiry of 
social welfare provision to other Asian countries. How are social welfare benefits designed and 
distributed in other Asian countries? Is there an “Asian Model” of the welfare state? Does the 
Chinese social welfare system distinguish it from other Asian countries? This chapter has three 
goals: 1) to examine how portable the multi-dimensional conceptualization of social welfare, 
developed and adopted in my study of Chinese social welfare, is to the comparative study of 
social welfare; 2) to explore the differences and commonalities of social welfare provision across 
Asian countries and to understand the causes of those differences and commonalities; and 3) to 
evaluate the pattern and development of Chinese social welfare in the broad and comparative 
context of Asia. The rest of this chapter unfolds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the measures 
of social welfare commonly used in existing studies and proposes a multidimensional 
conceptualization and measure of social welfare. Using the multidimensional measure of social 
welfare, Section 5.2 presents the commonalities and differences of social welfare provision in 
Asian countries. Section 5.3 investigates the main explanations of cross-national social welfare 
differences in the literature and elucidates how the multidimensional conceptualization of social 
welfare contributes to a clearer understanding of the relationships between democracy, economic 




empirical tests and main findings, discussing two main implications of this study on comparative 
social welfare studies. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter by comparing Chinese social welfare 
development to other Asian countries’.   
5.2 Social Protection in Asia 
To achieve the above goals, I engage the literature on comparative social welfare, especially 
social welfare in the developing world. The comparative study of social welfare often starts from 
government social spending, with data analysis relying primarily on central government 
expenditures for social security and welfare programs. A rich analytical debate persists regarding 
whether government social spending should be constructed as a share of GDP, a share of total 
government spending or on a per capita (dollar) basis. Each measure has advantages as well as 
drawbacks (Kaufman & Ubiergo 2001; Rudra & Haggard 2005). Most studies use social 
spending as a share of GDP, thus capturing the overall allocation of societal resources. However, 
this measure is strongly affected by the size of government and arguably does not capture how 
governments allocate the resources directly under their control. Social spending as a share of 
total government spending seems to provide a more direct measure of government priorities and 
has the additional benefit of increasing the variance across countries. But welfare dollars per 
capita better capture the value of the resources potentially available to recipients. No matter 
which measure is used, Asian countries in general spend relatively less on social welfare, such as 
pensions, than do other countries. Among 37 Asian countries, only four countries spend more 
than 5% of GDP per capita on social welfare: Japan, South Korea, Mongolia and Uzbekistan.  
However, Asian countries, especially in the northeast and southeast of Asia, spend noticeably 
more on human-capital-related welfare programs, such as education (Table 5.1). Thus, some 
scholars characterize the Asian welfare state as a “human capital welfare capitalism model” 




Holliday 2000); and others call it a “human capital-based social spending regime” (Wibbels and 
Ahlquist 2007). By contrast, Latin American welfare systems that spend relatively more on 
pension and social security are typically referred to as “protective welfare regimes” or 
“insurance-based social regimes” by scholars (Rudra 2007; Wibbels and Ahlquist 2007).  
The typology of welfare regimes can be traced back to Gosta Esping-Andersen’s work on the 
welfare state. Esping-Andersen’s famous “three worlds of welfare capitalism” comprise liberal, 
corporatist/conservative, and universal/social democratic welfare regimes. The 
corporatist/conservative welfare regime is characterized by a state-led and occupational-based 
social insurance system, which includes a “state edifice perfectly ready to displace the market as 
a provider of welfare,” and that maintains an “emphasis on upholding status differences.” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, pg. 27) Thus, this system is fundamentally different from the tax-based 
and universal social democratic welfare state. In contrast to these two, the liberal welfare regime 
is a “residual” welfare state that relies on the private sector for welfare provision, combined with 
a number of state-led means-tested social assistance or transfer programs for the poor. Similar to 
the corporatist/conservative welfare state in continental European countries, social insurance is 
the predominant form of social protection in Asia (Figure 5.1). This dominance is most 
pronounced in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Central and West Asian countries tend to maintain 
a somewhat greater balance between social insurance and social assistance, though social 
insurance is still dominant.  
Figures on government social spending, whether measured as a share of GDP, a share of 
government expenditure or in per capita dollars, do not reveal much about the policy choice and 
design of welfare programs, or about the associated distributional implications and consequences. 




simply how much money a state spends, but what the programs that states initiate actually do. 
Hence, a multidimensional measure of social welfare provides important advantages in terms of 
capturing the nuances of policy design and distributional consequences. In existing studies of 
comparative social welfare, only a few notable attempts have been made to develop and adopt a 
multidimensional conceptualization or measurement of social welfare. Esping-Anderson (1991) 
characterizes the welfare state in the OECD countries around T.H.Marshall’s (1950) proposition 
of “social citizenship” and categorizes welfare regimes based on two indicators: de-
commodification (eligibility rules or restrictions on entitlements; income replacement; the range 
or level of benefits provided) and stratification (the degree of segmentation, fragmentation and 
inequality of social welfare programs). That categorization of welfare regimes, while inducing 
much debate, has helped scholars of comparative social welfare to compare and dissect the 
varieties of contemporary welfare capitalisms. In a large-N study of social protection around the 
world, Mares (2005) computes an index of social policy protection for more than 100 countries 
using two new indicators: the scope of social insurance coverage and the degree of redistribution 
of social policy. Replacing the level of social welfare expenditures with this disaggregated 
measure of social protection, her work better uncovers the political mechanism and conditions by 
which economic openness leads to different characters of social protection, namely, the scope of 
benefit coverage and the allocation of costs across different occupations.  
Building on this scholarship, I develop and propose a conceptualization of social welfare 
based on three dimensions: coverage, generosity and stratification. Generosity, similar to the 
concept of social welfare expenditures on a per capita basis that is commonly used in existing 
studies, captures the depth of welfare provision or the average level of benefits that beneficiaries 




receive the benefits, represents the breadth of social welfare provision. While both generosity 
and coverage pertain to the absolute gains that beneficiaries enjoy from social protection, 
stratification describes the relative gains or the inequality of benefits that different beneficiaries 
receive. These three dimensions are correlated in different ways depending on specific 
conditions. For example, when the total amount of welfare benefits available for allocation is 
fixed, broader coverage might lead to lower generosity and vice versa. As another example, low 
coverage and high generosity might suggest high stratification of social welfare within the 
population. This chapter will demonstrate how this three-dimensional conceptualization and 
measurement of social welfare help in comparing and explaining the variation of social welfare 
in Asia.  
Asian countries offer a widely varying degree of social protection, in terms of social welfare 
expenditure per capita as a percentage of GDP per capita: the figure ranges from 10.5% for Japan 
to .125% for Papua New Guinea. As Figure 5.2 shows, East Asia, including Japan, Korea, 
Mongolia and China, has excelled, with the average social welfare benefit standing at 6% of 
GDP. Central and West Asia, comprising transition economies such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan, have also done relatively well, with an average social 
welfare benefit of 3.93% of GDP. Social welfare spending in Southeast Asia, including 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, is below average, at 2.38% of 
GDP. Social protection in the Pacific Islands and South Asia is the lowest in Asia, about 2% of 
GDP.  
Disaggregating the social protection (including social insurance, social assistance and labor 
market service programs) along the three dimensions of generosity, coverage and stratification 




and 5.4 jointly illustrate that the depth of social protection, namely, average benefits per recipient, 
is largest in the Pacific Islands (22.5% of GDP per capita) and South Asian countries (7.1% of 
GDP per capita), yet only about 20% of the population receives benefits in South Asia and only 
about 12% do in the Pacific Islands. This suggests that the majority of social benefits in these 
regions go to a small portion of the population. In contrast, East Asia has lower depth of social 
protection but the highest breadth of such programs in Asia—over 83% of the population 
receives some benefits, in the context of the highest overall spending on social protection in the 
region (about 6% of GDP per capita).  
Disaggregating social protection according to the stratification dimension provides a more 
thorough understanding of the distributional impact of social protection on the poor and the non-
poor. If the degree of stratification/inequality of social protection is measured by the ratio of the 
benefits that the non-poor and the poor receive relative to the poverty line (normalized by one-
quarter of GDP per capita), the stratification of social protection is significantly higher in South 
Asia and the Pacific Islands than in East and Southeast Asia (see Figure 5.5). In 10 of the 37 
Asian countries, the poor receive fewer relative benefits, measured as a percentage of poverty-
line expenditures of the respective country, than the non-poor. In Pakistan, for instance, the poor 
receive 3.3% of poverty line expenditures (about .83% of GDP per capita), while the non-poor 
receive 5.1% (about 1.28% of GDP per capita). A similar pattern is apparent in several Pacific 
Island countries, such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Solomon Islands.  
In summary, Asian countries spend less on social protection compared to their counterparts 
in other regions with similar levels of income. In terms of programs, social insurance dominates 
social protection across Asia and the Pacific. A multidimensional conceptualization of social 




countries. Descriptive data demonstrates that, as expected, countries in East Asia, including the 
high-income countries like Japan and South Korea, and middle-income countries such as China 
and Mongolia, spend relatively more on social protection than do countries in other regions of 
Asia. However, Central and West Asia, comprised of no high-income countries and a number of 
transition economies, exhibit above-average spending on social protection. Southeast Asia, 
conversely, which includes one important high-income country (Singapore) and several large 
middle-income countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) exhibits well 
below-average spending on social welfare. South Asian countries offer the lowest social 
protection in Asia. Pacific Island countries do not perform well in social protection, either, but 
with the third highest average GDP per capita among regions in Asia, its social protection is at 
least higher than the average social protection in South Asia. Why is social welfare development 
so uneven and different in Asia? Can existing comparative social welfare studies explain the 
variation? How might the multidimensional conceptualization and measure of social welfare help 
to explain the variation? The next section turns to these questions.  
5.3 Democracy, Globalization and Social Welfare  
A large number of studies have explored the causes of social welfare variation across nations, 
and the two important trends emerging in the 1980s in world politics and economics -- 
democratization and globalization—have attracted much attention from scholars interested in 
studying their impact on social welfare development. In this section, I lay out the main findings 
of these two lines of literature and elucidate how the multidimensional conceptualization of 
social welfare can address some of the unanswered questions in existing studies of comparative 
social welfare.   




The welfare state is typically considered to be a more robust feature of democracies than of 
non-democratic states (Przeworski et al. 2000; Lake & Baum 2001; Avelino et al. 2005; Deacon 
2009). According to the received wisdom, democracies are better suited to providing public 
goods, like social welfare benefits, for two reasons. First, a top-down explanation holds that 
democratic leaders have to win a large share of the popular vote in order to win elections, so they 
have a stronger interest in providing social policy and other public goods in order to garner broad 
support. Alternatively, a bottom-up explanation argues that democracies permit interest group 
organizations and increase social pressure, allowing public demand for social policy to drive 
government spending and policy decisions. A paradox in the literature, however, is that the 
welfare state often emerged in non-democratic settings, where politicians have fewer incentives 
to heed popular demand (Mares and Carnes 2008). Esping-Anderson labels it a “historical oddity” 
that “the first major welfare state initiatives occurred prior to democracy and were powerfully 
motivated to arrest its realization.” (Esping-Anderson 1990, pg. 15) Other scholars have found 
significant variation in public goods provision among both democracies and non-democracies 
(Charron and Lapuente 2011; Dreze and Loh 1995; Lott 1999; Mulligan et al. 2004; Truex 2013). 
Those mixed empirical findings are typically attributed to differences in measurement or in the 
definitions of regime type used in empirical analyses (Lu and Liu 2013, Mares and Carnes 2008), 
or to publication bias regarding statistical significance or the size of effects in quantitative 
studies (Truex 2013). A more basic question, however, remains unaddressed in most of the 
discussion to date regarding regime type and social welfare: what aspect of social welfare 
provision differs across democracies and non-democracies? I argue that the distinction lies more 
in the distributional aspects of social welfare provision in democracies and non-democracies than 




Without the bottom-up democratic mechanism, social welfare provision in autocracies is 
attributed to the political leaders’ motivation for maintaining regime survival and stability.  In 
the important book Political Economy of Dictatorship, Wintrobe (1998) argues that dictators 
provide public goods mainly for two purposes: 1) to increase the loyalty of the population, and 2) 
to promote general economic growth on which the dictator’s budget depends. Other scholars of 
the political economy of dictatorship suggest that autocratic rulers use social welfare privileges 
to buy the support of winning coalitions, in order to ensure that they stand on the side of the 
regime against social opposition forces (Haber 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, autocratic leaders must provide generous benefits to certain privileged groups, such 
as the military and police forces and the bureaucratic or administrative class, to maintain the 
loyalty of these groups that is necessary to rule. More importantly, autocratic leaders might adopt 
expansive social legislation and progressive social welfare to preempt unrest, riot and revolution 
by the poor. In other words, as the threat to regime survival or stability can come from both elites 
and the masses, autocratic leaders attempt to strike a balance in benefits between them; choosing 
to distribute benefits and goods only to elites or only to the masses is not an optimal strategy for 
maximizing the prospect of regime stability. Thus, leaders in non-democracies must calculatedly 
balance between elites and other social groups in the provision of social welfare.    
An implication derived from the above argument, also a key feature of autocratic social 
welfare provision that has been implied but less pronounced in the literature, is that the 
inequality or stratification of social welfare provision is more prominent in non-democracies and 
it is commensurate with the leaders’ political strategy for regime survival. As Esping-Andersen 
pointedly remarks, “Social welfare is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly 




force in the ordering of social relations.” (Esping-Anderson 1990, pg. 23) Although scholars 
have noted that the conservative and the liberal welfare states in affluent democracies have also 
embedded certain patterns of stratification or inequality in their social welfare systems (i.e. the 
labor market insiders-outsiders cleavage in the conservative welfare state and the poor-rich 
inequality in the liberal welfare state), we know from the analysis of Chinese social welfare that 
the stratification of social welfare is more complex and preserved out of political consideration in 
autocracies. Hence, I propose to disaggregate the level of social welfare spending along the 
different dimensions of coverage, generosity and stratification in both theory building and 
empirical analysis, as doing so allows not only for an analysis of the relationship between regime 
type and the distribution of social welfare but also for an evaluation of the nuances of social 
welfare distribution between democracies and autocracies.   
Moreover, I argue that the fiscal situation of the state, as opposed to the political regime, is a 
key determinant of the depth and breadth of social welfare provisions. The composition of fiscal 
revenues of the state (regardless of its status as democratic or non-democratic) accounts for 
political leaders’ economic preferences for social welfare provision. The sources of fiscal 
revenues, to a large extent, define who constitutes the elites or “constituencies” whose interest 
political leaders seek to satisfy in social welfare provisions, regardless of regime type. Based on 
the neoclassical theory of the state and taxation (North 1981; Bates and Lien 1985; Levi 1988), 
Jeffrey F. Timmons argues that the state has pecuniary incentives to cater to taxpayers, thereby 
encouraging an overlap between the distribution of taxes and the distribution of public benefits. 
As a result, “the people who pay for government obtain the bulk of its benefits” (Timmons, 2005, 
pg. 530). Using cross-sectional data from approximately ninety countries from 1975 to 1999, he 




One important distinction in terms of the tax base or revenue source is between the direct 
taxation of individuals (i.e. tax on income, payroll tax, property tax etc.) and the taxation of 
corporations (i.e. taxes on goods and services, taxes on trade and transaction etc.). The more the 
state relies on the taxation of individuals for revenue, the more accountable and responsive the 
government must be to the people. Hence, the countries that rely more heavily on the taxation of 
individuals should provide more social welfare benefits—indicated by both high depth and 
breadth of social welfare -- than other states do. Another distinction in revenue sources is 
between own-source revenue and outside-source revenue such as inter-governmental grants or 
transfers. According to the recent literature on federalism and fiscal decentralization (Rodden 
2006, 2004), governments that can claim and obtain revenue from outside sources, such as other 
levels of government, demonstrate less fiscal discipline.  Hence, it follows as a prediction that 
higher shares of inter-governmental transfers or grants in a government’s total fiscal revenue 
supply should be associated with greater government spending.  
To sum up, although conventional wisdom suggests that democracies have an “inherent” 
advantage in social welfare provision, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
regime type and social welfare (spending or outcomes) is mixed at best. The confusion is 
attributed to the ambiguity in both theory and empirical operationalization of regime type (the 
independent variable), social welfare (the dependent variable) and the causal links connecting 
them. For improvement, I suggest disaggregating social welfare spending according to the three 
dimensions noted earlier—coverage, generosity and stratification. I predict that the difference in 
social welfare between democracies and non-democracies is more pronounced on the dimension 
of stratification (inequality of benefits across groups). Moreover, my study points to the 




political leaders’ preferences on social welfare policy (e.g. depth and breadth of social welfare 
provision). The effect of fiscal structure on social welfare provision is expected to hold across 
democracies and non-democracies. The absence of this factor in many existing studies may 
partially account for the inconclusiveness of the effect of regime type alone on social welfare.  
Globalization and Social Protection 
During the past quarter century, globalization penetrated most regions of the world, including 
Asia. Many scholars view globalization or economic openness as a great source of momentum 
for increasing social welfare (Cameron 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Garrett, 2001). These scholars argue 
that expanding resources are typically devoted to public sectors including welfare programs, to 
purportedly protect citizens from the adverse effects of globalization such as increasing 
economic uncertainty, labor dislocation, poverty and inequality. The positive relationship 
between economic openness and the size of public sectors is not limited to advanced 
industrialized economies but robust in a broader sample, comprising more than 100 countries 
(Rodrik 1997). Most existing studies of globalization and social welfare (Cameron 1978; Rodrik 
1997; Rudra 2002) rely on the aggregated measure of total government expenditure, 
consumption or social spending. Nonetheless, the distribution of government expenditure is as 
important as the levels of spending, despite remaining less frequently studied (Mares 2005). 
Countries with equal amounts of welfare state spending might distribute the spending unevenly 
to various social groups or across social welfare programs. As Section 5.2 describes, the Pacific 
Island and South Asian countries seem to target very high levels of expenditure to narrow 
subgroups of the population, whereas East Asian countries distribute the benefits of their social 
welfare programs relatively broadly across the entire population. Similarly, the mix of various 




spending. Important information about the distribution of social welfare benefits is simply 
discarded if aggregated expenditure data are used. In this sense, disaggregating the social 
spending data according to coverage, generosity and stratification is useful to compare and 
characterize the distribution aspects of welfare spending across countries.  
More importantly, the disaggregated measure of social welfare can assist in teasing out the 
real relationship between economic openness and welfare states. Different arguments persist in 
the literature regarding the correlation between globalization and the size of the welfare state. 
One line of literature argues that in the era of economic openness public demands for social 
protection will increase, which governments respond to by enlarging the safety net and 
government expenditure (Katzenstein 1985, Ruggie 1982). Another line of study points to the 
“race to the bottom” in wages, social protection and labor market regulations (Stephens et al. 
1999; Swank 1998). The idea is that with financial market liberalization capital has new 
opportunities for relocation in low-cost and low-regulation countries, so governments might cut 
social welfare expenditure and regulations in order to attract more investment. I contend that 
these two views of globalization are complementary rather than contradictory, and that their 
predictions actually address different dimensions of the social welfare. Based on the first 
mechanism, economic openness is predicted to be positively associated with the coverage of 
social protection; according to the second mechanism, it is negatively associated with the 
generosity of social protection. In the empirical analysis that follows, I test these predictions.  
Recent research on globalization and the welfare state revolves around the specification of 
the political mechanisms and conditions under which economic openness leads to changes in 
social expenditures or policy. Public demands for social protection under economic openness are 




specific factors model) but a bundle of factors can moderate or countervail such demands. Qiang 
Zhou (2011) finds that when inter-industry labor mobility is high in an economy (meaning that 
dislocated labor can easily find jobs in other sectors without much compromise in wages), their 
demands for social protection derived from external economic openness are moderate. Similarly, 
the government can take advantage of this mechanism in which high cross-sector labor mobility 
enables equalizing income, which in turn obviates the need for the government to spend more on 
the welfare state (Zhou 2012). Moreover, the redistribution preference of the labor class and the 
poor is less homogenous in developing countries, in part because of a salient rural-urban divide. 
Drawing on World Value Survey evidence on preferences for redistribution in 41 developing 
countries, Haggard et al. (2013) find that redistribution preferences of low-income groups vary 
significantly depending on occupation and place of residence.  
Even though a strong public demand exists for social protection, the domestic political 
institutions or conditions that determine how those public demands are articulated and then 
translated into government spending or policy is not a constant across countries; instead, this 
constitutes a parameter crucial to explaining differential outcomes. It is commonly believed that 
public demands for social protection are better translated into policy outcomes in democracies 
than in autocracies. As discussed above, the empirical and quantitative evidence that 
democracies perform better in the provision of social welfare is mixed, but scholars do find that 
democracies and autocracies respond to economic openness differently, indicated by uneven 
changes across social policy areas: greater change in welfare or pensions is found in democracies 
while greater change in education and health programs is apparent in autocracies (Rudra and 
Haggard 2005; Kaufman and Haggard 2008). The social welfare pattern (i.e. prioritizing human-




states in Asia echoes these statistical findings (Peng and Wong, 2008). The power of labor or 
tradable sectors under economic openness is another key factor that helps to explain how public 
demand is translated into social policy. Rudra (2002, 2005) argues that persistent collective 
action problems due to large-sized surplus labor and low skills undermine labor’s political clout 
and bargaining position in less developed countries and thus, contrary to what the Stolper-
Samuelson trade theory predicts, prevent workers from becoming the “winners” of globalization. 
Similarly, a less concentrated export structure is expected to aggravate the collective action 
problems faced by workers and employers in the export sector, and to decrease their 
organizational capabilities (Mares, 2005). Furthermore, Mares and Carnes (2008, 2012) argue 
that public demand or preference for government-administrated social insurance is conditional 
on the capacity of the state to enforce social insurance legislation. Weakness in state capacity 
erodes the potential gains workers can reap from contributory social insurance, especially 
programs with a longer lag time between the payment of the contributions and the receipt of 
social insurance benefits, such as pensions. Based on the received wisdom, I speculate that all the 
moderating factors including labor mobility, state capacity, and the power/organizational 
capability of labor are expected to impact the depth and breadth of social welfare, though they 
should have little effect on the stratification dimension. The reason is that these factors intensify 
or undermine social demand for absolute gains from social protection, which substantially 
mitigates the high economic risks and uncertainty that individuals face from external economic 
openness, rather than the relative gains.    
In sum, globalization or economic openness is a remarkable trend that has paralleled changes 
in the welfare state in the post-war period, especially since the 1980s. Much scholarship has been 




mechanisms that link them. Nevertheless, theoretical and analytical improvements can be made 
by replacing the aggregated measure of welfare spending that characterizes the existing studies 
with the multidimensional measure of social welfare proposed here. The multidimensional 
measure captures different theoretical mechanisms by which economic openness, directly or 
indirectly, might change the scope, magnitude and distribution of social protection. Specifically, 
I argue that social welfare in democracies differs from social welfare in non-democracies 
primarily on the dimension of stratification; some key features of the state fiscal structure, such 
as reliance on the taxation of individuals (as opposed to corporate taxation) or outside sources (as 
opposed to local sources) for fiscal revenue lead to more generous social welfare provisions; 
economic openness induces expansion in the coverage of social protection but retrenchment of 
generosity of social welfare programs.  
The next section presents the empirical tests and findings regarding the following hypotheses 
formulated based on this section.  
Hypothesis 1: social welfare in non-democracies has a higher degree of stratification than 
does social welfare in democracies.   
Hypothesis 2: countries with higher shares of tax revenue from taxation on individuals 
provide more social welfare benefits, indicated by both high depth and breadth of social welfare. 
Hypothesis 3: countries with higher shares of total fiscal revenue from outside sources 
provide more social welfare benefits than otherwise.   
Hypothesis 4: economic openness is positively associated with the coverage of social 
protection.  
Hypothesis 5: economic openness is negatively associated with the generosity of social 
protection. 
5.4 Empirical Analysis  




To test the hypotheses, I construct a dataset for 37 Asian countries from 2005 to 2010. I use 
the Social Protection Index (SPI) data collected by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the 
dependent variables (ADB 2013a). SPI is computed as the expenditures-to-beneficiaries ratio of 
respective welfare programs (including social insurance, social assistance and labor market 
programs; for detailed components of each category, see Table 5.2) compared to poverty-line 
expenditures (normalized by one-quarter of GDP per capita). Thus, in its simplest form, the SPI 
of each country can be expressed as:  
 
                                    
                            
 
      
                                    
                            
 
 
Following the above theoretical analysis, social protection is conceptualized on multiple 
dimensions—coverage, generosity and stratification. The generosity and the coverage of social 
welfare are used as dependent variables that represent the depth and the breadth of social, 
protection respectively. These two dimensions can be identified by a simple disaggregation of 
the SPI. Namely, Total Expenditures/Total Intended Beneficiaries can be expressed as two 
multiplicative parts:  
                 
                          
 
                          
                            
 
 
In other words, the first term registers the average size of benefits actually received (i.e. 
generosity), and the second, the proportion of intended beneficiaries actually covered (i.e. 
coverage). Similarly, the SPI can be disaggregated into two subcomponents: SPI for the poor 
(SPIp) and SPI for the non-poor (SPInp). Each has a population weight, such that the two 
subcomponents can be added to produce the overall SPI. I use the ratio of SPInp to SPIp as the 




The key independent variables are three: political regime, fiscal structure and economic 
openness. I use Marshall et al’s (2013) 20-point scale (-10 to +10) “POLITY2” from the PolityIV 
Dataset for measuring political regime. Higher POLITY2 scores indicate more democratic 
regimes. For robustness check, I also use “political rights score” (PRS) from Freedom House’s 
“Freedom in the World” dataset to approximate political regime. The rating of PRS is based on a 
1-to-7 scale with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of political freedom.
91
 I 
assume that the high level of political freedom is an indicator of democracy. The fiscal structure 
of a country is characterized by two factors: its tax base and its revenue source. Tax base is 
calculated as the share of taxation on individuals (including taxes on income, payroll or 
workforce, and property) out of total tax revenue, as opposed to the share of taxation on 
corporations (such as taxes on goods and services, taxes on transaction and international trade). 
Revenue source is measured as the share of grants or inter-governmental transfers out of total 
fiscal revenue. The fiscal data comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook. The measure of economic openness is the standard measure of 
exports plus imports as a share of GDP. The trade data are collected from ADB’s Statistical 
Database System Online (SDBS). Based on the theoretical analysis, I expect to find a negative 
relationship between democratic regimes and the level of stratification of social protection; a 
positive relationship between taxation on individuals and social protection (in terms of both 
generosity and coverage); a positive relationship between outside-sourced fiscal revenue and 
social protection; and finally, a positive relationship between economic openness and the 
coverage of social welfare but a negative relationship between economic openness and the 
generosity of social welfare.  
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 The political-rights rating is based on criteria on electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 





In addition to the variables testing theoretical predictions, I have added a range of control 
variables that might affect variation in social protection across countries: GDP per capita 
(logarithmic value) as a control for the level of economic development (data from SDBS); total 
dependency ratio (< 15 & 65+, data from World Population Prospects), and total government 
social expenditure (from SPI dataset). I use a cross-section-time-series model for statistical 
analysis, and each specification of the model includes country dummy variables as controls, a 
standard procedure in economics to control for the specific effects of each particular country. 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.3.  
Empirical Analysis Results  
 
The statistical results are summarized in Tables 5.4-5.8. Overall, the statistical findings lend 
substantial support to the theoretical predictions. First, democratic regime is associated with a 
lower level of stratification of social welfare, and this relationship is significant at the 95% 
confidence interval in most model specifications with Polity2 as the measure of political regime. 
By contrast, political regime does not have a statistically significant impact on the coverage or 
the generosity of social protection. Second, the results regarding the effect of fiscal structure on 
social protection are mixed. The theory suggests that greater taxation of individuals will lead to 
more social protection. The quantitative results are not statistically significant, though the 
variable measuring taxation of individuals does have a positive sign, as expected in all model 
specifications. The lack of significance for this variable may be a function, at least in part, of 
data scarcity. As for the impact of outside-source revenue measured by the share of external 
grants (from foreign governments, international organizations and other general government 
units) in fiscal revenue, the statistical results show that intergovernmental grants increase the 




significant in most specifications of the model. Third, economic openness measured by 
international trade is, as expected, negatively associated with the generosity of social protection 
but positively related to the coverage of social protection. The results on trade are consistent and 
significant in all model specifications. These findings provide a more accurate understanding of 
the relationship between economic openness and social protection, which is often a subject of 
debate in the literature.      
Specifically, Table 5.4 summaries the results on political regime and the stratification of 
social protection. Model 1 is the baseline model and Models 2-4 include a range of control 
variables. Controlling for relevant economic and social conditions (see Model 3), a one-point 
increase in the Polity2 score decreases the stratification of social protection (i.e. the ratio of 
social protection received by the non-poor and the poor) by .55. Model 4 controls for total 
government social expenditure (as a share of GDP) in addition to the economic and social 
conditions; then, the impact of political regime loses statistical significance at conventional 
levels. This may be indicative of the fact that political regime influences the stratification of 
social protection through changing total government social expenditures. As a robustness check 
of the relationship between political regime and social welfare stratification, I use the level of 
political freedom--PRS from the Freedom House-- to replace the Polity2 score as a proxy of 
political regime in all model specifications. Using the new measure of political regime, the 
statistical results loses significance at conventional levels but the “PRS” variable does keep a 
positive sign in all model specifications, suggesting that lower level of political freedom (higher 
value on PRS) is associated with higher stratification f social welfare spending.  
Table 5.5 presents the quantitative results on taxation and social protection (coverage and 




taxation variable; Models 2-4 include political, economic and social control variables, 
respectively. All of these models suffer from small sample sizes as a result of substantial missing 
data on government finances. The explanatory variable of interest in these models is taxation on 
individuals, the “Indivtax” variable. It consists of three categories of taxes from the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook: 1) taxes on income, profit & capital gains; 2) taxes on 
payroll and workforce; and 3) taxes on property. These taxes are similar to income or personal 
taxes in Western countries, requiring considerable state capacity to keep track of individuals’ 
income, property and employment. The more the state relies on these taxes for revenue, the more 
responsive the government must be to the people, and hence the more social welfare benefits it 
provides. I do find that the variable “Indivtax” is positively associated with social protection (in 
terms of both coverage and generosity) in all model specifications, although it is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. In Table 5.6, I replace taxation on individuals (“Inditax”) with 
taxation on corporations, such as taxes on goods and services and taxes on international trade and 
transactions (the variable “Corptax”), to check the relationship between taxation and social 
protection. Again, partially as a result of small sample sizes, none of the results are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. However, taxation on corporations seems to be consistently 
and positively associated with the generosity of social protection and negatively associated with 
its coverage, suggesting that a fiscal structure with more taxation on corporations increases the 
level of benefits from social protection for narrower constituencies (e.g. employees of taxable or 
tradable sectors). This echoes the logic of “representation through taxation” in existing studies 
(Gelbach 2008). That said, bigger samples and more data are needed to empirically confirm the 




Table 5.7 displays the quantitative results on the relationship between outside-source revenue 
and social protection. Some existing studies (e.g., Rodden 2006) suggest that intergovernmental 
transfers or grants might lead to overspending or a bigger government due to less fiscal 
discipline. The statistical analysis here partially supports that claim: a greater share of 
intergovernmental grants in the total fiscal revenue does increase the generosity of social welfare. 
However, grants are negatively associated with the coverage of social welfare, meaning that 
fewer people receive social welfare benefits if a considerable portion of fiscal revenue comes 
from outside sources such as intergovernmental transfers or grants. This finding lends itself to 
two possible interpretations. First, the result may be a function of the granters’ preferences. For 
example, international organizations such as the World Bank usually earmark the use of their 
grants, and oftentimes even the eligibility of receivers, which can limit the scope of beneficiaries 
(Rwangombwa 2009, Winters 2010). Second, states that rely on outside-source revenue have 
fewer incentives to please or remain accountable to their citizens; with the “windfall” from 
outside sources, those states tend to overspend on a narrow group of elites or people with 
political clout. This logic is similar to the political economy of the “Rentier State” (Ross 1999, 
2001). Both interpretations add insight into the received wisdom on the relationship between 
fiscal source and social welfare.  
Finally, the results in Table 5.8 provide very strong support to the predictions that economic 
openness decreases the generosity of social protection but increases its coverage. According to 
the results in Model 4, other conditions being equal, one percent increase in the share of trade in 
GDP will decrease the generosity of social protection by .05 percent of GDP and increase the 
coverage of social protection by .30 percent of eligible population. This finding reconciles the 




to the bottom” in social welfare spending. In fact, each side of the debate is confirmed to some 
extent in this analysis. The uncertainty or economic risk associated with exposure to international 
markets and competition does induce the government to provide social protection to more people; 
however, the total amount of resources that governments eventually allocate to social protection, 
or the average level of benefits that people receive through social protection, has not increased 
proportionally, owing to the pressure of controlling labor cost increases. To be noted, economic 
openness in this analysis is measured by the share of international trade (the sum of imports and 
exports) in GDP, which appropriately captures the content of economic openness in Asia. An 
interesting future analysis might test whether the differential relationships between economic 
openness and the coverage and generosity of social protection hold in other regions, where 
economic openness manifests more in terms of financial markets or the free flow of capital.  
Robustness Tests 
It is noted that there is considerable amount of missing data in the ADB’s SPI dataset that the 
dependent variables are based on. To reduce the possible influence of missing values, I fill in the 
missing values of dependent variables with predicted values based on multiple imputations (MI) 
method (King et al. 2001). The regression results using the MI dataset hardly change compared 
to the ones using the previous dataset with missing data. This suggests that the findings are 
robust to the missing data in the social protection index. Other efforts to check the robustness of 
the regression results were taken including constructing a similar dataset using other data source-
- the World Bank’s Atlas of Social Protection: Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE).
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The ASPIRE dataset is compiled from various individual/household survey data and supposed to 
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 The ASPIRE include ten indictors of social protection. Among them, the indicator of “average per 
capita transfer”, “coverage”, and “benefit incidence” are similar to the concepts of “generosity”, 
“coverage” and “stratification” developed in this study. For more detail about the indicators computed in 




cover most countries in the world since 2005. However, its variable computation is less 
transparent and its data at this stage is even more unbalanced (available N< 70) compared to the 
ADB’s SPI dataset. Better data and novel measurement are needed for future research to 
untangle the multiple dimensions of policy design and distributional consequences of social 
protection.     
Implications  
This study has two main implications for the comparative study of social welfare. The first 
concerns the multidimensional conceptualization and measure of social welfare. Most existing 
studies of social welfare (with the important exceptions of Esping-Anderson 1990, Mares 2005) 
use aggregated levels of government social spending to measure the social welfare provision of a 
country and compare it cross-nationally. Such a measure of social welfare, though easily 
amenable to large-N quantitative and comparative analyses, overlooks important information 
about the distributional aspects of social welfare policy. As a result, some theoretically-sound 
propositions find insufficient or inconclusive support in empirical analyses that use aggregated 
levels of social welfare spending as the dependent variable. Examples can be found in the 
existing studies examining the relationship between democracy and welfare state and the 
relationship between economic openness and social protection. To resolve this problem, some 
scholars disaggregated social welfare spending by policy areas such as pensions, health and 
education (Rudra and Haggard 2005, Haggard and Kaufman 2008); other scholars have replaced 
social welfare spending with social policy results such as the numbers of public schools, public 
sanitation, roads, safe water (Deacon 2009) or the primary pupil teacher ratio, immunization 
rates and infant mortality rates (Truex 2013). The solution this study proposes is to conceptualize 




dimensions: coverage (breadth), generosity (depth) and stratification (inequality). Unlike the 
measurements based on social policy results, the multidimensional measure of social welfare 
does not require extra data collection efforts; furthermore, compared to the disaggregated 
measure of social welfare by policy area, the multidimensional measure better captures the 
distributional aspect of social welfare. Using the multidimensional measure of social welfare, 
this study obtains some empirical results that have the potential to reconcile competing and even 
contradictory arguments in the literature regarding democracy, economic openness and the 
welfare state. The evidence indicates that democracy is not necessarily associated with broader 
or more generous social welfare provision; instead, democracy does mitigate the inequality in 
social welfare provisions, indicated by significantly lower levels of stratification of social 
welfare in democracies than in non-democracies. The findings also indicate that economic 
openness (or globalization) does come with broader coverage (breadth) of social protection in 
Asia, as evidence from OECD countries and the small open states has suggested (Cameron 1978; 
Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 2001); however, the proponents of the “race to the bottom” argument 
that economic openness disincentivizes social welfare spending due to competition for 
investments are also correct in the sense that the generosity (depth) of social protection decreases 
with economic openness. It is important to note that these nuanced findings, and the novel 
understanding of democracy, economic openness and social protection that they imply, are based 
on the data of Asian countries from 2005 to 2010.  
The second implication of this study on comparative social welfare concerns the remarkable 
variation and character of social protection in Asia. As delineated in Section 5.2, various sub-
regions of Asia and the Pacific have approached social protection in notably different ways.  




development across these sub-regions, bring in different priorities and perceived challenges in 
the ongoing social welfare reform among Asian countries. According to an Asian social 
development specialist, Sri Wening Handayani, “one can notice differences while moving across 
this vast continent. In South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, most social protection 
programs have focused on expanding coverage and identifying financing sources to fight poverty, 
reduce vulnerability, and provide long-term protection to the population. In transition economies 
in Central Asia, the focus has been more on modifying generous Soviet-era systems to ensure 
their sustainability in a market economy” (Asian Development Bank, 2013b).  
Furthermore, in a few developed countries in Asia such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, 
and some middle-income countries such as China, aging populations have raised significant 
issues regarding the sustainability of social welfare systems and workforce productivity. 
According to Lindert (2004), who systematically evaluates government social spending since the 
18
th
 century, population aging, GDP per capita, and democracy are the three most powerful 
predictors of social spending (as a percentage of GDP) around the world and the prediction is 
that all three factors are leading to social spending increases. By contrast, this study, using data 
from only Asian countries, indicates that increasing dependency ratio actually decreases the 
generosity of social welfare that Asians receive from their governments; moreover, controlling 
for democracy, increasing GDP per capita and dependency ratios decreases the stratification (or 
inequality) of social welfare that Asian governments provide. These findings seem to support the 
existence and persistence of “Asian values” that espouse reliance on family or private support for 
welfare (Peng and Wong 2008; Goodman et al. 1998). A caveat to this interpretation is that the 
sample on which these findings are derived is unbalanced and covers only a short period of time 




might introduce more countries and years into the sample in order to test the robustness of the 
findings and to redefine the boundaries of the aforementioned results.            
5.5 Concluding Remarks  
As mentioned earlier, this chapter has three principal goals: 1) to examine how portable the 
multdimensional conceptualization of social welfare, developed and adopted in my study of 
Chinese social welfare, is to the comparative study of social welfare; 2) to explore the 
differences and commonalities of social welfare provision among Asian countries and to 
understand the causes of those differences and commonalities; and 3) to discuss the pattern and 
development of Chinese social welfare in the broad and comparative context of Asia. This 
chapter has demonstrated that the multidimensional conceptualization of social welfare is 
portable to comparative studies of social welfare in Asia and enables us to understand more 
accurately the relationship between democracy, economic openness and social protection. The 
primary goal of this dissertation, however, is to explain the development and distribution of 
Chinese social welfare. Thus, how does the comparative study of social welfare in Asian 
countries inform our understanding of Chinese social welfare development, and vice versa?  
Chinese social welfare (mainly in the form of social insurance) has been dramatically 
expanding over the past decade. According to ADB’s SPI data, the breadth (coverage) of 
Chinese social protection in 2009 was .798 (meaning that 79.8% of the eligible population were 
actual beneficiaries of social welfare), ranked only after Japan (.905) and South Korea (.886) 
among 37 Asian and Pacific countries. Given that social protection coverage in China was 
only .448 in 2005 (compared to .950 in Japan and .842 in South Korea at the same time), this 
figure suggests remarkable progress on the part of the Chinese government in social welfare 
expansion. The dramatic expansion of Chinese social protection, according to my quantitative 




strategic choice and the interplay between increasing government financial input and the lively 
labor market (migration) derived from economic openness. Chinese politicians’ strong incentives 
to create a large risk pool for social protection to cope with the changing labor market and 
demography is not unique. From the quantitative study of social protection in Asia, a significant 
and strong positive relationship between economic openness and the coverage of social 
protection is also apparent. Some evidence exists from the comparative studies that fiscal 
resources, such as taxation of individuals, increase the coverage of social protection, as well.  
   In stark contrast to its remarkable achievement in terms of social welfare expansion, the 
generosity (depth) of Chinese social welfare is much lower than the expected level, given its 
economic development or income level. According to ADB’s SPI data, the depth of Chinese 
social welfare in 2009 was .174 (meaning that the average benefit level of Chinese social welfare 
was only about .04 % of its GDP), which places China between Thailand (.153) and the Kyrgyz 
Republic (.196). My study of Chinese social welfare indicates that a lack of sufficient financial 
input, especially at the local levels, is the primary cause of the low generosity of social welfare in 
China. Some Chinese local governments, under severe fiscal constraint, prioritize expanding the 
coverage of social welfare over raising the average level of benefits. This political choice in 
China is reflected in the choices of other states in East Asia, where the score for social protection 
breadth is considerably higher than the score for social protection depth: according to ADB’s SPI 
data, the average depth of social protection in East Asia in 2009 was much lower than the 
average depth in Central and West Asia (.461), South Asia (.360) and the Pacific (.899), and 
barely higher than in Southeast Asia (.284). Furthermore, my quantitative study of social welfare 
in Asia between 2005 and 2010 shows that economic openness and population aging have a 




policy in East Asian countries note that the social welfare reform in South Korea and Taiwan in 
the post-1997 era refocused social insurance to be “productivist” in order to meet the imperatives 
of economic globalization and demographic shifts (Peng and Wong 2008).  
The third dimension of social protection is stratification (or inequality) of welfare benefits. A 
low coverage yet high generosity of social welfare provision suggests high stratification in social 
protection, with only a small portion of population receiving the generous benefits. On the 
contrary, a high coverage yet low generosity of social welfare provision suggests more equality 
(i.e. less stratification) in social welfare distribution, with a large portion of the population 
receiving benefits, though less generous ones. The degree of stratification of Chinese social 
welfare provision is above the mean of Asian countries and stays at a relatively high level 
compared to other East Asian countries. Moreover, my subnational study of Chinese social 
welfare found that the stratification of social welfare differs across Chinese regions depending on 
the composition of local constituencies and the incentives of national and subnational politicians 
who interact with those constituencies and one another. In the Chinese regions where state 
sectors, military, and certain ethnic minority groups are concentrated, the stratification of social 
welfare is higher, because the state attempts to privilege these groups in social welfare provision 
as a means of maintaining order and social stability. In my comparative study of Asian social 
welfare using the ADB’s SPI dataset, stratification is measured by income groups rather than by 
social status (e.g. urban/rural residency, employment sectors etc.), but the finding that 
democracies have lower levels of stratification (or inequality) of social welfare than do non-
democracies is not contradictory to the finding from the Chinese case.
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 As leaders in non-
democracies (including China) rely less on a large portion of the population for political survival, 
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 The Chinese urban state-sector employees including government officials, party cadres and military, 




they tend to concentrate the welfare benefits and allocate more resources to the elites or to small 
groups with political clout and connections. The detailed case studies of Chinese social welfare 
have illustrated, in a subnational context, the political logic of social welfare distribution that the 
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Table 5.1 Government Social, Social Security, Education, and Health Spending in the 
Developing World 
Note: Latin America and East Asia (1976-1980), Eastern Europe, 1990.  
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Figure 5.1 Components of Social Protection by Region, 2009 
Note: The number refers to the expenditures-to-beneficiaries ratio of respective welfare program 
compared to poverty-line expenditures (normalized by one-quarter of GDP per capita). For 
example, if the figure of social insurance were 0.100 in region X, this number would mean that 
the social insurance expenditures (per intended beneficiary) represent 10% of poverty-line 
expenditures or 2.5% of GDP per capita of the region. 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2013, The Social Protection Index: Assessing Results for Asia 






Figure 5.2 Social Protection Index by Region, 2009 
Note: The Social Protection Index (SPI) is an indicator that divides total expenditures on social 
protection by the total number of intended beneficiaries of all social protection programs. For 
assessment purposes, this ratio of expenditures to beneficiaries is compared with poverty-line 
expenditures. For example, if the SPI were 0.100 in country X, this index number would mean 
that total social protection expenditures (per intended beneficiary) represent 10% of poverty-line 
expenditures. For purposes of consistency, each country’s poverty-line expenditures are set at 
one-quarter of its GDP per capita. The higher this index number, the better a country’s 
performance. 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2013, The Social Protection Index: Assessing Results for Asia 





Figure 5.3 Depth of the Social Protection Index by Region and Program, 2009 
Note: the depth of SPI means the average size of benefits received by actual beneficiaries 
compared to the poverty-line expenditure. For example, if the depth were 0.200, this would 
signify that the average size of benefits is 20% of poverty-line expenditures or 5% of GPD per 
capita. 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2013, The Social Protection Index: Assessing Results for Asia 







Figure 5.4 Breadth of the Social Protection Index by Region and Program, 2009 
Note: the breadth of SPI means the proportion of intended beneficiaries who actually receive 
benefits. The breadth would be 0.500, meaning that half of all intended 
beneficiaries receive benefits. 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2013, The Social Protection Index: Assessing Results for Asia 







Figure 5.5 Stratification of Social Protection by Region, 2009 
Note: stratification of social protection is measure by the ratio of benefits that the poor and the 
non-poor receive respectively, relative to the poverty line expenditure (set as one-quarter of GDP 
per capita).  
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2013, The Social Protection Index: Assessing Results for Asia 













































 Table 5.2 Components of Social Protection Index 
Item Expenditures (%) Beneficiaries (%) 
Social Insurance (share of social protection) 59 37 
 Individual SI Programs (share of total SI)   
      Pensions 65 45 
      Health Insurance 13 35 
      Other SI 22 20 
Total SI 100 100 
Social Assistance (share of social protection) 36 58 
 Individual SA Programs (share of total SA)   
      Social Transfers 32 34 
      Child Welfare 34 31 
      Disaster Relief  14 15 
      Assistance to the elderly 12 8 
      Health Assistance 5 9 
      Disability Programs 3 2 
Total SA 100 100 
Labor Market Programs (share of social 
protection) 
5 6 
 Individual LMP Programs (share of total 
LMP) 
  
      Skills Development and Training 46 48 
      Food/Cash for Work Programs 54 52 
Total LMP 100 100 
Note : SI= social insurance, SA=social assistance, LMP=labor market program  





 Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Cross-National Quantitative Analysis of Social 
Protection 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
spi_d 129 .473 .574 .032 4.529 
spi_b 129 .365 .324 .001 1.757 
spi_s 130 6.279 9.106 .123 55.25 
polity2 222 4.113 1.971 1 7 
prs 173 4.040 3.553 0 10 
inditax 128 .372 .163 .042 .692 
corptax 128 .554 .218 .146 1.024 
gdppc 182 9.717 1.646 6.547 14.117 
trade 163 87.701 36.871 25.025 171.052 
dependency 204 59.686 17.034 8 106 
socialexp 121 3.274 3.448 .000 19.348 
Source: data of “spi_d”, “spi_b”, “spi_s” from Asian Development Bank’s Social Protection 
Index dataset; data of “trade”, “gdppc” and “socialexp” from Asian Development Bank’s 
Statistical Database System Online; data of “”inditax” and “corptax” from Internal Monetary 
Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook; data of “polity2” from Marshall et al’s (2013); 
data of “prs” from Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” dataset; data of “dependency” 




Table 5.4 Political Regime and Stratification of Social Welfare 
 Polity2 as measure of democracy PRS as measure of democracy  





































Govsociexp    .48 
(.90) 


















N 106 83 83 70 130 106 97 84 





Table 5.5 Taxation on Individuals and Social Protection 
 DV: Generosity of Social Protection DV: Coverage of Social Protection 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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(.001) 
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GDP pc   -.022 
(.021) 
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(.053) 
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(.002) 


















N 75 59 59 66 75 59 59 66 





Table 5.6 Taxation on Corporations and Social Protection 
 DV: Generosity of Social Protection DV: Coverage of Social Protection 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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(.012) 
  
Trade     -.003 
(.002) 
   .002 
(.004) 
 
GDP pc   -.117 
(.112) 
   .032 
(.170) 
 
Dependency     -.006* 
(.003) 


















N 75 59 59 66 75 59 59 66 





Table 5.7 Fiscal Source and Social Protection 
***p < .01, ** p< .05, * p<.1 
 
  
 DV: Generosity of Social Protection DV: Coverage of Social Protection 
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Table 5.8 Economic Openness and Social Protection 
***p < .01, ** p< .05, * p<.1 
 
 DV: Generosity of Social Protection DV: Coverage of Social Protection 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (1) 2) (3) (4) 
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6.1 Summary of the Arguments and Findings 
Who gets what, when and how from the Chinese welfare state? This is the core question that 
motivates my research. Although an extensive literature examines the welfare state in affluent 
democracies, we still know relatively little about the origin, design, and implementation of social 
welfare programs in authoritarian regimes. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the welfare 
state is a feature only of democracies, however, my research demonstrates that authoritarian 
regimes might dramatically expand social welfare even without democratization. My dissertation, 
using a combination of individual-level survey data and government statistics, employing 
quantitative analysis along with extensive fieldwork to understand the nuances of social welfare 
policy, explains the political rationale for the policy design, implementation, and distributional 
pattern of social health insurance under the Chinese decentralized authoritarianism. 
Chinese healthcare provision, in the form of social health insurance, has undergone a 
dramatic expansion over the past decade without significant political reform or democratization. 
Accompanying the expansion has been a sharp stratification of healthcare benefits across social 
groups and across regions. A paradox thus arises: the impressive expansion of social health 
insurance and the increased number of social health insurance programs have not reduced, but 
have rather reproduced, socioeconomic inequalities in China. Instead of leveling the social 
playing field, the changes in social health insurance continue to link social benefits to citizens’ 
socioeconomic status and residency. To address this paradox, I develop a theoretical framework 
that takes into account the political actors and their incentives created by authoritarianism, the 




Authoritarian leaders are fundamentally interested in regime stability. As threats to the 
regime can emerge from both elites and the masses, authoritarian leaders must strategically 
distribute resources between them. Doing so in a manner that efficiently balances benefits 
between the elites and the masses so as to maximize the leaders’ survival prospects constitutes a 
choice with potential costs. One strategy the Chinese authoritarian regime has adopted is to 
maintain particularly privileged welfare provisions for elites while preserving an essentially 
modest social provision for the masses. Under the conditions of political centralization and fiscal 
decentralization, the Chinese central leaders, on one hand, establish and promote a highly 
stratified social welfare system to achieve a “divide and rule” situation that ultimately weakens 
social groups’ capabilities for horizontal mobilization while privileging certain groups over 
others. On the other hand, however, the central leaders seek to delegate discretionary power to 
local leaders regarding the coverage and generosity of social health insurance, to accommodate 
diverse local and social needs and to co-opt local leaders in the policy making process. Given the 
center’s strategy, Chinese local leaders, who owe their political careers to the center rather than 
to the general public in their jurisdiction, proactively design and provide welfare benefits in a 
manner that suits the socioeconomic conditions in their jurisdiction and thus contributes to social 
stability, a well-known priority target in the center’s assessment of local leaders. My study 
emphasizes that the Chinese local leaders encounter different constellations of constraints in 
social policy making and implementation, such as fiscal stringency and social risk. The dynamics 
of central-local interactions thus stands at the core of the politics of social welfare provision in 
China. 
To explain the pattern and variation of social health insurance in China, I first conceptualize 




stratification, coverage, and generosity. Generosity, similar to the concept of spending 
commonly used in existing social welfare studies, captures the average level of benefits, or 
spending per individual. Coverage, in terms of the proportion of people insured in the total 
population, represents the spread of health insurance benefits among individuals. Stratification, 
measured by the inequality of benefits that different groups have received, describes the 
distributional pattern of social welfare benefits across specific social groups within the general 
public. I examine these three dimensions of Chinese social health insurance using both 
government statistics and individual-level survey data. I then utilize an original provincial-level 
panel dataset (from 1999 to 2010) to conduct an in-depth quantitative analysis of regional 
clustering patterns and the causes of regional variation in Chinese social health insurance.  
Furthermore, I employ subnational comparative case studies drawing on various government 
documents and more than 140 field interviews conducted in 16 Chinese provinces from 2009 to 
2012 to reconstruct and illustrate the political mechanisms—how local socioeconomic conditions 
and the dynamics of central-local interaction influence the distribution of social health insurance 
benefits by shaping local leaders’ policy preferences and choices. Lastly, I compile and make use 
of a cross-national dataset from various public sources, including The Social Protection Index 
(from the Asian Development Bank), World Governance Indicators (from the World Bank), 
World Population Prospects (from the United Nations, DESA) and the International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Financial Statistical Yearbook, to evaluate the relationship between 
democracy, economic openness and social protection, thus putting the study of Chinese social 
welfare into the broader comparative context of Asia. 
The main empirical findings of the dissertation are threefold. Firstly, the Chinese social 




urban; 2) labor market insiders versus labor market outsiders; and 3) state versus non-state 
sectors. These social cleavages, which cross-cut class differences, have been institutionalized 
into China’s social health insurance system by the Center through a bundle of social legislations 
and finally by the Social Insurance Law, promulgated in 2010. Moreover, the center makes use 
of fiscal transfers and top-down personnel control to maintain its preferable stratification pattern 
of social welfare distribution. The pattern of stratification in social health insurance thus persists 
across Chinese localities: urban state-sector employees receive far more benefits than other urban 
residents and rural dwellers in all of China’s provinces. Secondly, in contrast to the uniform 
stratification pattern of social welfare, the generosity and coverage of social health insurance 
differ dramatically across localities, indicating that local officials choose different models of 
social welfare provision based on the specific profile of constraints they encounter in local 
circumstances. Specifically, local officials in regions with high levels of labor mobility tend to 
expand more the coverage of social health insurance, while local officials in regions with high 
levels of fiscal revenue are more likely to enhance the generosity of social health insurance 
benefits. While officials in regions with high labor mobility and fiscal prosperity become 
pioneers in promoting risk and income redistribution through substantial social health insurance 
reform, their counterparts in regions with neither high labor mobility nor fiscal prosperity tend to 
defend the status quo—a fragmented and inequitable social health insurance system—in their 
jurisdictions. Thirdly, using the same multidimensional conceptualization of social welfare 
benefits developed and adopted in my study of Chinese social welfare, my dissertation 
demonstrates that social protection in other countries can also be investigated and evaluated 
according to the three dimensions of coverage, generosity and stratification. In comparison, the 




among Asian countries. However, the generosity of Chinese social welfare is significantly lower 
than expected based on the country’s economic development and income levels, and the 
stratification of social welfare provision in China is considerably higher than average, a feature 
that China shares with other non-democratic states in Asia.   
This dissertation attempts to contribute to the studies of authoritarianism, decentralization 
and social welfare in the following aspects. First, in specifying the rationale, conditions and 
policy results of the interaction between Chinese central and local leaders in social welfare 
provision, the dissertation sheds light on how political leaders in an authoritarian regime with 
multilevel governance structure respond to social needs. The analysis of subnational politicians’ 
incentive structure and policy choices in social welfare provision, which are missing in most 
extant studies of authoritarianism and social welfare, demonstrates an “indirect accountability” 
built into the Chinese social welfare provision. The “indirect accountability”, evidenced by local 
leaders’ proactive accommodation of social and local needs through social policies, may partially 
account for the puzzling resilience and flexibility of Chinese authoritarian regime. Second, the 
dissertation demonstrates that social welfare expansion, in some cases, is not a result of 
democracy but of resilient authoritarianism. Social welfare is one tool employed by authoritarian 
leaders to maintain regime stability. The political motivation for social welfare provision is 
different in non-democracies—it is more directly from top-down pressure of maintaining order 
rather than from bottom-up demands as in democracies—but this does not mean that non-
democracies provide less social welfare than democracies do. Furthermore, the dissertation 
highlights the multidimensionality of social welfare policy and the trade-offs that politicians face 
in distributing welfare benefits. It suggests that politicians, no matter in democracies or non-




provision and that they make policy choices on the different dimensions of social welfare –
coverage, generosity and stratification– according to the specific institutional and socioeconomic 
constraints they encounter. It is the combination of these different choices that constitute the 
variation of social welfare provision observed cross countries and within countries.     
The demand side of Chinese social welfare, including individuals’ preference for 
redistribution, public opinion of social welfare and its potential impact on regime survival and 
legitimacy, has been under-addressed in the dissertation. Although the aim of this dissertation is 
primarily to explain the supply side and the distributional aspects of Chinese social welfare, a 
full accounting of the political economy of social welfare should include an analysis of the 
demand side, or, the preferences and opinions of the public who receive and consume the welfare 
benefits. Social preference and public opinion of welfare benefits constitute a latent yet 
important driving force underlying the process as well as the distributional results of Chinese 
social welfare provision. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter, I draw empirical evidence from 
secondary works and public survey projects to examine individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution and the public opinion of social provision and governance over the period of 
Chinese social welfare reform (the mid-1990s to present). The empirical findings, though 
preliminary and sketchy, suggest an important avenue for future research on Chinese social 
welfare and on comparative social welfare more generally.   
6.2 Individuals’ Preferences for Redistribution in China  
The theory that this dissertation develops to explain the provision of welfare benefits in 
China left me with pressing questions about the demand side of social welfare policy in China. 
Specifically, what are ordinary Chinese citizens’ preferences for social protection and 
redistribution in general? Do they differ from the interests of citizens in advanced industrial 




examined redistributive preferences in Western democracies. The conventional perspective relies 
on the median voter theory, which predicts that the more the median voter’s income falls below 
average income, the higher the level of tax-cum-transfer the median voter will prefer and the 
larger the size of the government will be (Meltzer & Richard 1981). Building on this insight, 
scholars of Western democracies also show that redistributive preferences can be a function of 
the individual’s income status (Finseraas, 2009), insurance needs (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001), 
level of education and specificity of skills (Cusack et al., 2006), social mobility expectations 
(Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Ok, 2001), uncertainty and the need to insure income loss when 
employed in a vulnerable economic sector (Mares 2005), or ethnic and religious heterogeneity 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006).  
Research on public policy preferences in the developing world is still in its infancy. 
However, the limited number of existing empirical studies of redistributive preferences outside 
of the advanced industrial democracies has generated findings that differ from, and even 
contradict, the Meltzer-Richard expectations. In a sample of Latin American countries, Cramer 
and Kaufman (2011) find that higher levels of inequality are associated with more negative 
average judgments about the existing distribution of income. Contrary to Meltzer–Richard 
expectations, they also find that the dissatisfaction of the poor actually decreases in more 
unequal societies. Ansell and Samuels (2011) find similar results in a sample of developing-
country autocracies and also note that preferences for redistribution were actually weaker in 
more unequal countries. More recently, Haggard et al (2013) argue that inequality has limited 
effects on demands for redistribution; they show instead that occupation and place of residence 
are key predictors of the redistributive preferences of low-income groups in the developing 




Built on the insights from the aforementioned studies of redistributive preferences in the 
developing world, I predict that preferences for redistribution in China should differ from the 
expected redistributive preferences in Western democracies for three reasons. First, decades of 
economic transition and reform have severely complicated the social cleavages in Chinese 
society. In addition to the rich-poor income cleavage that features prominently in market 
economies and in empirical studies of public preference in Western democracies, Chinese 
society is further divided by the cleavage between state sectors and non-state sectors—a typical 
feature of transition economies. The legacy of the communist “Iron Rice Bowl” (a work-unit-
based welfare system) continues to leave state-sector employees with higher expectations 
regarding provisions of comprehensive welfare from the state.  
Second, since the Maoist era, rural and urban China have operated under quite distinct 
systems, with urban residents consistently privileged over rural ones in terms of social provisions. 
Moreover, the urban-rural division in the Chinese economy has exacerbated rather than mitigated 
during decades of economic reform and openness. In 2010, the urban-rural income gap in China 
stood at 3.23:1, notably higher than the average level (2.0:1) in developing countries. Taken 
along with the findings from existing studies of redistributive preferences in the developing 
world, these conditions suggest that preferences for redistribution in China should split along the 
salient urban-rural divide. Furthermore, like other large-population states with diverse regional 
economies, China faces built-in regional disparities in socioeconomic development, by virtue of 
its size and geographic expanse. Those regional disparities have been reinforced by fiscal 
decentralization since the mid-1980s. Hence, we may see evidence of distinct regional patterns in 




Third, throughout much of China’s history, social welfare has not been seen as a basic 
social right for citizens. In order to preempt competing political organizations and to maintain 
political stability, the Chinese authoritarian leadership has thus sought to maintain differential 
social welfare provisions based on the hierarchy of social groups, a strategy that impedes 
horizontal mobilization and cross-class coalitions. Hence, despite the dramatic expansion of 
social insurance coverage since 2003, Chinese social entitlements remain stratified and closely 
linked to people’s socioeconomic status, as determined by factors such as government 
employment, household registration (hukou), and labor market participation. Such contextual and 
institutional settings should have dampened rather than provoked more demand for redistribution. 
I predict, therefore, that the public tolerance of inequality remains high in China, even as Chinese 
citizens expect the government to play more important role in redistribution.  
Data from the Chinese component of the World Value Survey (WVS)
94
 provides 
evidentiary support for some of the above predictions. Following existing studies (Berens 2012; 
Haggard et al. 2013), I use respondents’ answers to the question (V118) that asks whether they 
believe “the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” 
or whether “people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” to estimate 
respondents’ preference for redistribution. About one third of Chinese respondents strongly or 
fairly strongly believes (8-10 on the 10-point scale) that assuring “everyone is provided for” is 
the responsibility of government, and the proportion of respondents that holds this view changes 
somewhat over time, fluctuating between 25.1% and 37.7% (Figure 6.1). As expected, this belief 
is more popular among the working class and lower and lower-middle classes than among upper 
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or upper-middle classes (Figure 6.2).
95
 I also estimate preferences regarding inequality (income 
differences) based on answers to the question (V116) that asks whether they believe “income 
should be made more equal” or whether “we need larger income differences as incentives”. 
About half of Chinese respondents strongly or fairly strongly (8-10 on the 10-point scale) believe 
in the latter, indicating that public tolerance of inequality is quite high in China. Chinese 
respondents’ tolerance of inequality, however, has decreased notably over time, from 68.6% in 
1991 down to 39.0% in 2007 (Figure 6.3). More interestingly, working class, lower-middle and 
lower classes indicate greater tolerance of inequality than do the upper and upper-middle classes 
in China (Figure 6.4).  
Compared to the burgeoning research on redistributive preference in the developing world 
(Cramer and Kaufman, 2011; Haggard et al. 2013; Berens 2012; Marques 2013), the literature 
specific to Chinese preferences for social welfare and redistribution is even smaller. Peter Lee 
and Chack-Kie Wong (2001), using a 1996 survey of urban views toward social welfare in 
Guangzhou and Shanghai, find that Chinese urban residents exhibit a “high welfare dependency 
orientation.” Mark Frazier, drawing on results from the 2004 Beijing Area Study (BAS), finds 
that older respondents are much more likely than younger ones to place responsibility on the 
state for providing pensions, as opposed to other providers such as employers and individuals 
purchasing commercial insurance. Moreover, the unemployed were much more likely than 
retirees or the employed to place responsibility on the state, rather than employers or individuals, 
for providing pension. Frazier also found strong support for universal pension coverage: 
respondents in the BAS survey were nearly unanimously in agreement with the statement that 
Chinese citizens should receive pensions as a basic right (Frazier 2010, pg. 153). Several caveats 
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must be noted, however, in interpreting findings based primarily on the BAS 2004 data. First, the 
data were collected only in Beijing, the capital city of China, where social welfare and other 
public goods provisions are among the best in the country. Thus, the findings cannot be used to 
infer preferences for social welfare in other Chinese regions. Second, the interview questions 
from which the data were collected pertain particularly to individuals’ views regarding pensions 
rather than social welfare or redistribution more generally. Thus, respondents’ answers to those 
questions may not reflect more than their views on the design of the pension system at the time 
of the survey in 2004 (contributory for the current workers, with almost no contribution from 
current retirees). Third, the data does not allow for a comparison of individuals’ preferences over 
time, owing to the fact that it is based on only one wave of the BAS survey. Martin Whyte’s 
investigation of public preferences over the government’s role in mitigating inequality and 
distributive injustice improves on Frazier’s analysis by exploiting a national survey conducted in 
2004. Whyte finds that both high-status Chinese citizens (those with high income, education and 
close connections to the state) and less advantaged ones (such as migrant workers and the urban 
unemployed) support “government leveling” (Whyte 2010). But Whyte’s conceptualization of 
“government leveling” is a bit different– it is more of an affirmative action orientation designed 
to promote equality of opportunity but not equality of results. 
In my previous study of Chinese preferences for social welfare and redistribution, which 
draws upon insights and qualitative evidence from field interviews in 16 Chinese provinces 
between 2009 and 2012, I emphasized the diversity of redistributive preferences and how those 
preferences differ across societal groups (Huang 2013). I argued that two lines of cleavage in 
social welfare preferences can be noted in urban China: one between state sector and non–state 




sector insiders generally support the payroll-tax-based and contributory social insurance 
programs for pension, healthcare, unemployment, and work injury. By contrast, non-state sector 
insiders lack incentives to join the social insurance programs without extra compensation from 
the government. Chinese state-sector outsiders (e.g. SOE laid-off workers, impoverished urban 
workers) defend the egalitarian social welfare benefits they used to enjoy in the “good old days” 
of work-unit socialism, while non-state sector outsiders (rural-to-urban migrants, informal and 
temporary workers etc.) tend to support universalistic social welfare provisions. The empirical 
assessment of these arguments, however, is limited to aggregated and qualitative evidence on 
public preferences. I will pursue future research on cross-sectional and cross-time variations in 
Chinese preferences for redistribution using individual-level survey data, from sources such as 
the WVS, in order to further explore the demand side of Chinese social welfare policy, without 
which our understanding of Chinese social welfare would be incomplete.   
6.3 Public Opinion and Regime Stability in China  
Most studies of the authoritarian welfare state, including this dissertation, argue that 
autocratic leaders design social welfare policy and mandate social welfare provision for the 
purpose of regime survival (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006). A key assumption 
underlying the literature is that social welfare can change people’s political attitudes and bolster 
regime legitimacy. However, the demand side of social welfare in non-democracies is less 
studied and needs more empirical exploration. Nearly everything we know about individual 
preferences for redistribution or social policy come from studies of developed democracies 
(Alesina and Guiliano, 2011; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003) or democratic subsamples 
from developing countries (Berens 2012; Cramar and Kaufman 2011; Wegner and Pellicer 2011). 
Some recent studies began to explore individuals’ preferences for redistribution in the 




a research focus on the moderation effect of existing institutions on individuals’ redistributive 
preference.  
The relationship between social preferences for redistribution (or welfare policy) and the 
state’s provision of social welfare is much trickier in non-democracies, owing to the fact that 
effective representation and accountability between politicians and constituencies is often absent 
in those contexts. My previous study (Huang 2013) finds that the Chinese authoritarian regime’s 
political priority since the late 1970s—economic growth with social stability—has induced the 
government to accommodate diverse social preferences in welfare policies. The three 
components of Chinese social welfare reform since the mid-1980s—social insurance, 
privatization and targeting—reflect concerns from the distinct social cleavages in China, each of 
which reflects distinct preference and interest for social protection. Nonetheless, we still know 
little about the impact of Chinese social welfare on support for and opposition to the regime, and 
hence on regime survival or the prospects for regime survival.   
Existing studies of Chinese public opinion generally concern the effects of broad political 
changes and economic reform on mass political attitudes (Tang 2005; Whyte 2010). Research on 
the impact of public goods or service provisions on political attitudes in China, conversely, 
remains in its nascent stages (Lu 2013; Michelson 2012; Saich 2008; Dickson and Shen 2012). 
Tony Saich, using a purposive stratified survey of 3,967 respondents in China between 2003 and 
2005, finds that all categories of citizens in major urban areas are more satisfied with 
government than are those living in small towns, townships or villages, suggesting that 
urbanization may improve views of government and facilitate the expansion of social insurance 
and welfare provision to a wider range of the population (Saich 2008). Saich’s work also shows a 




Among village residents, satisfaction with the lowest levels of government increased from 37% 
in 2003 to 52% in 2005. Meanwhile, satisfaction with the central government declined slightly 
(Figure 6.5).  
Ethan Michelson, comparing two waves of individual-level survey data collected in 2002 
and 2010 from rural China, shows two trends in public opinion regarding social welfare and 
governance, which largely confirm Saich’s earlier finding. First, the rural stimulus programs—
including agricultural subsidies, the expansion of rural healthcare provisions, and a family 
allowance program—have improved rural residents’ perceptions of local government. Second, 
the rural stimulus programs, to which the central government injected four trillian yuan in 
response to the 2008 global economic crisis, has improved perceptions of township and village 
governments to a greater extent than they improved perceptions of the central government 
(Michelson 2011).  
Using a difference-in-differences analysis and data from a national survey conducted in 
2004 and 2009, respectively, Xiaobo Lu finds that on the contrary, a recent government 
education policy (abolition of the school fee for compulsory education) has enhanced citizens’ 
trust in China’s central government but has not improved opinions of local government, due 
primarily to state media bias in reporting the policy (Lu 2014).  
In these existing empirical studies of social policy and public opinion in China, scholars are 
more concerned about the sustainability of the co-optation strategy adopted by Chinese 
authoritarian leaders as a tool for ensuring regime stability, rather than on the differential impact 
of social policy on public support across different levels of government. Both Michelson and Lu 
contend that increasing social welfare provisions have mixed consequences on regime support. 




the government (despite asymmetrical trust at different levels of government, to be discussed 
later); in the long run, however, increased welfare provisions elevate the public’s expectation 
regarding government responsibility and widen the gap between public demands and the state’s 
responsiveness to those demands (Lu 2014, Michelson 2012). Given that the provision of public 
goods, including social welfare, in China is still largely decentralized to local states, many of 
whom have severe fiscal constraints and burdens, the inability to fund the expansion of social 
welfare benefits and to satisfy rising public expectations constitutes a potential threat to the 
legitimacy and prospects for survival of the Chinese authoritarian regime.   
In stark contrast to Saich’s and Michelson’s finding that public support for local 
government has increased from 2003 to 2005 and from 2002 to 2010, I find—using a new 
national panel survey, the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS)
96
—that assessments of local 
(county/district/city) government’s performance become increasingly negative from 2010 to 
2012 (Figure 6.6). In 2010, 66.87% of respondents agreed that the local government had made 
some or much achievement over the past year; over the subsequent two years, this number 
decreased to 56.75%. Moreover, in 2010, 30.82% of respondents stated that the local government 
had made little or no achievement over the past year, and this number increased to 40.4% in 
2012. A disaggregation of people’s assessments of local government performance by their health 
insurance situations suggests that the decrease in public support for local government is more 
substantial among those who receive no benefits from social health insurance (including people 
who join only private insurance programs or who have no health insurance at all). In 2010, 
64.51 % of people with no social health insurance held positive views of local government (i.e. 
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agreeing that the local government had made some or much achievement over the past year), a  
number that decreased by about 1/5 to 52.90% in 2012 (Figures 6.7 & 6.8). By contrast, 72.08% 
of those who enjoy the most generous social health insurance—from the free government 
medical care program or the Urban Employee Basic Health Insurance program—held positive 
views of local government (by the same definition as above) in 2010, and this number decreased 
by only about 1/8 to 62.40 % in 2012 (Figures 6.3 & 6.4). Despite the generally decreasing trend 
in the public’s assessment of local government between 2010 and 2012 according to the CFPS 
data, those receiving generous healthcare benefits not only demonstrate stronger support for local 
government than do their counterparts who receive less generous healthcare benefits, but they 
also maintain a relatively higher level of support in local government over time.  
Similar evidence can be found in another national survey project conducted in 2008: the 
China Survey.
97
 In the China Survey questionnaire, the degree of people’s satisfaction with 
government is quantified on a 10-point scale with “0” representing no satisfaction and “10” 
representing great satisfaction. The data indicates that a greater share of respondents who have 
social health insurance expressed satisfaction (6-10 on the satisfaction scale) with the county/city 
governments than did those who have no social health insurance, though the difference between 
these two groups is small at the highest level of satisfaction (Figures 6.9). Furthermore, the gap 
between people who have social health insurance and those who do not is more noticeable in 
terms of satisfaction with the village/community committee, which is often the direct distributor 
and provider of social welfare benefits (Figure 6.10). Similarly, a greater share of respondents 
who have social health insurance expressed “much trust” or “some trust” in government officials 
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(including central/provincial/county government officials) than did the respondents with no 
social health insurance (Figure 6.11). The evidence from these national public surveys supports 
the presumption that the expansion of social welfare benefits contributes to maintaining and even 
enhancing public support for local government under China’s decentralized governance system, 
despite the general decrease in public support for local government in recent years.   
Existing studies of Chinese public opinions have repeatedly shown that popular trust in the 
central government is exceedingly high and popular trust in local government exceedingly low 
(Shi 2001; Chen 2004; Li 2004). Comparing citizens’ assessment of different levels of 
government using the China Survey data (Figures 6.9, 6.10, and 6.12), I find that in 2008 about 
40% of respondents were very much satisfied with the central government and that satisfaction 
with the local governments (including city/county government and village/community 
committees) was only about 15%. In terms of the degree of people’s satisfaction with 
government, satisfaction with the central government is quite high and stable (the satisfaction 
score rising stably and rapidly from 5 to 10 on the 10-point scale), while satisfaction with the 
county/city government is moderate (the satisfaction score concentrated around the middle of the 
10-point scale) and satisfaction with the village/community committees is fluctuating (multiple 
peaks over the 10-point satisfaction scale). In terms of trust in government officials, 48.35% of 
respondents agreed that “they trust the central government officials very much” (Figure 6.13); in 
contrast, less than 20% of respondents agreed that “they trust the county government officials 
very much” (Figure 6.14). 
 The finding from this study and the work of others (O’Brien 1996; Li and O’Brien 1996; 
Bernstein and Lu 2000) demonstrates that Chinese citizens tend to “disaggregate the state” in 




satisfaction, trust, and support that respondents assign to different levels of government in public 
opinion surveys. This phenomenon has important implications for the stability and legitimacy of 
the Chinese authoritarian regime. In a study of Chinese contentious politics, Yongshun Cai 
contends that divided state power in a multilevel government structure helps China maintain 
stability despite numerous instances of social unrest (Cai 2008). In terms of social policy, the 
decentralization of public goods provision allows the central government to transfer the blame 
for governance issues to local governments to some extent; meanwhile, the central government 
claims credit for successful policies through biased state media or information dissemination 
even when the credit should be shared among various levels of government (Lu 2013).  
The fact that Chinese citizens demonstrate greater trust in and satisfaction with the upper-
level government compared to lower-levels of government indicates that the Chinese central 
government achieves its intended purpose of enhancing public support by expanding the 
decentralized provision of social welfare. Moreover, with enhanced public support, the central 
government gains authority and leeway to mediate between the public and the local states, thus 
offsetting the potential for direct state-society confrontation or conflict. It is commonly noted 
that Chinese citizens tend to petition the upper levels of government about local grievances (Cai 
2008; Li 2008). However, the asymmetric public support for different levels of government 
(regardless of the direction of asymmetry) popularly divides government authority and 
empowers some levels over others, which may undermine rather than strengthen the 
government’s legitimacy and unity, on which continued survival of the Chinese authoritarian 
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Figure 6.1 Citizens’ Preference for Redistribution 
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Figure 6.2 Citizens’ Preference for Redistribution 
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Figure 6.3 Citizens’ Preference for Inequality 
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Figure 6.4 Citizens’ Preference for Inequality 
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Figure 6.5 Citizens' Satisfaction with Different Levels of Government 




























Figure 6.6 Public Assessment of Local Government Performance 

























































Figure 6.7 Public Opinion of Local Government Performance by Beneficiaries of Health 
Insurance Program 
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Figure 6.8 Public Opinion of Local Government Performance by Beneficiaries of Health 
Insurance Program 


































Figure 6.9 Citizens’ Satisfaction with County/City Government 



























Figure 6.10 Citizens’ Satisfaction with Village/Community Committee 

























Figure 6.11 Citizens’ Trust of Government Officials 









































Figure 6.12 Citizens’ Satisfaction with Central Government 


























Figure 6.13 Citizens’ Trust of Central Government Officials 






























Figure 6.14 Citizens’ Trust of County Government Officials 
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